Through the current public enforcement powers, the Commission has the possibility to request information and perform inspections in order to collect such evidence that can prove an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. However, undertakings involved in cartels, that are willing to inform the Commission of the existence of such activity, should not be deterred from doing so by the high fines which they might face. Voluntary assistance from cartel participants is of great importance since cartels are secret and therefore by their very nature extremely difficult to detect and investigate without the cooperation of at least one of the participants. Immunity and reduction of fines for ‘whistle blowers’ has been considered justified with regard to the great reduction of cartels that follows. The EU has introduced the Leniency Notice, which aim is to fulfil these goals, and at the same time fulfil the overriding aims of competition law enforcement. The Leniency Notice has been considered necessary as a tool for the Commission to enforce competition law and has proven to be a great success. The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether it may be justified to modify and extend the Leniency Notice further by introducing Leniency Plus. Leniency Plus is a method with the primary objective to detect more cartels. It functions by rewarding cartel participants with additional lenient treatment for disclosing other cartels. Leniency Plus have to be able to fulfil the goals of effective public enforcement of competition law, and at the same time operate under the general principles of EU law, mainly the principles of proportionality, equal treatment, effectiveness and legal certainty. It will be argued that an introduction of Leniency Plus in the Leniency Notice should be welcomed, subject to certain further modifications for it to function in the EU, such as limitations in the number of undertakings eligible for immunity, increase the standard of evidence provided, or to complement it with a negative sanction to enforce disclosure.

KEY WORDS: leniency, hard-core cartel, whistleblowing, competition The EU/US Leniency policy is a thesis collecting and classifying huge amount of information and data from several legislations in relation to a relatively new phenomenon of leniency policy. Its additional value are not only commentaries on the de lege lata (currently existing) legislation, but mainly de lege ferandae presumptions emphasizing the trends which could be anticipated in the leniency policies in the future. Processing world data would not be in my capacities and therefore I decided to work with the most representative legislations - those of the European Union and of the United States, a minor insight is also given in case of Great Britain, Germany and France. The thesis helps the reader get familiar with the basic leniency concepts (terminology, principles, history) and subsequently starts explaining the core of the laws from the substantial as well as procedural point of view. Chapters enabling comparison of European and American law firstly set both legislative frameworks and then provide a comparative chapter at the end dealing with weaknesses and strengths of each program. The historical part deals with the circumstances which led to passing of the legislative predecessors of the current laws but also carefully...

The Commercial Times reported on 9th December, 2010 that EU imposed a fine of 26 billion on five TFT-LCD firms. Also it was covered that during the enforcement of Antitrust, Samsung was indemnified against punishment since it acted as an informer, while Chimei Innolux incurred the heaviest fine of £á0.3 billion. Samsung is not only playing the role of a supplier to TFT-LCD firms in Taiwan, it is also a competitor and an important customer of them. At the time when 911 terrorist attacks happened in USA, global economy had entered a deep recession. Taiwan¡¦s TFT-LCD industry formed an alliance with Samsung after experiencing a deficit for three consecutive quarters. However, when investigation of Anti-dumping was undergoing, Samsung betrayed its promises. By studying this incident, the co-opetition relationship between Samsung and the TFT-LCD industry in Taiwan was being explored. Besides, how and what the industry should learn from this lesson is reviewed from the application of co-opetition strategies as well as the viewpoint of Game Theory.

Smutná, J. Restricting business through prohibited agreements. Diploma thesis. Brno: Mendel University, 2020 The thesis deals with the issue of protection of competition. Particular at-tention is paid to prohibited agreements. In the first part of the thesis are defined the basic concept of competition. The second part describes practical examples. Based on the information obtained, recommendations are proposed and risks of prohibited agreements are identified.

The purpose of this study was to explore the causal relationship between purpose of appraisal and leniency in performance ratings. A model in which rater self-efficacy mediated the relationship between appraisal purpose and leniency was tested. In addition, behavioral recognition accuracy was hypothesized to affect rater leniency. In a laboratory setting, 109 undergraduate raters judged the videotaped performance of a graduate teaching assistant. Results of the study showed that (a) leniency was positively related to task-specific self-efficacy, and (b) behavioral recognition accuracy was positively related to general rating self-efficacy. A purpose of appraisal effect was not observed and the proposed mediational model was not supported. These results were discussed in relation to rater affect, accountability in performance ratings, and information processing. / Master of Science

Efficient enforcement of cartel law This thesis deals with the issue of effective enforcement of cartel law, focusing on the interaction between public and private enforcement. The aim of this thesis is to compare the enforcement systems of cartel law in Czech, European and American legal systems, in particular to compare the form and functioning of two key tools of public and private enforcement, i.e. the leniency program and the actions for damages, to analyse the interaction between them, reveal the main tension and finally to compare the solutions to this conflict that are offered by different legal systems. I am comparing the solutions offered by current legislation in the EU and the Czech Republic with the solutions of US antitrust law where both tools coexist and have been successfully operating for some time. On the basis of such comparison I will try to determine whether the current solution is effective or whether there exists a more suitable one. The thesis consists of three parts. The first part is divided into two chapters, where the first chapter defines the basic terminology that relates to the issue of antitrust law enforcement. Further it contains a description of relevant sources of law. The second chapter deals with various antitrust law enforcement models which operate within...

