Com publicação de O Conceito de Direito, de Herbert Hart, introduziuse na teoria do direito toda uma gama de novos problemas que, a partir da segunda metade do século XX, tornaram-se o centro dos debates da filosofia jurídica, marcadamente para o positivismo jurídico. A questão do método aparece como particularmente especial nesse conjunto de problemas. As teses centrais de O Conceito de Direito dependem diretamente de teses correlatas sobre a possibilidade de uma teoria descritiva do direito que leve em consideração a perspectiva interna dos participantes de um sistema jurídico. A forma como Hart estrutura essa teoria apresenta certa peculiaridade. Diferentemente dos autores da tradição positivista, Hart não se vale de uma concepção de ciência ou métodos científicos para o desenvolvimento da teoria. Não se trata de importar métodos para obter avanços. Pelo contrário, Hart vai defender a ideia de que para se obter uma melhor compreensão teórica do direito precisamos, ao desenvolver a teoria, atender às características do objeto. Significa dizer que, para sabermos o tipo de método que vamos utilizar na teoria do direito, precisamos saber antes exatamente quais características o objeto tem, para então moldarmos um método adequado a estas características. / With the publication of Herbert Hart’s “The Concept of Law”, a whole new range of problems were introduced in legal theory and they became the core of debates in legal philosophy from the second half of the 20th century, especially for legal positivism. The issue of method is relevant within this set of problems. The central theses of “The concept of Law” rely directly on corresponding theses about the possibility of a descriptive legal theory that takes into account the internal perspective of the participants of a legal system. The way Hart structures this theory is unique because, differently from other authors within a positivist tradition, he does not use a concept of science or scientific methods in order to develop the theory. The question is not about importing methods so as to obtain advances. In contrast, Hart advocates that, to obtain a better theoretical comprehension of the law, we need to meet the specifications of the object while developing the theory. In other words, in order to know which type of method will be used in law theory, it is necessary to know in advance the exact features of the object, so as to format a method that is adequate for those characteristics.

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:48:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000410180-Texto+Parcial-0.pdf: 121592 bytes, checksum: e01ba0b7d2f79219d78c679fefe63ff8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / This work addresses some of the most important issues about judicial discretionary powers. Positivist perspectives are reviewed and it is suggested methods to surpass its doctrine, whose teachings have not been adequate enough to explain a plausible interpretation of Law. It is defended that the act of enforcing the law is unique and demands interpretation, comprehension and application of Law. Therefore, it is argued in this research that hermeneutical philosophy approach (GADAMER) is essential because the linguistic turning point has ceased traditional separation of subject and object, and it is understood that well-founded interpretation shall be present when both elements are put together. These issues have been framed from the debates between the law philosophers Herbert Hart and Ronald Dworkin. According to Herbert Hart, a soft positivist, it is allowed, in hard cases (based on problems of uncertainty about rights), to enforce rules in different manners, and the judge may use his creative power when facing the open texture of the rules. On the other hand, Ronald Dworkin denies discretionary powers to judges because they must give “the right answer” in all cases grounded on pre-existing moral principals. It is sustained in this research that the “right answer approach” (DWORKIN) is not compatible with democratic values in a constitutionally pluralistic community, and in every case the adjudicator must reach the “best answer” (JUAREZ FREITAS) among all possibilities. / Nesta dissertação questionamos alguns dos aspectos mais importantes da teoria da discricionariedade judicial. Criticamos e propomos a superação das posturas positivistas, as quais não se mostram adequadas para bem explicar o fenômeno da interpretação do direito. A idéia central é a defesa de que o ato aplicativo do direito é único e implica a interpretação, a compreensão e a aplicação do direito. Propomos, assim, que a abordagem da hermenêutica filosófica (GADAMER) é fundamental, pois a viragem lingüística rompeu com a tradicional separação entre o sujeito e o objeto, e se passou a entender que a boa interpretação somente ocorre na devida união entre ambos. A partir das discussões travadas pelos jusfilósofos Herbert Hart e Ronald Dworkin traçamos os contornos desta questão. Para Hart, um positivista brando, frente aos casos difíceis (baseados nos problemas da incerteza do direito), permite-se que as regras sejam aplicadas de diversas maneiras, e frente à textura aberta das regras o juiz irá dispor de seu poder de criação do direito. Por outro lado, Ronald Dworkin nega que o juiz tenha poder discricionário, pois em todo e qualquer caso tem a responsabilidade de encontrar a “resposta correta”, baseado nos princípios morais pré-existentes à decisão judicial. Defende-se, ao final, que a “única resposta correta” (DWORKIN) não corresponde aos ideais democráticos de uma sociedade constitucionalmente pluralista, e em todo caso o juiz deve procurar a “melhor resposta” (JUAREZ FREITAS) entre as possibilidades que estão à sua disposição.

