This thesis aims to analyze the efficiency of the leniency programme. This programme is currently the most important cartel fighting instrument in EU and Czech Republic. The first section deals with cartel agreements and their impact in general. It also shows reasons for implementation of the leniency programme and other cartel fighting instruments. Second section concerns on general principles of leniency programme and its position within current system of law. The next two parts contains description and history of leniency program in EU and Czech Republic. They also analyze decisions of European Commission and Office for the Protection of Competition in Czech Republic. This analysis creates the most important part of this section. The last section aims at juridical institutes able to endanger efficient functiong of leniency programme in future and defines their relation to this programme.

Eftergift av konkurrensskadeavgift är, med sitt införande år 2002, ett förhållandevis nytt förfarande inom den svenska konkurrensrätten. Eftergiften kräver oftast en situation där kartellmedlemmar anger varandra och syftar således till att förhindra kartellverksamhet genom att skapa instabilitet inom kartellen. Dessutom underlättas de bevissvårigheter som ofta förknippas med dolda karteller. 　 Problematiken kring eftergift av konkurrensskadeavgift är oklarheterna kring möjligheten att neka eftergift för ett företag vars deltagande i kartellen har behäftats med synnerligen försvårande omständigheter. Sådana omständigheter kan anses vara återfall i kartellverksamhet, ledande roll inom kartellen eller påverkan på marknaden som lett till att företag utanför kartellen tvingats bort från marknaden. Detta ger således utrymme för en diskussion angående huruvida en situation där eftergift av konkurrensskadeavgift nekas ett företag kan uppkomma. Förutsatt att företaget i övrigt uppfyllt de kriterier som framgår av 3 kap. 12 § konkurrenslagen. 　 I fråga om bevissituationer kring kartellmål och de bevissvårigheter sådana förfarande ofta är behäftade med, finns det genom EU-rättspraxis riktlinjer för vilka beviskrav som ställs för att konkurrensskadeavgift ska kunna utdömas. Dessa beviskrav har uttryckts vara lägre än för brottmål och behöver således inte uppnå nivån "bortom allt rimligt tvivel". Däremot har inte någon lägre gräns för vilken nivå beviskraven bör uppnå, för att höga konkurrensskadeavgifter ska kunna utdömas, uttryckts. 　 Sammanfattningsvis finns det oklarheter förknippade med fall om eftergift och beviskrav, som skulle kunna leda till rättslig problematik, vilket kommer att analyseras närmare i denna uppsats.

This thesis aims to provide a legal framework concerning Leniency Program which is by far one of the most successful tools in detection and prosecution of criminal cartel conduct, which has been recently perceived as one of the most important and dangerous anticompetitive conduct. Under the current system, an applicant making a leniency application will apply to seek full immunity from sanctions. If full immunity is not available, the applicant can apply for a reduction of any fine levelled against it. The study examines the level of transparency, predictability and effectiveness in the Czech Republic, European Union and United States. Chapter three provides an overview of a historical aspect of a Leniency Program including case law and recent development in each of abovementioned jurisdiction. In order to take all aspects into account, an impact of this program on human rights and recidivism is also discussed in this paper. Final chapter contains a recent development concerning Antitrust Damages Actions and rules on disclosure of evidence on leniency.

The focal point of the dissertation is the term of cartel, which could be described as agreements distorting competition concluded by competitors on the horizontal level of the market, and, above all, legal instruments which are used in the process of detecting and punishing cartels. In particular, the dissertation thesis deals with three of possible instruments used in the enforcement process of cartels, i.e. with dawn rides (unannounced on-the-spot inspections/investigations carried out in business and non-business premises), sanctions and sanction policies and with the leniency programs. These instruments are generally thought to be the most important and most effective tools in the enforcement process of cartels and necessary precondition of efficiency of competition law itself. In accordance with the topic, the dissertation thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is concerned with theoretical and normative definitions of agreements distorting competition and cartels. The main purpose of this part is to provide basic characteristics of these terms and to describe them in a way which will create a basement for explanation of the three legal instruments, which form the focal point of the thesis. Second, fundamental part of the dissertation, deals with commentary to selected legal instruments, mentions already above. In particular it consists of three chapters, each one dealing with one of the instruments in question. In the final part of the dissertation are introduced conclusions and evaluations of the three legal instruments and also some proposals pro futuro.

Master of Science / Department of Psychology / Satoris S. Culbertson / Performance appraisals are an important component to any organization’s performance management system. They require supervisors to observe and retain information regarding employee performance. This study sought to investigate the effects of appraisal purpose in this process. This extension and replication of Williams, DeNisi, Meglino, and Cafferty’s (1986) lab study of appraisal purpose investigated whether designating an employee for a positive outcome results in lenient performance ratings and vice-versa for a negative designation. This outcome would indicate assimilation, whereby the designation acts as an anchor creating bias in the direction of the anchor. However, the negative and positive designations may both result in leniency, indicating a universal tendency toward leniency when memory for performance is limited. Furthermore, I investigated whether making a deservedness rating for each employee would result in less lenient or severe ratings, relative to the designation conditions. Finally, I investigated whether self-reported rater expertise would moderate the assimilation effect. A total of 108 undergraduate students from a large Midwestern university viewed confederates performing cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on a dummy and were instructed to observe performance in order to make a designation (positive or negative) or deservedness rating, or were given no instructions (control). They made an initial decision and were then asked to return two days later and rate each confederate’s performance again. Consistent with previous findings, raters making positive designations tended to give lenient ratings, relative to other conditions. Furthermore, as expected, those making negative designations gave relatively severe ratings. Finally, the results also partially supported my expectation that rater expertise in the performance domain moderates the biasing effects of appraisal purpose. Implications for practice and recommendations for future research are discussed.