This thesis deals with a legal framework of leniency programme. The program provides imunity or fine reduction from government penalties to the first member of a cartel in exchange for cooperation. The aim of the thesis is to evaluate effectiveness and functioning of the Czech and European leniency program, effects in practice and current challenges the program is facing. In introduction thesis deals with general requirements for an effective leniency program, further with development of the program in the EU and the Czech Republic with focus on progress towards more efficient, transparent and attractive system and application practice of the Commission, and. Office for Protection of Competition. It briefly introduces the European Competition Network and Model Leniency programme. Another part deals with the private enforcement of competition law in context of the current case law concerning access to the file and protection of leniency materials.

Leniency Programmes have been introduced as a complementary measure in the enforcement of competition law in detecting cartels, on the basis that hard to find evidence will be provided by undertakings coming forward to confess, in exchange for immunity or reduction in fines. The advantages of leniency are deemed to be twofold, since evidence is thereby expected to be given voluntarily, and in turn it would save up the limited resources available to enforcement authorities, by reducing lengthy investigations in search of evidence. Therefore, the widely accepted view by regulators, economists, and lawyers alike is that leniency is by far the most effective method of detecting and deterring anticompetitive activities by undertakings. An 'undertaking' covers any entity engaged in an economic activity that offers goods or services in a given market. In the UK, Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 governs prohibitions that fall within the category of cartels of which price-fixing, market or customer sharing, agreements to restrict production or supply, and bid-rigging are the most serious 'hard-core cartels'. This study evaluates the efficacy of the Leniency Programme in the enforcement of competition law applied in respect of cartel infringements based on cases decided by the UK's principal enforcement authority. Chapter I cases decided and published over a twelve-year period, since the Competition Act 1998 came into force, have been analysed in order to evaluate whether the leniency programme has been an incentive for colluders to apply for leniency. The results indicate that very few leniency applications were submitted voluntarily before an investigation was begun by the enforcement authority. Moreover, the detection rate of Chapter I cases on average has been very low over the twelve-year period, less than 2 cases per year, excluding settlements. The research also shows that contrary to the accepted view that evidence relating to cartels is difficult to find, cartels studied in this thesis have left a trail of both electronic, and other evidence that the authorities were able to seize. Further, the leniency applicants were not always reliable witnesses, and despite leniency, the enforcement authorities had to conduct lengthy investigations, negating the cost saving assertion and taking resources away from ex officio interventions by the authorities. The conclusion drawn from this study is that rather than enhancing detection and deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour by undertakings, the leniency programme overlaps, and in effect, undermines the public enforcement of competition law in the UK.

The diploma thesis addresses the issue of the effect of the introduction of leniency program and its reforms on the European competition policy and above all of its effect on investigation of forbidden cartel agreements. Leniency program is currently one of the main tools being implemented in fighting cartels. It works by providing immunity to the first company that provides relevant proof of the cartels existence. This work has three main goals. Firstly it aims to analyse the effectiveness of the leniency program and its reforms when it comes to uncovering cartels. The second goal is to unveil the European Commissions strategy concerning granting leniency and its development over the time. The last goal is to provide a quality analysis of all three forms of leniency and their mutual comparison. This diploma thesis is divided into four chapters: two theoretical and two practical chapters. The first one explains the issue of cartel agreements, individual types of cartels, investigation and its methods and the principals of imposing fines. The analysis of the leniency program itself, its introduction in 1996 and the following reforms in 2002 and 2006 will be the main topics of the second chapter. The third chapter contains the analysis of all Commissions decisions against cartels from 1993 till April 2016. It contains data relating to the development of number of decisions, the amount of fines, the size of the cartels and the percentage of the leniency granted in this period. The forth and the last chapter will focus on a case study of the LCD cartel and on the basis of theoretical findings contained in the first two chapters it will uncover the principles of this particular cartel and the investigation procedures.

Self-ratings of work performance have been investigated by researchers for a number of years. Previous research has shown that self-ratings are often lenient, inaccurate, and lack convergence with other performance measures. However, self-ratings are less likely to produce a halo effect when compared to other performance appraisal measures. Further, it has been suggested that the inclusion of self-ratings may decrease an employee's defensiveness in the appraisal system. The current study investigated boundary conditions (Type A / B personality type, social comparison information, and public / private rating settings) that might facilitate more accurate, and less lenient self-ratings. Limited support was found for the research hypotheses. A number of theoretical and empirical explanations can be offered to interpret the findings. / Master of Science