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Ce mémoire a pour objectif de présenter le rôle des idées dans la connaissance singulière chez John Locke. Les « idées » constituent la pierre angulaire de la théorie de la connaissance chez Locke. Selon lui, la connaissance est la « perception d'une liaison » de concordance ou de discordance entre les idées. L'idée est, pour lui, le matériau de notre connaissance. Le rôle des idées dans la connaissance singulière est de nous représenter les existants réels. Les idées singulières sont reçues et perçues par l'esprit pour former des propositions singulières. La perception de la liaison de concordance ou de discordance entre les idées constitue la connaissance singulière ou la connaissance générale. Dès lors le rôle des idées consiste à faire connaître les êtres qui existent, à établir une correspondance entre le sujet connaissant et la réalité extérieure. L'idée en tant que fondement épistémologique est le principe de toute connaissance et, précisément, de la connaissance singulière. Nous utiliserons la principale oeuvre de Locke, à savoir l'Essai sur l'entendement humain, pour réaliser cette étude. Il s'agit donc de réexaminer la pensée de Locke en épistémologie en reconstruisant les concepts du corpus de sa théorie de la connaissance sous l'angle spécifique du rôle que jouent les idées dans la connaissance singulière. Pour réaliser cette étude, nous procéderons à une analyse systématique en exposant d'abord, dans une première partie, le cadre conceptuel de la théorie lockienne des idées, puis, dans une seconde partie, nous montrerons en quoi celles-ci consistent dans la connaissance singulière. Dans la première partie du mémoire, nous présentons, la conception lockienne des idées en montrant leur origine sensible. Pour montrer le caractère sensible des idées, nous utilisons particulièrement le livre 2 de l'Essai sur l'Entendement humain. Dans le chapitre 1, nous présentons les deux sources de la connaissance. Nous discutons, ensuite, dans le chapitre 2, la cause des idées tout en nous attachant à montrer que les idées sont causées par les pouvoirs des objets extérieurs que Locke appelle qualités. Et, dans le chapitre 3, nous analysons les opérations de l'esprit en montrant le rôle des idées en général. Après l'analyse de la théorie des idées, nous essayons de montrer comment les idées se déterminent en connaissance, dans la connaissance singulière, ce qui constitue l'objet des chapitres de la seconde partie. Le livre 4 de L'Essai sur l'entendement humain est ici notre référence principale. Dans notre chapitre 4, nous tentons de définir la connaissance singulière. Dans le chapitre 5, nous analysons la connaissance de l'existence des êtres réels en montrant le rapport des idées aux choses existantes et la certitude. Ensuite, dans le chapitre 6, nous examinons les limites de la connaissance singulière liées à l'impossibilité de connaître la substance. Et, enfin, dans le chapitre 7, nous pouvons avancer ce qui nous apparaît être la position sceptique de Locke en épistémologie. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Philosophie, Épistémologie, Connaissance, Idée, Existence, Êtres réels, Locke.

This thesis attempts to describe the similarities and the differences between Boyle's position and Locke's on the primary and secondary quality distinction. / It is in the Corpuscular Hypothesis that Boyle draws the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. Locke not only accepts the Corpuscular Hypothesis but also presents some arguments to support it. / Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 respectively examine the differences in the positions of Boyle and Locke on primary and secondary qualities, in their lists of primary qualities, the terminologies they employ, and the scopes of their discussions. Little attention has previously been paid to these differences. / Chapter 3 discusses the essence of the primary/secondary quality distinction. My point is that the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is really a distinction between two kinds of powers for both Boyle and Locke.

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Orientador: Yara Adario Frateschi / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-14T10:17:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TrainFilho_Sergio_M.pdf: 640177 bytes, checksum: cac1731be3b5dc843337a1641824fd95 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009 / Resumo: Este trabalho visa à compreensão da cidadania em John Locke. Através da análise do estado de natureza, da teoria da propriedade e do estabelecimento das condições que levam os homens à elaboração do pacto formador da sociedade civil, busco compreender os argumentos da filosofia política de Locke sob os quais estariam estabelecidas duas leituras distintas a respeito da cidadania. Uma leitura tem por base a igualdade de poder político no estado de natureza e sua manutenção quando do estabelecimento da sociedade civil, o que acarretaria a isonomia de direitos e deveres dos cidadãos. Enquanto a outra entende que há uma diferenciação de direitos políticos entre os homens. Esta diferenciação teria por fundamento elementos de ordens distintas, como a manutenção de interesses político-econômicos e o uso diferenciado da razão, pensada no âmbito da moral teológica lockeana. A verificação de que ambas as leituras encontram respaldo na obra do filósofo suscita a ocorrência de ambigüidades que envolvem não apenas o seu pensamento político, mas também o de seus intérpretes. Para compreender essa ambiguidade, utilizo uma contextualização de autor e obra que permite dizer que há a diferenciação da cidadania, mas que ela é decorrente de um difícil projeto político de estabilização social que requer abordagens ambíguas. A idéia central dessa dissertação é, tendo por base a cidadania, estabelecer um ponto de partida para a compreensão das ambiguidades no pensamento de Locke. Um filósofo ao qual é possível atribuir ao mesmo tempo um caráter humanista cívico e individualista possessivo. / Abstract: The present work aims to understand citizenship in John Locke. Through the analysis of state of nature, property theory and the establishment of the conditions that take the men to the elaboration of compact of the civil society, we want to understand the arguments of the political philosophy of Locke under two distinct readings regarding citizenship. One reading has the base of equality of political power in estate of nature and its maintenance when the establishment of civil society would cause the isonomy of rights and duties of the citizens. However, the other understands that there is differentiation of political rights between the men. This differentiation would be based on distinct elements of orders, such as the maintenance of economic-political interests and the differentiated use of reason, thought on lockean theological moral scope. Both readings find endorsement in the philosopher work who excite the occurrence of ambiguities which involves not only its political thought but also its interprets. To understand this ambiguity, we use a contextualization of the author and work that allows saying that there is the differentiation of the citizenship, but that it is occurs from a difficult political project of social stabilization which require ambiguous approach. The main idea of this dissertation is, considering citizenship, to establish a starting point in order to understand the ambiguities on Locke's political thought. A philosopher that is possible to attribute, in the same time, a character civic humanist and possessive individualism. / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestre em Filosofia

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This thesis attempts a critical analysis of modern individualism through an examination of its origins in the seventeenth century. In this thesis I discuss the notion of autonomous and self-responsible individuality as a culturally constructed and culturally specific idea. Furthermore, I describe autonomy as only one of a complex of related features of the modern individual, including a withdrawn and objectifying stance toward the natural world, values and other human beings. / In this thesis, I examine two seventeenth-century authors--Robert Burton and John Locke--each of whom represents a different conception of individuality. Burton emulates communal conceptions of identity characteristic of the Middle Ages and Renaissance, while Locke describes an essentially modern, analytical individuality based on the control and possession of an objectified "other". / The theoretical framework for this analysis is derived from Michel Foucault and Timothy Reiss' description of the transition from the Renaissance to the seventeenth century as a transition between different epistemes or discourses. Throughout this thesis, I supplement this essentially structuralist approach with perspectives from Medieval, Renaissance and seventeenth-century cosmology, literary theory, political theory and epistemology.