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No description available.

Let \(\char{cmmi10}{0x54}\) : \(\char{cmmi10}{0x58}\) → \(\char{cmmi10}{0x58}\) be a function from a countably infinite set \(\char{cmmi10}{0x58}\) to itself. We consider the following problem: can we put a structure on \(\char{cmmi10}{0x58}\) with respect to which \(\char{cmmi10}{0x54}\) has some meaning? In this thesis, the following questions are addressed: when can we endow \(\char{cmmi10}{0x58}\) with a topology such that \(\char{cmmi10}{0x58}\) is homeomorphic to the rationals \(\char{msbm10}{0x51}\) and with respect to which \(\char{cmmi10}{0x54}\) is continuous? We characterize such functions on the rational world. The other question is: can we put an order on \(\char{cmmi10}{0x58}\) with respect to which \(\char{cmmi10}{0x58}\) is order-isomorphic to the rationals \(\char{msbm10}{0x51}\), naturals \(\char{msbm10}{0x4e}\) or integers \(\char{msbm10}{0x5a}\) with their usual orders and with respect to which \(\char{cmmi10}{0x54}\) is order-preserving (or order-reversing)? We give characterization of such bijections, injections and surjections on the rational world and of arbitrary maps on the naturals and integers in terms of the orbit structure of the map concerned.

This thesis, which is divided into five papers, explores biased decision making in naturalistic environments and its implications for the efficiency of financial markets and forecasts of competitive event outcomes. Betting markets offer a valuable real world decision making context, allowing analysis that is not possible using regular financial market data. The first paper surveys studies that have employed betting markets to investigate biased decision making and discusses why the extent of these biases is significantly less than in the laboratory. The second paper addresses unresolved issues relating to noise trading and herding in financial markets, by showing that noise trading is associated with increased market efficiency, that the extent of herding differs depending on the direction and timing of changes in market prices, and that this results in an economically significant inefficiency. The findings of this paper have important policy implications for wider financial markets: regulatory measures to protect investors from the destabilizing effects of noise appear to be self-defeating and herding is particularly prevalent when uninformed traders perceive that informed traders are participating in the market. The third and fourth papers address the favourite-longshot bias (FLB), where market prices under-/over-estimate high/low probability outcomes. These papers demonstrate that previous explanations of the bias are inconsistent with evidence of trading in UK betting markets by developing and testing the predictions of models that explain the bias in terms of competition between market makers and the demand preferences of bettors. Moreover, it is definitively shown that, when no market maker is involved, the bias is due to cognitive errors of traders rather than their preference for risk, because only prospect theory, and not risk-love, can explain a reduced FLB in events with strong favourites. The final chapter explores methodological concerns relating to estimates of forecast accuracy in models of discrete choice, and arrives at a much more rigorous understanding of the value of these estimates.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 159-166). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Bing Kwan, Florida State University, College of Engineering, Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed June 16, 2004). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 111-116). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Em nossa vida cotidiana há duas condições frequentes: 1) há situações nas quais não existem instruções explícitas, mas apenas contingências aos comportamentos e 2) comportamentos que aparentam ser iguais a um observador externo, podem ser originados por raciocínios diversos. Partindo destas premissas, procurou-se neste experimento, desenvolver procedimentos experimentais que levam a determinado comportamento (respostas que refletem transitividade lógica) sem instruções explícitas, averiguando a seguir, quais os raciocínios que realmente estavam atrás das respostas (transitivas ou não) dadas pelos sujeitos. O experimento de Siemann & Delius (1993) utilizado para o estudo da inferência transitiva e que foi replicada por Cruz (20003) em sua dissertação de mestrado, suscitou uma série de temas metodológicos e conceituais abordados para viabilizar a pesquisa do raciocínio transitivo: o conceito de consciência e sua relação com o raciocínio; caracterização do raciocínio por sua explicação; utilização dos conceitos de introspecção, tomada de consciência, metacognição, empatia e teoria da mente para a interpretação de entrevistas. A essência deste experimento é seu método experimental que foi composto de duas fases, validação e comprovação. Na fase de validação, 