Performance appraisal ratings provide the basis for numerous employment decisions, including retention, promotion, and salary increases. Thus, understanding the factors affecting the accuracy of these ratings is important to organizations and employees. Leniency, one rater error, is a tendency to assign higher ratings in appraisal than is warranted by actual performance. The proposed study examined how personality factors Agreeableness and Conscientiousness relate to rater leniency. The ability of narrower facets of personality to account for more variance in rater leniency than will the broad factors was also examined. The study used undergraduates' (n = 226) evaluations of instructor performance to test the study's hypotheses. In addition to personality variables, students' social desirability tendency and attitudes toward instructor were predicted to be related to rater leniency. Partial support for the study's hypotheses were found. The Agreeableness factor and three of the corresponding facets (Trust, Altruism and Tender-Mindedness) were positively related to rater leniency as predicted. The hypotheses that the Conscientiousness factor and three of the corresponding facets (Order, Dutifulness, and Deliberation) would be negatively related to rater leniency were not supported. In the current sample the single narrow facet Altruism accounted for more variance in rater leniency than the broad Agreeableness factor. While social desirability did not account for a significant amount of variance in rater leniency, attitude toward instructor was found to have a significant positive relationship accounting for the largest amount of variance in rater leniency.

The purpose of this study was to determine if leniency and halo error in student ratings could be reduced by training the student raters and by using a Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale (BARS) rather than a Likert scale. Two hypotheses were proposed. First, the ratings collected from the trained raters would contain less halo and leniency error than those collected from the untrained raters. Second, within the group of trained raters the BARS would contain less halo and leniency error than the Likert instrument.

The relationship between private and public enforcement of cartel law has been heavily discussed in the recent years, both in legal doctrine and political circles. The European Commission has come up with various initiatives in order to promote and support changes in the legal orders of the EU Member States, which would make the private enforcement of cartel law easier and more accessible, especially for consumers, but for other subjects impaired by the violation of competition rules as well. However, this effort needs to be balanced with the existing system of public enforcement, notably with the established and well-funcioning leniency programmes. A strenghtened "private pillar" must not cause any damage to the exisitng "public pillar". Can private enforcement be an efficient complement to the hitherto system (predominantly public), and if so, where are the limits of it? On one hand, the support of private enforcement could discourage cartelists to participate in the leniency programmes, because the possible economic benefits (exemption from fines) might not outweigh the losses (huge amounts paid on damages in connection with follow-on actions). On the other hand, it has been argued that private enforcement is deeply underdeveloped in the European Union and no ideas of the European Commission drawing...

Impact of the Leniency Program and the Institution of Settlement upon the Civil Enforcement of Competition Law Keywords: competition law, leniency program, private enforcement of competition law The purpose of this thesis is to assess the mutual interference between the private and public enforcement of competition law. In the public enforcement there is growing trend of using modern tools such as leniency programme or settlement decisions. These are based on the cooperation between competition authorities and undertakings. On the other hand such cooperation and very often disclosure of confidential information by undertakings may threaten their position in terms of potential civil law suits by consumers or business partners. It is often claimed that private and public enforcement are complementary but when it comes to these modern tools a clear conflict arises. The thesis consists of two following two chapters. First chapter describes the evolution of private enforcement of competition law within EU. From its underdeveloped beginnings ten years ago it started to attract attention. European Commission has recently published a proposal of a directive which should foster the private enforcement within EU. Second half of the first chapter describes the development of new modern tools within the public...

- cz Tato práce se zabývá analýzou antimonopolní politiky se zaměřením na kartelové dohody v Evropské unii. Cox·v model proporcionálních rizik je v rámci této práce použit pro predikci proměnných, které ovlivňují trvání a stabilitu kartel·. Tyto proměnné jsou rozděleny do následujících skupin. Velikost a vnitřní struk- tura kartelu, charakteristika účastník· kartelové dohody, ukazatele vnějšího prostředí na trhu, vnitřní kontrolní mechanismy a proměnné, určující účin- nost antimonopolní politiky. Pro účely této práce byl sestaven data set, který zahrnuje kartely soudně stíhané Evropskou komisí v období mezi lety 1990 a 2004. Tato práce navíc obsahuje přehled detekčních metod. Zahrnuje jak metody, které jsou v současnosti aktivně využívány Evropskou komisí za účelem detekce kartel·, tak i nové metody, tzv. screeningové metody trh·, které mohou do budoucna přispět k efektivnějšímu procesu detekce. Screeningové metody se zabývají zkoumáním reálných tržních proces· a hledají znaky koluzního chování. Součásti této práce je mimo jiné i analýza politiky shovívavosti a její dopad na životnost kartel· a na délku administrativních proces·. Očekávaným přínosem této práce je poskytnutí uceleného přehledu detekčních metod a proměnných, které ovlivňují životnost a stabilitu kartel·. 1