In my thesis I investigate the impact the conceptual domestication and material technical transformation of space and movement has had on the behaviour of the human organism and the way it relates to its environment. In doing so l will examine the formation and structure of three non-identical yet interrelated forms of human space; rational-geometrical space, lived space, and technologically mediated space, I combine a phenomenological approach, which allows for an analysis of the horizontal relation between embodied organism and environment, with an archaeological perspective that traces the genealogy of specific symbolic and technological formations viewed in their nexus with lived, embodied behaviour. I argue that both the process of the conceptual domestication of space, particulady in the form of what Husserl refers to as the tendency of rationalisation and technisation, as well as the concrete technological transformation of the spatial environment, come into being and develop in a comparable way, While both initially directly or indirectly presuppose the perceptual' and motor activity of the embodied human organism, their subsequent development is tendentiously characterised by a relative departure from the human body in lieu of an extra-somatic organisation and materialisation of sense and behaviour. The implications for the behaviour of the individual human organism are ambivalent. On the one hand, the increasing uncoupling of technology and conceptual systems from human embodiment, has allowed for a rapid development of the human's overall technical and symbolic capacities, The result is an expansive material and symbolic 'humanisation' (Leroi-Gourhan) of the organism's behavioural and geographical environment. On the other hand, the very same process entails a behavioural regression with regard to the human organism's sensorimotor activity. I argue, by way of the former, that this may entail a constriction of the human organism's cognitive and imaginative capacities, potentially threatening its individuality.

La philosophie biologique de la technique s'est progressivement constituée depuis un débat d'idées à la fois tributaire des questions du XIXe siècle et d'un fonds philosophique antique. Il en émerge une thèse sur l'action qui fait l'homme civilisé ainsi que sur les sources et attributs de sa mainmise sur le monde à travers les progrès de la technique et l'effet d'agrandissement qui peut en résulter pour le corps individuel et collectif. C'était un programme revendicatif, car il défendait le principe d'une nouvelle pratique de la philosophie et s'installait en position de juge et de substitut de la religion. Contre de tels enjeux, où se croisent originairement des influences allemandes, anglaises et françaises, la philosophie de la technique est entrée en résistance, au risque de perdre de vue plusieurs choses : le sens de sa légitimité philosophique naturelle ; celui de sa vocation à l'interdisciplinarité ; l'accès à un objet latent en elle, le champ définitionnel de l'homme et la question de l'image. reconnaître ce qu'elle est à partir de ce qu'elle fut, demande à la philosophie de la technique : un effort de remise à plat de l'étude des sources dont elle s'est officiellement dotée ; l'élargissement du cercle des autorités ; de se détourner du concordisme ; de résister par l'analyse au préjugé défavorable dont l'accable la critique du naturalisme. C'est à ce prix qu'elle pourra restaurer en elle le sens d'une transition qui devait l'éloigner sans rupture d'un évolutionnisme trop prégnant, tout en préservant son intérêt pour la question de l'homme. En France, une telle mutation se dessine à travers le triangle d'auteurs Bergson, Simondon, Leroi-Gourhan. / Biological philosophy of technics progressively developped rom a debate of ideas depending both on the 19th century's issues and on antique philosophical information holdings. What emerges is a thesis about actions that make a civilized man and about the origins and attributes of his control over the world through technical progress and the magnifying effect that arises as a result for individual or collective systems. it was a ground-breaking program as it was in favour of the principle of a new practice of philosophy and it portayed itself as a judge and a substitute for religion. The philosophy of technics started resisting such challenges which, originally were under German, English and French influence. By doing so it risked losing sight of several aspects : the meaning of its natural philosophical legitimity, that of its vocation for interdisciplinarity, the access to a latent potential inside it, Man's definitional field and the subject of image. Recognizing what the philosophy of technics is from what it used to be requires some conditions : an effort to clarify the study of its official sources, an enlargement of the circle of competent authorities, turning away from concordism, resisting, through analysis, the negative bias poured out over it by the criticism of naturalism. This is the cost at which the philosophy of technics will be able to retsore, in its bosom, a sense of a transition that should move it away, but not cut it from, a too prevalent evolutionism, as well as it should keep its interest for the subject of Man. In France, such a mutation can be observed in a trio of authors : Bergson, Simondon and Leroi-Gourhan.