106 sujeitos humanos adultos participaram como voluntários, e foram utilizados para testar catorze diferentes versões da situação experimental, até se obter duas versões validadas: uma versão capaz de ensinar premissas e a outra capaz de algo mais: ativar o raciocínio transitivo. Cada versão consistia em uma situação de condicionamento que não previa comunicação verbal ou contatos interpessoais, uma vez que foram utilizados programas de computador para produzir estímulos, gerenciar a exibição de estímulos, registrar as respostas e os tempos de reação, além de prover contingências. Após interação do sujeito com o programa, foram realizadas entrevistas em que o pesquisador verificou a eventual ativação do raciocínio transitivo. Na fase de comprovação, treze sujeitos humanos adultos foram submetidos a primeira (grupo de controle: seis sujeitos) e segunda (grupo experimental: sete sujeitos) versões validadas comparando-se seus resultados. Para o grupo experimental, os estímulos eram retângulos de seis cores diferentes, ordenados pelo tamanho e designados A, B, C, D, E e F. Os estímulos eram apresentados em pares e a escolha do menor estímulo em cada par era reforçada. Para o grupo de controle, os estímulos eram iguais aos do grupo experimental, mas os retângulos tinham todos o mesmo tamanho. Para os dois grupos, era aplicado esquema de reforço semelhante, que reforçava A no par AB, B em BC, C em CD, D em DE e E em EF, mas para o grupo experimental eram treinados também os pares de estímulos AC, AD, AF, CF e DF. Além disso, o grupo experimental passava por situações em que o encobrimento parcial dos estímulos permitia ora diferenciar-lhes somente pelas cores, ora por cores e tamanhos, e por situações em que a mudança do matiz das cores ora impedia, ora permitia, que os estímulos fossem identificados por suas cores. Estas diferenças entre os grupos experimental e de controle são críticas, pois os resultados obtidos com as entrevistas e com a coleta automatizada de dados foram analisados e demonstraram que o raciocínio transitivo foi ativado em todos os sete sujeitos do grupo experimental e apenas em um sujeito do grupo de controle. Comprovou-se, também, a diferença entre as duas versões validadas: uma versão aplicada aos sujeitos do grupo de controle conseguiu ensinar as premissas, necessárias à ativação do raciocínio transitivo, mas foi insuficiente para ativá-lo em todos os sujeitos desse grupo; e, outra versão que utilizou-se de elementos adicionais para ativar o raciocínio transitivo de todos os sujeitos do grupo experimental. Comprovou-se, ainda, que tanto o raciocínio transitivo quanto o domínio das premissas são necessários para a manifestação de um comportamento transitivo. Verificou-se, finalmente, a eficácia da validação no desenvolvimento do método experimental / In our everyday life there are two frequent conditions: (1) there are situations with no explicit instructions, but only consequences to our behavior and (2) behaviors that seem to be the same to external observers, in fact have been have been originated by different reasoning. Using these two facts as the starting point, this research tried to develop experimental proceedings that induce a certain behavior (behavioral responses that reflect transitive logic) without explicit instructions followed by the assessment of the real reasoning behind the given responses (transitive or not) by each subject. Siemann and Delius´ (1993) experiment about the transitive inference, replicated by Cruz (2003) for his master monograph, elicited many methodological questions and concepts that had to be considered to investigate transitive reasoning. For example, the concept of consciousness in its relation to reasoning, assessment of reasoning through explanation, the concept of introspection, becoming conscious, metacognition, empathy and theory of mind had to be considered to interpret the interviews with the subjects. The main point of this experiment is its method that was divided in two phases, validation and confirmation. In the validation phase, 106 voluntary adult human subjects tested 14 different versions of a computer program, to finally end up with two validated versions: one version capable to teach the premises and the other to also activate transitive reasoning. Each version consisted of a conditioning session with no verbal communication or personal contact, since a computer generated and managed the presentation of the stimuli, recorded the subjects´ responses and reaction times and also provided the contingencies to the responses. After the interaction of the subject with the computer program was finished, an interview with the subjects revealed an eventual activation of transitive reasoning. In the confirmation phase, 13 adult human subjects have been submitted to the validated computer program versions for comparison: six subjects of the control group to the first version and seven subjects of the experimental group to the second version. The stimuli for the experimental group were