<p> This dissertation examines Bernard Lonergan' s understanding of value, its assumptions and its development, for the sake of determining the role of human nature and human historicity in the experience of value. The categories of nature and history reflect a specifically modem form of the long-standing question of the relationship between physis and nomos- i.e., nature and convention, or 'nature and nurture'-for modernity has made us accutely aware of the historicity of cultural conventions. We ask of Lonergan: how or to what extent is the experience of value determined by human nature, and how or to what extent is it historically conditioned?</p> <p> To understand Lonergan' s position one must appreciate both the difference and the continuity between his earlier and later thought. Lonergan' s earlier thought reflects a rather Kantian fonnalistic account of value as the rational good, but his later thought embraces Scheler' s non-fonnal, material account of value-i.e., the good is an object of natural appetite-a position in which affectivity plays a role in revealing value. In spite of this development, there yet remains an underlying unity: there is a fundamental opposition of affect and intellect that precludes the possibility of understanding value as both rationally and materially good. Lonergan associates affect with natural spontaneity, and intellect with the deliberate:, progressive dynamic of history. Because of this, in his earlier work he presents value as rationally, and therefore historically, determined; yet in his ma1ure position value is grasped primarily in affective apprehensions, which are ahistorical intuitions, grounded in human nature and the 'reasons of the heart'.</p> <p> In response, it will be argued that this dichotomy of feeling and rationality can be transcended without sacrificing Lonergan' s account of self-transcendence.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Thesis advisor: Patrick Byrne / This dissertation proposes to give an expanded reading and interpretation of the work of Bernard Lonergan, SJ, in political theory around the question of political legitimation: What does it mean for a governing entity to exercise coercive power legitimately? To answer this question from Lonergan’s thought requires that we do several things: understand the historical context in which we find ourselves (Chapters 1-2), understand what Lonergan means by authenticity (Chapter 3), and how that relates to legitimate authority, which is an authentically operating matrix of authentic individuals participating in authentic communities governed by and utilizing authentic institutions and institutional sub-communities (Chapters 4-6). We come out at the Conclusion with a method for evaluating governmental legitimacy that expands on Lonergan’s approach.The history of the conversation concerning political legitimation is capacious, complex, confused, and contradictory, and I do not propose to recount it here in full. But with so much already said, what does Lonergan bring to the table distinct from the previous conversation? What is new is his philosophical focus, emphasizing method over concrete content or legislative procedure, which leads to an account of legitimation as authenticity. What matters is how individuals, communities, and institutions, including governments, are operating, not what particular form they take. Granting that his account of legitimation as authenticity is unique, why do we need authenticity to make sense of legitimate political authority? What does it add that the myriad other available accounts of legitimation do not already have? Available accounts of legitimation meander through the shoals of history, and it’s usually only through trial and error that a navigable passage connecting power to legitimate authority is found. In brief, what Lonergan’s thought provides is a way to skim over the shoals of history so that no matter what new features may form beneath the waves, legitimate authority will always be possible and recognizable. We begin with an extensive but partial mapping of those shoals and pointing to some of the major shipwrecks of previous theories, the better to distinguish Lonergan’s view of legitimation as rooted in authenticity of individual, community, and institution in subsequent chapters. This will also give us examples for practical evaluation to show how Lonergan’s method might work in action. Lonergan is not a cultural relativist, but he does claim that his understanding of legitimacy will be applicable in all times and for all peoples and that, by extension, legitimate government is always possible, no matter what form it takes. He gives a retrospective evaluation method, looking at the progress or decline of a culture, a nation, a civilization, a people as a proxy for the legitimacy of their leadership. “Inquiry into the legitimacy of authority or authorities is complex, lengthy, tedious, and often inconclusive” because direct evaluation of authenticity is complex, lengthy, tedious, and often inconclusive. (Bernard Lonergan, “Dialectic of Authority,” in A Third Collection, ed. Robert Doran and John Dadosky, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 6) But “[t]he fruit of authenticity is progress” and “[t]he fruit of unauthenticity is decline”, and the meat of this work is to spell out in detail the authentic operations of individuals, communities, and institutions (and institutional sub-communities). (Lonergan, “Dialectic of Authority”, 6, 7) These are what produce the progress or decline, and we conclude by supplementing Lonergan’s method with an approach that concurrently evaluates the operations of individuals, communities, and institutions and their sub-communities to see whether they are operating unauthentically (because unauthenticity is easier to recognize than authenticity in concurrent evaluation) and so, likely to produce either progress or decline. This is not as reliable as the retrospective method because not everything going on at a given time can be known to the contemporaneous observer and evaluator, but it is also more useful for creating concrete critiques of what is, in fact, going forward. (Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 2nd ed., ed. Robert Doran and John Dadosky (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 168) / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis advisor: Andrew Barrette / The field of health care encompasses a myriad of ethical dilemmas surrounding the core conceptions of goodness and values. This thesis discusses the method of intentionality analysis, especially as it is explicated by Bernard Lonergan and his students, to raise awareness of a distortion of values related to health and health care in the United States. Health is a vital value that is meant to be upheld with absolute precedence by health care institutions. Values, of individuals and of institutions, as intentional responses to feelings, must be ordered in a specific way to align with the objective scale of values. Through the orientation toward, then the realization of true values, the good of order operates. Despite that health is the preferred value, health care institutions in the United States do not always operate in accordance with ordered values; there is a distortion of values experienced at the institutional level. In the United States, financial gain and greed compete with the execution and achievement of the true value of health and thus also of the terminal value. This disruption of the good of order contributes to the decline of human good, which may be remedied by conversion. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Thesis (M. Div.)--Regent College, 1996. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-161).

Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2003. / Bibliography: leaves 109-113.

Thesis advisor: Frederick G. Lawrence / This dissertation seeks to answer the question, arising from Bernard Lonergan's 1972 lectures on philosophy of God and systematic theology, of why he thinks philosophy of God, or natural theology, should be included within the functional specialty Systematics. The author argues that a key to the answer is an analysis of the concrete operations performed by philosophers as they pursue the question of God. Relevant to the distinction between and unity of philosophy of God and Systematics are both natural knowledge of God, which consists of affirmations and negations that can be immanently generated, and supernatural knowledge, which consists of affirmations and negations that cannot be immanently generated and thus require belief in divine revelation in order to be made by humans in this life. There is a way in which Systematics presupposes truths unknowable without revelation that the natural knowledge of philosophy does not, since Systematics includes hypotheses that attempt to account for how those truths could be so, doing so in a way that goes beyond what natural knowledge alone provides. However, even if philosophy results in natural knowledge, when the philosopher is Christian, it often performatively presupposes supernatural knowledge of revelation inasmuch as its inquiry into the question of God often in fact is preceded by and originates from the philosopher's horizon of Christian faith, which is partially constituted by affirmations of truths unknowable without revelation. Performatively, Christian philosophers often seek to understand the Christian God in whom they already believe. This explains Lonergan's practical recommendation to transfer philosophy of God to the theology department, as well as his comment in the essay "Dimensions of Meaning" that once philosophy becomes "existential and historical...the very possibility of the old distinction between philosophy and theology vanishes." Sublated by Systematics, philosophy of God is the aspect of faith seeking understanding that results in analogical understanding and affirmation of God as an unrestricted act of understanding, affirming, and loving. This knowledge provides an explanatory (though analogical) understanding of the God in whom Christians believe through faith. It is even included in theological hypotheses, such as Lonergan's possibly relevant explanation of the Trinity, which takes its starting point from the psychological analogy in which the one unrestricted act of understanding gives rise to a judgment of value and decision. Philosophy also contributes to the control of meaning in systematic theology by ruling out explanations of revelation that are incompatible with natural knowledge. Incorporating philosophy of God into the functional specialty Systematics such that philosophy of God attains "its proper significance" and "effectiveness," the theologian can answer the question of God in a more complete way than is possible through philosophy alone. The dissertation begins in Chapter 1 by giving an account of the distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge of God--as well as the more basic distinction between nature and supernature--in a way that attempts to be adequate to the "the third stage of meaning," in which metaphysical distinctions must have a basis in self-knowledge and self-appropriation. Chapter 2 then explains Lonergan's approach to philosophy of God as that which results in natural knowledge, as in chapter 19 of Insight. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the functional specialty Systematics, which pursues understanding of truths affirmed in the light of faith, including truths unknowable without revelation. Chapter 4 discusses why philosophy of God, when considered in terms of its concrete performance by the Christian philosopher, often is preceded by and emerges from a horizon of faith (and belief) and so is an exercise in faith seeking understanding, with its natural knowledge contributing to Systematics' task of explaining the conditions for the possibility of truths unknowable without revelation. The Conclusion raises and begins to answer further pertinent questions, such as whether Lonergan's understanding of philosophy of God as Systematics holds for non-Christian philosophers. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis (M.A.)--Memorial University of Newfoundland, 2001. / Bibliography: leaves [170]-182.

Religious diversity has become a central topic in the philosophy of religion. This study proposes a methodological approach to the topic by exploring the division of tasks set out by Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984). Lonergan’s methodological framework, which he called functional specialization, provides a generic differentiation of tasks, each of which is central to the overall project of understanding religious diversity. This thesis explores the relevance and utility of functional specialization as a methodological approach to religious diversity in the philosophy of religion. [...] / La diversité religieuse est aujourd’hui une préoccupation centrale dans l’étude de la philosophie des religions. Cette étude propose une démarche méthodologique en explorant la division des tâches mise de l’avant par Bernard Lonergan (1904- 1984). La méthodologie employée par celui-ci, qu’il nomma « spécialisation fonctionnelle», permet d’établir une séparation générique des tâches, chacune d’elles jouant un rôle important dans la compréhension globale de la diversité religieuse. Cette étude illustré la pertinence et l’utilité de la spécialisation fonctionnelle en tant qu’approche méthodologique dans la philosophie des religions, et particulièrement dans l’étude de la diversité religieuse. [...]

