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1	Human Good and the Institutional Distortion of Values in the Field of Medicine: A Lonerganian Approach to Health Care Ethics in the United States Lee, Heather January 2023 (has links) Thesis advisor: Andrew Barrette / The field of health care encompasses a myriad of ethical dilemmas surrounding the core conceptions of goodness and values. This thesis discusses the method of intentionality analysis, especially as it is explicated by Bernard Lonergan and his students, to raise awareness of a distortion of values related to health and health care in the United States. Health is a vital value that is meant to be upheld with absolute precedence by health care institutions. Values, of individuals and of institutions, as intentional responses to feelings, must be ordered in a specific way to align with the objective scale of values. Through the orientation toward, then the realization of true values, the good of order operates. Despite that health is the preferred value, health care institutions in the United States do not always operate in accordance with ordered values; there is a distortion of values experienced at the institutional level. In the United States, financial gain and greed compete with the execution and achievement of the true value of health and thus also of the terminal value. This disruption of the good of order contributes to the decline of human good, which may be remedied by conversion. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: Philosophy. lonergan health healthcare values human good ethics
2	Reframing Catholic and Islamic political theologies : the human good as a basis for public civility Park, Richard S. January 2014 (has links) With the rise of religious plurality and the global public resurgence of religion, deep social unrest and even fatal violence have resulted in a compelling need for plural societies to construct a framework of ‘public civility’. Recently, secularist frameworks such as multiculturalism and legal pluralism have been put forward. Yet, insofar as these approaches are considered non-moral, they are relativistic, and thereby lack the resources needed to ground a universal public civility. Also, approaches to building a ‘just society’ within both Catholic social thought and Islamic jurisprudence have been made specifically on the basis of ‘the common good’. The problem with these approaches is that the so-called ‘common good’ is internally defined such that the ‘good’ is ineluctably uncommon. A more promising basis on which to construct a universal framework of public civility is found in the classical notion of ‘the human good’. The argument proceeds in three main stages: (1) a critical assessment of ideological and sociological forces which have resulted in the fragmentation of modern society and the decline of public life; (2) a delineation of ‘the human good’ on the basis of which I construct a framework of public civility between Catholic and Islamic traditions; and (3) an illustration of the proposed framework in Mindanao, Philippines which represents one of the longest standing internal conflicts in history. The main contention is that Catholic and Islamic political theologies enhance the construction of public civility when reframed in terms of ‘the human good’ in contrast to ‘the common good’. In support of this thesis, I explore the Catholic doctrine of the imago dei and the Islamic notion of fiṭra as prospective conceptual counterparts to the idea of ‘the human good’. I conclude by analyzing the cosmopolitan scope of a framework of public civility as based on ‘the human good’. 261.7
3	Plato on Pleasure, Intelligence and the Human Good: An Interpretation of the Philebus Fletcher, Emily 28 February 2013 (has links) The Philebus is devoted to the question what constitutes the good for a human being. Although Socrates initially favors a life of pure intelligence against the hedonist’s life of pure pleasure, he quickly concedes that some pleasures actually enhance the life of intelligence. In order to determine which pleasures deserve a place in the best life, Socrates undertakes a lengthy investigation into the nature of pleasure. Commentators have long been frustrated in their attempt to uncover a single, unified account that explains in a plausible way the extraordinary variety of pleasures analyzed in the dialogue. I argue that this search for a generic account of pleasure is misguided, because one of the main purposes of Socrates’ division of pleasure is to expose its essentially heterogeneous nature. Pleasures can be bodily or psychic, pure or mixed with pain, truth apt or not, healthy or diseased, and inherently measured or unmeasured, and there are no essential properties which all of these diverse phenomena share. The inclusion of some pleasures in the final ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus represents a dramatic shift in Plato’s attitude towards certain pleasures, and so it is not surprising that many scholars misinterpret the force of this conclusion. Even in the Republic where the pleasures of reason are favorably compared to the pleasures of spirit and appetite, intellectual pleasures are judged to be more pleasant and real than other pleasures, but they are nowhere judged to be better or praised as genuine goods. In the Philebus, not only are some pleasures unambiguously ranked among the highest goods, but Socrates gives no indication that these pleasures are good only in some qualified or extrinsic way. Instead, certain pleasures make their own positive contribution to the goodness of the best human life, making the mixed life more valuable and choiceworthy than the unmixed life of intelligence. Plato Philebus Timaeus pleasure intelligence knowledge the human good the good life moral psychology cognition perception sensation intentionality consciousness aisthēsis phronēsis nous hēdonē health disease animals gods soul body desire expectation memory recollection false pleasure pain 0422 0289 0294
4	Plato on Pleasure, Intelligence and the Human Good: An Interpretation of the Philebus Fletcher, Emily 28 February 2013 (has links) The Philebus is devoted to the question what constitutes the good for a human being. Although Socrates initially favors a life of pure intelligence against the hedonist’s life of pure pleasure, he quickly concedes that some pleasures actually enhance the life of intelligence. In order to determine which pleasures deserve a place in the best life, Socrates undertakes a lengthy investigation into the nature of pleasure. Commentators have long been frustrated in their attempt to uncover a single, unified account that explains in a plausible way the extraordinary variety of pleasures analyzed in the dialogue. I argue that this search for a generic account of pleasure is misguided, because one of the main purposes of Socrates’ division of pleasure is to expose its essentially heterogeneous nature. Pleasures can be bodily or psychic, pure or mixed with pain, truth apt or not, healthy or diseased, and inherently measured or unmeasured, and there are no essential properties which all of these diverse phenomena share. The inclusion of some pleasures in the final ranking of the goods at the end of the Philebus represents a dramatic shift in Plato’s attitude towards certain pleasures, and so it is not surprising that many scholars misinterpret the force of this conclusion. Even in the Republic where the pleasures of reason are favorably compared to the pleasures of spirit and appetite, intellectual pleasures are judged to be more pleasant and real than other pleasures, but they are nowhere judged to be better or praised as genuine goods. In the Philebus, not only are some pleasures unambiguously ranked among the highest goods, but Socrates gives no indication that these pleasures are good only in some qualified or extrinsic way. Instead, certain pleasures make their own positive contribution to the goodness of the best human life, making the mixed life more valuable and choiceworthy than the unmixed life of intelligence. Plato Philebus Timaeus pleasure intelligence knowledge the human good the good life moral psychology cognition perception sensation intentionality consciousness aisthēsis phronēsis nous hēdonē health disease animals gods soul body desire expectation memory recollection false pleasure pain 0422 0289 0294

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