differently colored rectangles of different sizes, designated by A, B, C, D, E and F. For each pair of different stimuli presented, the subject was reinforced for choosing the smaller one. Stimuli for the control group were similar, but all rectangles had the same size. Reinforcement scheme was also the same for both groups, reinforcing stimulus A in the pair AB, B in pair BC, C in pair CD, D in pair DE and E in pair EF, but the experimental group was also trained for the pairs AC, AD, AF, CF and DF, never presented to the control group during training. Another difference between both groups was that the experimental group sometimes had the stimulus partially covered, so that stimulus differentiation could be done only by colors or by colors and sizes at the same time. Color saturation was also manipulated, so that during parts of the training it was not possible to distinguish the stimuli by colors. According to the results of these interviews and the computer records of the subjects´ responses, all seven subjects of the experimental group had transitive reasoning activated by the proceeding, against only one subject of the control group. It was clear that there was a significant difference between both validated versions of the computer program: the version submitted to the control group was capable to teach the premises to activate transitive reasoning, but was not sufficient to really activate it in all subjects. On the contrary, the other version included additional elements to activate transitive reasoning in all subjects of the experimental group. Both, transitive reasoning and the knowledge of the transitive premises are necessary to elicit transitive behavior. The validation method for the computer program versions revealed being efficient

Em nossa vida cotidiana há duas condições frequentes: 1) há situações nas quais não existem instruções explícitas, mas apenas contingências aos comportamentos e 2) comportamentos que aparentam ser iguais a um observador externo, podem ser originados por raciocínios diversos. Partindo destas premissas, procurou-se neste experimento, desenvolver procedimentos experimentais que levam a determinado comportamento (respostas que refletem transitividade lógica) sem instruções explícitas, averiguando a seguir, quais os raciocínios que realmente estavam atrás das respostas (transitivas ou não) dadas pelos sujeitos. O experimento de Siemann & Delius (1993) utilizado para o estudo da inferência transitiva e que foi replicada por Cruz (20003) em sua dissertação de mestrado, suscitou uma série de temas metodológicos e conceituais abordados para viabilizar a pesquisa do raciocínio transitivo: o conceito de consciência e sua relação com o raciocínio; caracterização do raciocínio por sua explicação; utilização dos conceitos de introspecção, tomada de consciência, metacognição, empatia e teoria da mente para a interpretação de entrevistas. A essência deste experimento é seu método experimental que foi composto de duas fases, validação e comprovação. Na fase de validação, 106 sujeitos humanos adultos participaram como voluntários, e foram utilizados para testar catorze diferentes versões da situação experimental, até se obter duas versões validadas: uma versão capaz de ensinar premissas e a outra capaz de algo mais: ativar o raciocínio transitivo. Cada versão consistia em uma situação de condicionamento que não previa comunicação verbal ou contatos interpessoais, uma vez que foram utilizados programas de computador para produzir estímulos, gerenciar a exibição de estímulos, registrar as respostas e os tempos de reação, além de prover contingências. Após interação do sujeito com o programa, foram realizadas entrevistas em que o pesquisador verificou a eventual ativação do raciocínio transitivo. Na fase de comprovação, treze sujeitos humanos adultos foram submetidos a primeira (grupo de controle: seis sujeitos) e segunda (grupo experimental: sete sujeitos) versões validadas comparando-se seus resultados. Para o grupo experimental, os estímulos eram retângulos de seis cores diferentes, ordenados pelo tamanho e designados A, B, C, D, E e F. Os estímulos eram apresentados em pares e a escolha do menor estímulo em cada par era reforçada. Para o grupo de controle, os estímulos eram iguais aos do grupo experimental, mas os retângulos tinham todos o mesmo tamanho. Para os dois grupos, era aplicado esquema de reforço semelhante, que reforçava A no par AB, B em BC, C em CD, D em DE e E em EF, mas para o grupo experimental eram treinados também os pares de estímulos AC, AD, AF, CF e DF. Além disso, o grupo experimental passava por situações em que o encobrimento parcial dos estímulos permitia ora diferenciar-lhes somente pelas cores, ora por cores e tamanhos, e por situações em que a mudança do matiz das cores ora impedia, ora permitia, que os estímulos fossem identificados por suas cores. Estas diferenças entre os grupos experimental e de controle são críticas, pois os resultados obtidos com as entrevistas e com a coleta automatizada de dados