Com publicação de O Conceito de Direito, de Herbert Hart, introduziuse na teoria do direito toda uma gama de novos problemas que, a partir da segunda metade do século XX, tornaram-se o centro dos debates da filosofia jurídica, marcadamente para o positivismo jurídico. A questão do método aparece como particularmente especial nesse conjunto de problemas. As teses centrais de O Conceito de Direito dependem diretamente de teses correlatas sobre a possibilidade de uma teoria descritiva do direito que leve em consideração a perspectiva interna dos participantes de um sistema jurídico. A forma como Hart estrutura essa teoria apresenta certa peculiaridade. Diferentemente dos autores da tradição positivista, Hart não se vale de uma concepção de ciência ou métodos científicos para o desenvolvimento da teoria. Não se trata de importar métodos para obter avanços. Pelo contrário, Hart vai defender a ideia de que para se obter uma melhor compreensão teórica do direito precisamos, ao desenvolver a teoria, atender às características do objeto. Significa dizer que, para sabermos o tipo de método que vamos utilizar na teoria do direito, precisamos saber antes exatamente quais características o objeto tem, para então moldarmos um método adequado a estas características. / With the publication of Herbert Hart’s “The Concept of Law”, a whole new range of problems were introduced in legal theory and they became the core of debates in legal philosophy from the second half of the 20th century, especially for legal positivism. The issue of method is relevant within this set of problems. The central theses of “The concept of Law” rely directly on corresponding theses about the possibility of a descriptive legal theory that takes into account the internal perspective of the participants of a legal system. The way Hart structures this theory is unique because, differently from other authors within a positivist tradition, he does not use a concept of science or scientific methods in order to develop the theory. The question is not about importing methods so as to obtain advances. In contrast, Hart advocates that, to obtain a better theoretical comprehension of the law, we need to meet the specifications of the object while developing the theory. In other words, in order to know which type of method will be used in law theory, it is necessary to know in advance the exact features of the object, so as to format a method that is adequate for those characteristics.

Com publicação de O Conceito de Direito, de Herbert Hart, introduziuse na teoria do direito toda uma gama de novos problemas que, a partir da segunda metade do século XX, tornaram-se o centro dos debates da filosofia jurídica, marcadamente para o positivismo jurídico. A questão do método aparece como particularmente especial nesse conjunto de problemas. As teses centrais de O Conceito de Direito dependem diretamente de teses correlatas sobre a possibilidade de uma teoria descritiva do direito que leve em consideração a perspectiva interna dos participantes de um sistema jurídico. A forma como Hart estrutura essa teoria apresenta certa peculiaridade. Diferentemente dos autores da tradição positivista, Hart não se vale de uma concepção de ciência ou métodos científicos para o desenvolvimento da teoria. Não se trata de importar métodos para obter avanços. Pelo contrário, Hart vai defender a ideia de que para se obter uma melhor compreensão teórica do direito precisamos, ao desenvolver a teoria, atender às características do objeto. Significa dizer que, para sabermos o tipo de método que vamos utilizar na teoria do direito, precisamos saber antes exatamente quais características o objeto tem, para então moldarmos um método adequado a estas características. / With the publication of Herbert Hart’s “The Concept of Law”, a whole new range of problems were introduced in legal theory and they became the core of debates in legal philosophy from the second half of the 20th century, especially for legal positivism. The issue of method is relevant within this set of problems. The central theses of “The concept of Law” rely directly on corresponding theses about the possibility of a descriptive legal theory that takes into account the internal perspective of the participants of a legal system. The way Hart structures this theory is unique because, differently from other authors within a positivist tradition, he does not use a concept of science or scientific methods in order to develop the theory. The question is not about importing methods so as to obtain advances. In contrast, Hart advocates that, to obtain a better theoretical comprehension of the law, we need to meet the specifications of the object while developing the theory. In other words, in order to know which type of method will be used in law theory, it is necessary to know in advance the exact features of the object, so as to format a method that is adequate for those characteristics.

