This thesis aims to understand the role of interest rate setting behavior of the banks for the transmission of technology, monetary policy and loan rate shocks into the real economy. To this end, we introduce a monopolistically competitive banking sector into a New Keynesian model. Here, each bank can change its loan rate only infrequently in the fashion of Calvo type staggered contract. This setting implies that the adjustment of the aggregate loan rate is sticky, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The results show that having sticky adjustment in the loan market changes the dynamics of the model significantly. Following each shock, the sluggish adjustment of the loan rate affects the amount of loan used by the borrowers considerably. This is the main reason behind the differentials across the impulse responses of the model with sticky loan rate and flexible loan rate.

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the role of the wholesale funding in the modern credit intermediation process and to estimate the possible impact of pro- posed regulation of the wholesale funding on lending activity of a bank or its risk profile. Throughout the analysis we used data set of 132-1167 banks from the European Union (number of banks depends on the hypotheses tested) during the period 2006-2012. We found that the banks that are more exposed to the whole- sale funding are able to increase their lending relatively more in comparison to the less exposed banks; this advantage is wiped out during the times of liquidity or collateral crunch. Results of defined simultaneous equation model suggest that stricter eligibility criteria, higher margins and introduction of 100% threshold for the Net Stable Funding Ratio will significantly decrease the wholesale funding ra- tio and thus limit the supply of loans. We consider those results alarming since the majority of European enterprises is financed by the financial intermediaries, not on the capital market and therefore additional limitation of the wholesale funding activities could negatively influence the overall economic activity within the Euro- pean Union. We discovered that the commercial banks tent to transfer the costs of the wholesale...

隨著赤道原則概念的推行，銀行的授信決策中，逐漸考量公司的環境、社會、公司治理等面向的表現，顯示企業社會責任表現已成為銀行風險評估的因素之一。因此，本研究以信用風險評等與銀行借款利率作為企業風險之代理變數，探討企業社會責任表現是否會影響信評機構與銀行對公司之預期風險。 在控制財務特性及公司治理變數下，本研究實證結果顯示：（1）企業社會責任負面表現（環保與安全、資訊公告、其他違法與違規及綜合指標面向）與信用風險評等呈正向關係；（2）企業社會責任負面表現（其他違法與違規面向）與銀行借款利率呈正向關係；（3）額外之測試顯示，長期借款利率較短期借款利率更能反映企業社會責任對利率的影響。綜合上述分析結果，信評機構及銀行皆會將企業社會責任負面表現視為風險因子，提升公司信用風險評等及借款利率，使得公司的融資門檻提高。 / With the promotion of the Equator Principles, environmental, social and governance performance of the business is becoming considerations for bank loan decisions. It shows that corporate social responsibility has been one of the factors for risk considerations. Therefore, our study uses credit rating as well as loan rates as proxies for business risk to investigate whether the CSR performance affects the risk anticipation of banks and credit rating agencies. After controlling firm-specific and corporate governance factors, we find that: (1) A significantly positive association exits between CSR negative performance (environmental protection and safety, information announcement, other violations and the whole) and credit rating; (2) A significantly positive association also exits between CSR negative performance (other violations) and loan rates; (3) the analysis of additional tests indicates that CSR negative performance has greater effect on long-term loan rates than on short-term rates. To sum up, the CSR negative performance is one of the risk factors for banks and credit rating agencies to increase the credit rating and loan rates, simultaneously raising the financing threshold for the business.