No description available.

<p>Increasing energy needs globally have recently led to an interest in effectively bringing energy services in the trading system. Energy services were part of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, whose main achievement was the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The objective of the GATS is to achieve progressive liberalisation and reduction or elimination of trade barriers of all services sectors, including energy services. The GATS has made commendable progress in liberalising many service sectors, however it has not made meaningful progress with energy services. Furthermore though the SADC region engages in energy services trade through bilateral and regional agreements, a variety of&nbsp / barriers inhibit major successes from being achieved. Effective energy services trade and liberalisation has therefore proved problematic both at the multilateral, regional and bilateral level. This study, seeks to investigate why energy services liberalisation and trade at the multilateral, regional and bilateral level is problematic, with a particular focus on&nbsp / the SADC region.</p>

This doctoral thesis consists in three chapters investigating cross-country linkages in different samples of industrialized economies. The first chapter shows that the share of the investment cycle's variance due to common international factors has increased in the United States as well in large European countries. The second chapter estimates the impact of the liberalization and internationalization of the financial and banking sectors on real GDP growth comovements. Since the late 1970s, a common international factor has contribued to most economic growth in th EU countries, the United States, Canada and Japan. Among several financial, bank and monetary indicators, equity prices, followed by portofolio investment have been by far the main drivers of this factor. The removal of controls on domestic credit emerges as the only financial liberalization policy measure with a large and negative effect on common growth before 1995. The third chapter investigates the sources of real GDP's comovements between the founding member states of the euro area. Throughout EMU, real cyclical synchronization was robustly linked to disparities in term of fiscal policy and of total factor productivity gains. Cyclical synchronization was closely related to similarities in unit labour cost growth before 2007, but not after 2007 when long-term interest rate differentials became a major cause of cyclical divergence.

No description available.

<p>Increasing energy needs globally have recently led to an interest in effectively bringing energy services in the trading system. Energy services were part of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, whose main achievement was the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The objective of the GATS is to achieve progressive liberalisation and reduction or elimination of trade barriers of all services sectors, including energy services. The GATS has made commendable progress in liberalising many service sectors, however it has not made meaningful progress with energy services. Furthermore though the SADC region engages in energy services trade through bilateral and regional agreements, a variety of&nbsp / barriers inhibit major successes from being achieved. Effective energy services trade and liberalisation has therefore proved problematic both at the multilateral, regional and bilateral level. This study, seeks to investigate why energy services liberalisation and trade at the multilateral, regional and bilateral level is problematic, with a particular focus on&nbsp / the SADC region.</p>

La sécurité alimentaire définie comme l'accès à tous à une nourriture saine et suffisante, comporte quatre dimensions : les disponibilités, l'accessibilité, l'utilisation et la stabilité. Soumis à l'ajustement structurel depuis la fin des années 1980, les pays en développement (PED) ont procédé à une libéralisation agricole et à une ouverture commerciale, tandis que les pays développés maintiennent leur protectionnisme agricole. Le premier objectif de la thèse est d'analyser les méfaits d'une libéralisation agricole mal menée et inadaptée à travers les bilans des réformes agricoles au Sénégal et de la crise alimentaire de 2008. Les causes profondes de cette crise sont la financiarisation des marchés agricoles, leur dérégulation, et l'inefficacité des politiques agricoles et alimentaires dans les PED. La sécurité alimentaire est un but affiché par tous les pays mais faudrait-il être en mesure de la quantifier? Notre seconde ambition est de construire un indice synthétique de sécurité alimentaire grâce à une analyse en composante principale sur un échantillon de 125 pays en 2005 et 2009. Le résultat principal est que le score des pays développés s'est amélioré durant cette période, alors que celui des pays à faible revenu et à déficit vivrier s'est dégradé. Ainsi, les inégalités alimentaires entre les pays développés et ceux pauvres se sont accrues. Une classification hiérarchique ascendante par la méthode de Ward a permis de distinguer quatre situations alimentaires : la satiété, la sécurité, l'équilibre, et l'insécurité alimentaire. Elle a montré que la dépendance aux importations et les prix alimentaires avaient plus d'impact sur l'insécurité alimentaire que les revenus.

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

Submitted by Alberto Vieira (martins_vieira@ibest.com.br) on 2017-08-15T16:59:06Z No. of bitstreams: 1 594971.pdf: 13952880 bytes, checksum: d2fa17872f6351421e6ce1d07fcccc16 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-15T16:59:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 594971.pdf: 13952880 bytes, checksum: d2fa17872f6351421e6ce1d07fcccc16 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2002-11 / Analisa os impactos sobre o crescimento econômico e o perfil distributivo na economia brasileira nos anos 90, após a implementação de uma estratégia neoliberal de desenvolvimento ao longo dessa década. Em termos específicos, objetiva-se mostrar que a abertura comercial e a liberalização financeira externa provocaram o aumento da fragilidade financeira e da vulnerabilidade da economia do país, definindo uma restrição externa ao crescimento ao longo do período, e uma maior suscetibilidade à ocorrência de crises de balanço de pagamentos. Em segundo lugar, o trabalho procura testar a hipótese convencional, segundo a qual a abertura externa tenderia a melhorar o perfil distributivo do país, observando indicadores tradicionais de concentração de renda, mas também os impactos da abertura sobre a distribuição funcional da renda, a estrutura do mercado de trabalho e a concentração de riqueza no país. / Analyse how the neoliberal policies implemented in Brazil during the 90's affected the country's economic growth and income distribution. More specifically, it will be discussed how trade and financial liberalization caused an increasing financial fragility and economic vulnerability in Brazil, posing an external constraint to economic growth during the last decade and increasing the probability of balance of payment crisis. The conventional hypothesis, which states that liberalization would reduce income inequality, will also be tested. This will be done by observing the usual indicators that reflect income distribution and also indexes that reflect changes in the functional distribution of income, in labor market structure and in wealth distribution in Brazil during the 90's.