This essay analyses Lionel Shriver’s We Need to Talk about Kevin (2003) from a feminist perspective. The objective of the essay is to demonstrate that a feminist reading of We Need to Talk about Kevin sheds light on the concept of shame and generates a discussion on the implications of the expectations that are placed upon a woman when she becomes a mother. The essay draws on the work of cultural feminists, such as Elspeth Probyn and Adrienne Rich, to demonstrate how shame and motherhood are entwined in the novel. This approach illuminates how patriarchal patterns in today’s society can restrict women’s abilities to lead a full life by blaming and by making them feel ashamed of not only their own actions but also of those of their children. The concept of shame is outlined as a gendered emotion, and the essay then examines the novel’s description of a mother’s responsibilities. These are then contrasted with the way in which shame functions for the community. The conclusion of the essay is that patriarchal structures are ever present in the novel and in society as a whole, and the location of shame in the mother, brought on by other members of the community as well as by the protagonist herself, results in the community being unable to heal itself.

This dissertation examines the five biographies or memoirs written about the renowned South African writer Herman Charles Bosman. The main aim of the study is to show how different, and often contradictory, the views of him are as presented in the biographies. I also investigate different theories of biography as expounded by Leon Edel, Ira Bruce Nadel and Ray Monk and explore to what extent each of the biographies conforms, or does not conform to the theory. It is the contention of this dissertation that though the existing theories are useful and do shed light on each biographer’s approach and practice, they are also limited in accounting fully for the diverse and often discrepant accounts of Bosman’s life. The dissertation opens with an explication of several different theories regarding biography, and gives a brief overview of the life story of Herman Charles Bosman. Some of the main elements of biography (including different forms of narration, language and myth) are discussed and how they might be used in biography. The subsequent chapters focus on and offers detailed analyses of the biographies of Bosman, beginning with Herman Bosman As I Knew Him by Bernard Sachs and My Friend Herman Charles Bosman by Aegidius Jean Blignaut. Thereafter Sunflower to the Sun by Valerie Rosenberg and Life Sentence by Stephen Gray are analysed. Finally, there is an analysis of several reminiscences of those who knew Bosman, including Lionel Abrahams’s important memoir. The strengths and limitations of the various biographies are analysed, thereby shedding light not only on the practice of biography itself, but also on the complex and enigmatic figure of Herman Charles Bosman. / Dissertation (MSc)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / English / MA (English Studies) / Unrestricted

Ce qui suit est une étude traitant de l'importance de l'image du chef par rapport au nationalisme selon Lionel Groulx. Celle-ci analyse la constante recherche de Groulx pour un chef; les qualités que le chef doit posséder; ainsi que le rôle et les implications de celui qui assume ces fonctions. Cette étude démontrera que, pour Lionel Groulx, un chef doit posséder à la fois des qualités de leader national et de prophète, dans le sens religieux du terme. En fait, c'est l'image qui prend le dessus sur la personne physique. Cette analyse présente le chef selon Groulx tel un mythe fâcheux - une image qui peut forger la conscience et les actions d'un peuple. Donc, le véritable chef n'est pas nécessairement le précurseur d'un nouvel état politique, mais plutôt d'un nouvel état moral. / The following is a study of the image of the chef in the nationalism of Lionel Groulx. It examines Groulx's unending search for a chef : those qualities that distinguishes a chef ; and the role and implications of a chef. This study will show that while Groulx's chef is at once a national leader and a prophet, in the religious sense, he is less a person than an image. In this study Groulx's chef is understood as a sorelian myth -- an image that could shape the consciousness and actions of a people, and therefore, is seen less as tolling the bells for a new political state, than for a new state of moral existence. / Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2013

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T14:33:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 410180.pdf: 121592 bytes, checksum: e01ba0b7d2f79219d78c679fefe63ff8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-01-12 / Nesta disserta??o questionamos alguns dos aspectos mais importantes da teoria da discricionariedade judicial. Criticamos e propomos a supera??o das posturas positivistas, as quais n?o se mostram adequadas para bem explicar o fen?meno da interpreta??o do direito. A id?ia central ? a defesa de que o ato aplicativo do direito ? ?nico e implica a interpreta??o, a compreens?o e a aplica??o do direito. Propomos, assim, que a abordagem da hermen?utica filos?fica (GADAMER) ? fundamental, pois a viragem ling??stica rompeu com a tradicional separa??o entre o sujeito e o objeto, e se passou a entender que a boa interpreta??o somente ocorre na devida uni?o entre ambos. A partir das discuss?es travadas pelos jusfil?sofos Herbert Hart e Ronald Dworkin tra?amos os contornos desta quest?o. Para Hart, um positivista brando, frente aos casos dif?ceis (baseados nos problemas da incerteza do direito), permite-se que as regras sejam aplicadas de diversas maneiras, e frente ? textura aberta das regras o juiz ir? dispor de seu poder de cria??o do direito. Por outro lado, Ronald Dworkin nega que o juiz tenha poder discricion?rio, pois em todo e qualquer caso tem a responsabilidade de encontrar a resposta correta, baseado nos princ?pios morais pr?-existentes ? decis?o judicial. Defende-se, ao final, que a ?nica resposta correta (DWORKIN) n?o corresponde aos ideais democr?ticos de uma sociedade constitucionalmente pluralista, e em todo caso o juiz deve procurar a melhor resposta (JUAREZ FREITAS) entre as possibilidades que est?o ? sua disposi??o.