foram analisados e demonstraram que o raciocínio transitivo foi ativado em todos os sete sujeitos do grupo experimental e apenas em um sujeito do grupo de controle. Comprovou-se, também, a diferença entre as duas versões validadas: uma versão aplicada aos sujeitos do grupo de controle conseguiu ensinar as premissas, necessárias à ativação do raciocínio transitivo, mas foi insuficiente para ativá-lo em todos os sujeitos desse grupo; e, outra versão que utilizou-se de elementos adicionais para ativar o raciocínio transitivo de todos os sujeitos do grupo experimental. Comprovou-se, ainda, que tanto o raciocínio transitivo quanto o domínio das premissas são necessários para a manifestação de um comportamento transitivo. Verificou-se, finalmente, a eficácia da validação no desenvolvimento do método experimental / In our everyday life there are two frequent conditions: (1) there are situations with no explicit instructions, but only consequences to our behavior and (2) behaviors that seem to be the same to external observers, in fact have been have been originated by different reasoning. Using these two facts as the starting point, this research tried to develop experimental proceedings that induce a certain behavior (behavioral responses that reflect transitive logic) without explicit instructions followed by the assessment of the real reasoning behind the given responses (transitive or not) by each subject. Siemann and Delius´ (1993) experiment about the transitive inference, replicated by Cruz (2003) for his master monograph, elicited many methodological questions and concepts that had to be considered to investigate transitive reasoning. For example, the concept of consciousness in its relation to reasoning, assessment of reasoning through explanation, the concept of introspection, becoming conscious, metacognition, empathy and theory of mind had to be considered to interpret the interviews with the subjects. The main point of this experiment is its method that was divided in two phases, validation and confirmation. In the validation phase, 106 voluntary adult human subjects tested 14 different versions of a computer program, to finally end up with two validated versions: one version capable to teach the premises and the other to also activate transitive reasoning. Each version consisted of a conditioning session with no verbal communication or personal contact, since a computer generated and managed the presentation of the stimuli, recorded the subjects´ responses and reaction times and also provided the contingencies to the responses. After the interaction of the subject with the computer program was finished, an interview with the subjects revealed an eventual activation of transitive reasoning. In the confirmation phase, 13 adult human subjects have been submitted to the validated computer program versions for comparison: six subjects of the control group to the first version and seven subjects of the experimental group to the second version. The stimuli for the experimental group were differently colored rectangles of different sizes, designated by A, B, C, D, E and F. For each pair of different stimuli presented, the subject was reinforced for choosing the smaller one. Stimuli for the control group were similar, but all rectangles had the same size. Reinforcement scheme was also the same for both groups, reinforcing stimulus A in the pair AB, B in pair BC, C in pair CD, D in pair DE and E in pair EF, but the experimental group was also trained for the pairs AC, AD, AF, CF and DF, never presented to the control group during training. Another difference between both groups was that the experimental group sometimes had the stimulus partially covered, so that stimulus differentiation could be done only by colors or by colors and sizes at the same time. Color saturation was also manipulated, so that during parts of the training it was not possible to distinguish the stimuli by colors. According to the results of these interviews and the computer records of the subjects´ responses, all seven subjects of the experimental group had transitive reasoning activated by the proceeding, against only one subject of the control group. It was clear that there was a significant difference between both validated versions of the computer program: the version submitted to the control group was capable to teach the premises to activate transitive reasoning, but was not sufficient to really activate it in all subjects. On the contrary, the other version included additional elements to activate transitive reasoning in all subjects of the experimental group. Both, transitive reasoning and the knowledge of the transitive premises are necessary to elicit transitive behavior. The validation method for the computer program versions revealed being efficient

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Thomas J. Watson School of Engineering and Applied Science, Department of Systems Science and Industrial Engineering, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.