The minimalist approach to natural human language argues that the syntax of a language L maps a certain structure to a certain form at PF and to a certain meaning at LF. With the above in mind, the ideal perhaps scenario, in terms of transparency, would be that the mapping between form and meaning would be one to one. In other words, there is as much form as there is meaning. This would further imply that the mapping between form and meaning is symmetric. The present thesis studies some aspects of the form and meaning of two kinds of wh-constructions in Modern Greek, i.e., questions and sluicing, and shows that the relevant mapping may not necessarily be one to one. With respect to questions, it is argued that the same form may correspond to more than one meaning. As regards sluicing, it is proposed that there is less form than meaning. On the face of the previous, the argument will be as follows. Syntax generates form, and restricts part of meaning, while additional aspects of meaning are facilitated by PF, regarding wh-questions, and LF, concerning sluicing. Finally, since PF contributes to meaning, LF sees PF, and vice versa. / Το μινιμαλιστικό πλαίσο προσέγγισης της φυσικής ανθρώπινης γλώσσας υποστηρίζει ότι η σύνταξη μιας γλώσσας Γ αντιστοιχεί μια ορισμένη μορφή με μια ορισμένη δομή στην ΦΔ, και με μία ορισμένη σημασία στην ΛΔ. Με αυτό ως δεδομένο, το ιδεατό ίσως σενάριο, όσον αφορά στην διαφάνεια, θα ήταν ότι η αντιστοίχιση μεταξή μορφής και σημασίας είναι ένα προς ένα. Με άλλα λόγια, υπάρχει τόση μορφή όση και σημασία. Κάτι τέτοιο θα υπονοούσε επίσης ότι η αντιστοίχιση μορφής-σημασίας είναι συμμετρική. Η παρούσα διατριβή μελετά ορισμένες πτυχές δομών ερώτησης μερικής αγνοίας, και δομών εκκένωσης, στα Νέα Ελληνικά, και δείχνει ότι η εν λόγω αντιστοίχιση δεν είναι απαραίτητα ένα προς ένα. Όσον αφορά στις δομές ερώτησης μερικής αγνοίας, υποστηρίζεται ότι η ίδια μορφή μπορεί να σχετίζεται με περισσότερες από μια σημασίες. Σχετικά με τις δομές εκκένωσης, προτείνεται ότι φέρουν λιγότερη μορφή απο σημασία. Με βάση τα παραπάνω, το επιχείρημα θα έχει ως εξής. Η σύνταξη παράγει μορφή, και περιορίζει μέρος της σημασίας, ενώ ένα άλλο μέρος της σημασίας εισάγεται από την ΦΔ, όσον αφορά στις ερωτήσεις μερικής αγνοίας, και την ΛΔ, σχετικά με τις δομές εκκένωσης. Τέλος, αφού η ΦΔ συνεισφέρει στην σημασία, τότε η ΛΔ δομή βλέπει την ΦΔ, και αντιστρόφως.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 2099375 bytes, checksum: cd43c67c82a3165f8062d5c071352f58 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-07-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The problem being addressed in this thesis can be formulated as follows: what is the relationship between the notion of an internalized linguistic competence, as conceived by the generative program, and a semantic theory? In other words, what is the extend and scope of a semantic theory consistent with the theoretical assumptions and the syntactic model assumed by the generative program? Two approaches are compared: the denotational approach, according to which syntactic derivations are inputs to the truth conditional interpretation and the intensional approach , according to which the syntactic derivations constrain, but do not determine, truth conditions .I argue that the first approach leads us to a dilemma : if the semantic structure is isomorphic to the syntagmatic structure, we multiply the terms of explanation, without explanatory gain. If there is no isomorphism, we have even more serious problems, because we could not explain the explanatory success of certain syntactic principles (such as the asymmetry between external argument and internal argument , for example) . Thus, this proposal does not provide the proper kind of idealization, it s not able to extend the positive heuristic of the generative program. I argue that the second proposal, by contrast, increases the positive heuristic of the program because it is able to explain ( and not simply redescribe) important empirical generalizations discovered by the generative program over the years . I argue that the formulation of an I-semantics requires, necessarily, a revision of traditional and tacitly accepted assumptions regarding the nature of the formal study of natural languages semantics. I-Semantics explains the etiology of the computational principles underlying interface phenomena, not the implementation of these operations, how sentences can be used to make true or false assertions. / O problema a ser abordado nesta tese pode ser formulado nos seguintes termos: qual a relação entre a noção de competência linguística internalizada, tal como concebida pelo programa gerativista, e uma teoria semântica? Dito de outro modo, qual o formato e escopo de uma teoria semântica coerente com as assunções teóricas de base e com o modelo sintático assumido pelo programa gerativista? Serão comparadas duas abordagens: a abordagem denotacional, na qual as derivações sintáticas são inputs para a interpretação semântica vero-condicional e a abordagem intensional, segundo a qual as derivações sintáticas restringem, mas não determinam, condições de verdade. Argumento que a primeira abordagem conduz-nos a um dilema: caso a estrutura semântica seja isomórfica à estrutura sintagmática, multiplicamos os termos da explicação, sem ganho explicativo. Caso não haja isomorfismo, ganhamos problemas ainda mais sérios, pois não conseguiríamos explicar o sucesso explicativo de certos princípios sintáticos (como a assimetria entre argumento externo e argumento interno, por exemplo). Assim, essa proposta não fornece o tipo adequado de idealização, não é capaz de ampliar a heurística positiva do programa gerativista. Sustento que a segunda proposta, por contraste, amplia a heurística positiva do programa, pois é capaz de explicar (e não simplesmente redescrever) importantes generalizações empíricas descobertas pelo programa gerativista ao longo dos anos. Defendo a tese de que a formulação de uma semântica-I requer, necessariamente, a revisão de pressupostos tradicional e tacitamente aceitos a respeito da natureza do estudo formal da semântica das línguas naturais. A semântica-I trata da etiologia dos princípios computacionais subjacentes aos fenômenos de interface, e não da implementação dessas operações, do modo como sentenças podem ser usadas para fazer asserções verdadeiras ou falsas.