A wealth of recent scholarship has focused on interreligious dialogue as a resource for the transformation of religious conflicts. Such studies often mention the importance of discoveries or 'insights' as key factors in successful dialogue processes. However, few authors have devoted sustained attention to understanding how insights contribute to transforming conflict dynamics during interfaith dialogues. / The present study draws on the cognitional theory of Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan as a framework for exploring the significance of insights in interreligious dialogue processes. The study begins with an overview of representative perspectives on learning in interfaith dialogue and conflict transformation. Following this, I offer a detailed analysis of Lonergan's work on insight in understanding, judgment, and practical learning, highlighting the important role that insights play in structuring interpretation and communication in dialogue situations. / Drawing on Lonergan's theoretical framework, I explore how insights are implicated in shaping communication in dialogues between religious actors, both in the development of conflicts, as well as in their transformation. Using case studies from dialogues involving Christians, Muslims, and Jews, I examine how mistaken insights can contribute to sustaining relationships of threat among parties in religious conflicts. I then examine how dialogue processes can act as catalysts for the emergence of new and more accurate insights that transform parties' understanding of the conflict. By helping parties correct mistaken interpretations and discover alternate ways of communicating, such insights can often play an important role in facilitating shifts from hostile patterns of interaction to more cooperative forms of engagement. / Throughout, I explain how Lonergan's work offers significant advances over existing discussions of insight and its role in conflict transformation processes. His approach identifies a range of different types of insights, and thus facilitates an analysis of the different roles insights can play in structuring communication at different phases of dialogue processes. It also permits a more developed exploration of the various cognitional and environmental conditions that facilitate or frustrate the occurrence of insights in dialogue situations. His work thus constitutes an important resource for theorists and practitioners seeking a better understanding of the cognitive dynamics that contribute to the transformation of interreligious dialogue processes.

Describing Bernard Lonergan's relation to philosophy of religion is tricky business, with complications arising on different levels. To begin with, he does not use the term as it is usually understood in the field of the same name. Moreover, he addresses the same issues as philosophers of religion, but under the guise of philosophy of God or natural theology. Finally, he understands idiosyncratically the issue of religious experience, which is now a specialized category in philosophy of religion called upon to support formally rational statements for or against theistic belief. This central issue in Lonergan is further complicated by the fact that his idiosyncratic understanding of (religious) experience plays different roles in his thinking about God and religion. In this study I flesh out the dynamics of these various components, their interrelationships, and their function from early to late development. / My point of departure is a period in Lonergan's thought where he attributes more to the influence of religious experience in our thinking than at any time prior in his career. In chapter 1 I pursue some reasons that have been given for the tardiness of his response, intimating its nature and what it meant for his controversial "proof" for God's existence. Something of a detour is taken in chapter 2 since discussion of the concept of religious experience in Lonergan must grapple with what he means by experience in general. I decipher three senses to the term integral to his concept of consciousness that I distinguish from a contemporary model, that of David Chalmers. Since Lonergan is emphatic about distinguishing consciousness from its concept I trace this aspect of his philosophical claim against the background of Kant and Hegel, his main dialogue partners on the question. In chapter 3 I return to the specifically religious dimension of the notion of experience in the early Lonergan. Here I track the development of his category of religious experience as it moves from the periphery to the explanatory basis of his thought. In chapter 4 the relevant later literature in Lonergan is examined in which is seen the emergence of what is technically philosophy of religion to him. Among the distinctions I introduce is the difference between his model of religion and what he calls his philosophy of religion. Conceiving it historically, I see the former, his model of religion, as the departure point for what in his philosophy of religion he sets out to accomplish. They are related, of course, but not one and the same thing. To avoid confusion with the field of the same name, I recommend that we refer to his philosophy of religion as it is literally, as a philosophy of religious studies, distinguishing it firstly from his philosophy of God and secondly from his model of religious experience. / Besides providing an unprecedented comprehensive understanding of Lonergan's philosophy of religion, outlining the matter this way also aids in identifying precisely what are the points of contact between Lonergan's thoughts on God and religion and the issues presently discussed by philosophers of religion. The conclusion offers an example of this at the level of "philosophy of," the formal component of Lonergan's philosophy of religion in the generic sense in which I understand it. It represents steps toward a larger project, which I adumbrate in the appendix.