Cette étude vise à déterminer dans quelle mesure des causes antérieures à la Révolution tranquille expliquent la nouvelle organisation sociale du Canada français, contrairement à l’idée selon laquelle les années soixante inaugurent une rupture identitaire amenant les Canadiens français à l’extérieur du Québec à ne plus se considérer comme issus d’une nation canadienne-française commune. Durant le première moitié du XXe siècle, plusieurs événements perturbateurs complexifient l’histoire des relations entre ces groupes minoritaires et ceux qu’elle perçoit comme les Autres : la majorité anglo-canadienne et les Canadiens français du Québec en situation majoritaire. Les crises scolaires en Ontario (1912), au Manitoba (1916) et en Saskatchewan (1931), ainsi que les crises de la conscription (1917 et 1944), ont chacune une incidence non seulement sur les rapports réels entre les minorités et les groupes majoritaires concernés, mais aussi sur les représentations qu’ils en ont dans la presse canadienne. Le dépouillement de quelques journaux des minorités canadiennes-françaises (Le Droit, Le Patriote de l’Ouest, La Liberté, La Survivance) publiés durant les crises provinciales ou nationales envisagées nous permettra de vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle elles contribuent, sous les formes qu’elles prennent dans la presse en tant que « moments discursifs » (Moirand), à préparer la rupture du Canada français de 1912 à 1944. Après avoir mis en évidence le contenu et les différentes formes du discours journalistique sur les relations entre les minorités canadiennes-françaises et les autres Canadiens, nous analyserons les discours relatifs à l’enfance (discours sur le parentage, les conditions d’hygiène, les mauvaises fréquentations, etc.) et ceux spécialement écrits à l’intention de la jeunesse canadienne-française. Ils nous aideront à suivre l’évolution de la littérature pour la jeunesse dans la presse, d’observer ce qu’elle tire des autres discours qui y circulent, comment elle conçoit sa fonction, souvent idéologique, dans la société, et la manière dont elle contribue au glissement identitaire qui s’opère graduellement jusqu’aux années soixante.

Cette étude vise à déterminer dans quelle mesure des causes antérieures à la Révolution tranquille expliquent la nouvelle organisation sociale du Canada français, contrairement à l’idée selon laquelle les années soixante inaugurent une rupture identitaire amenant les Canadiens français à l’extérieur du Québec à ne plus se considérer comme issus d’une nation canadienne-française commune. Durant le première moitié du XXe siècle, plusieurs événements perturbateurs complexifient l’histoire des relations entre ces groupes minoritaires et ceux qu’elle perçoit comme les Autres : la majorité anglo-canadienne et les Canadiens français du Québec en situation majoritaire. Les crises scolaires en Ontario (1912), au Manitoba (1916) et en Saskatchewan (1931), ainsi que les crises de la conscription (1917 et 1944), ont chacune une incidence non seulement sur les rapports réels entre les minorités et les groupes majoritaires concernés, mais aussi sur les représentations qu’ils en ont dans la presse canadienne. Le dépouillement de quelques journaux des minorités canadiennes-françaises (Le Droit, Le Patriote de l’Ouest, La Liberté, La Survivance) publiés durant les crises provinciales ou nationales envisagées nous permettra de vérifier l’hypothèse selon laquelle elles contribuent, sous les formes qu’elles prennent dans la presse en tant que « moments discursifs » (Moirand), à préparer la rupture du Canada français de 1912 à 1944. Après avoir mis en évidence le contenu et les différentes formes du discours journalistique sur les relations entre les minorités canadiennes-françaises et les autres Canadiens, nous analyserons les discours relatifs à l’enfance (discours sur le parentage, les conditions d’hygiène, les mauvaises fréquentations, etc.) et ceux spécialement écrits à l’intention de la jeunesse canadienne-française. Ils nous aideront à suivre l’évolution de la littérature pour la jeunesse dans la presse, d’observer ce qu’elle tire des autres discours qui y circulent, comment elle conçoit sa fonction, souvent idéologique, dans la société, et la manière dont elle contribue au glissement identitaire qui s’opère graduellement jusqu’aux années soixante.