Religious diversity has become a central topic in the philosophy of religion. This study proposes a methodological approach to the topic by exploring the division of tasks set out by Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984). Lonergan’s methodological framework, which he called functional specialization, provides a generic differentiation of tasks, each of which is central to the overall project of understanding religious diversity. This thesis explores the relevance and utility of functional specialization as a methodological approach to religious diversity in the philosophy of religion. [...] / La diversité religieuse est aujourd’hui une préoccupation centrale dans l’étude de la philosophie des religions. Cette étude propose une démarche méthodologique en explorant la division des tâches mise de l’avant par Bernard Lonergan (1904- 1984). La méthodologie employée par celui-ci, qu’il nomma « spécialisation fonctionnelle», permet d’établir une séparation générique des tâches, chacune d’elles jouant un rôle important dans la compréhension globale de la diversité religieuse. Cette étude illustré la pertinence et l’utilité de la spécialisation fonctionnelle en tant qu’approche méthodologique dans la philosophie des religions, et particulièrement dans l’étude de la diversité religieuse. [...]

A wealth of recent scholarship has focused on interreligious dialogue as a resource for the transformation of religious conflicts. Such studies often mention the importance of discoveries or 'insights' as key factors in successful dialogue processes. However, few authors have devoted sustained attention to understanding how insights contribute to transforming conflict dynamics during interfaith dialogues. / The present study draws on the cognitional theory of Canadian philosopher Bernard Lonergan as a framework for exploring the significance of insights in interreligious dialogue processes. The study begins with an overview of representative perspectives on learning in interfaith dialogue and conflict transformation. Following this, I offer a detailed analysis of Lonergan's work on insight in understanding, judgment, and practical learning, highlighting the important role that insights play in structuring interpretation and communication in dialogue situations. / Drawing on Lonergan's theoretical framework, I explore how insights are implicated in shaping communication in dialogues between religious actors, both in the development of conflicts, as well as in their transformation. Using case studies from dialogues involving Christians, Muslims, and Jews, I examine how mistaken insights can contribute to sustaining relationships of threat among parties in religious conflicts. I then examine how dialogue processes can act as catalysts for the emergence of new and more accurate insights that transform parties' understanding of the conflict. By helping parties correct mistaken interpretations and discover alternate ways of communicating, such insights can often play an important role in facilitating shifts from hostile patterns of interaction to more cooperative forms of engagement. / Throughout, I explain how Lonergan's work offers significant advances over existing discussions of insight and its role in conflict transformation processes. His approach identifies a range of different types of insights, and thus facilitates an analysis of the different roles insights can play in structuring communication at different phases of dialogue processes. It also permits a more developed exploration of the various cognitional and environmental conditions that facilitate or frustrate the occurrence of insights in dialogue situations. His work thus constitutes an important resource for theorists and practitioners seeking a better understanding of the cognitive dynamics that contribute to the transformation of interreligious dialogue processes.

Describing Bernard Lonergan's relation to philosophy of religion is tricky business, with complications arising on different levels. To begin with, he does not use the term as it is usually understood in the field of the same name. Moreover, he addresses the same issues as philosophers of religion, but under the guise of philosophy of God or natural theology. Finally, he understands idiosyncratically the issue of religious experience, which is now a specialized category in philosophy of religion called upon to support formally rational statements for or against theistic belief. This central issue in Lonergan is further complicated by the fact that his idiosyncratic understanding of (religious) experience plays different roles in his thinking about God and religion. In this study I flesh out the dynamics of these various components, their interrelationships, and their function from early to late development. / My point of departure is a period in Lonergan's thought where he attributes more to the influence of religious experience in our thinking than at any time prior in his career. In chapter 1 I pursue some reasons that have been given for the tardiness of his response, intimating its nature and what it meant for his controversial "proof" for God's existence. Something of a detour is taken in chapter 2 since discussion of the concept of religious experience in Lonergan must grapple with what he means by experience in general. I decipher three senses to the term integral to his concept of consciousness that I distinguish from a contemporary model, that of David Chalmers. Since Lonergan is emphatic about distinguishing consciousness from its concept I trace this aspect of his philosophical claim against the background of Kant and Hegel, his main dialogue partners on the question. In chapter 3 I return to the specifically religious dimension of the notion of experience in the early Lonergan. Here I track the development of his category of religious experience as it moves from the periphery to the explanatory basis of his thought. In chapter 4 the relevant later literature in Lonergan is examined in which is seen the emergence of what is technically philosophy of religion to him. Among the distinctions I introduce is the difference between his model of religion and what he calls his philosophy of religion. Conceiving it historically, I see the former, his model of religion, as the departure point for what in his philosophy of religion he sets out to accomplish. They are related, of course, but not one and the same thing. To avoid confusion with the field of the same name, I recommend that we refer to his philosophy of religion as it is literally, as a philosophy of religious studies, distinguishing it firstly from his philosophy of God and secondly from his model of religious experience. / Besides providing an unprecedented comprehensive understanding of Lonergan's philosophy of religion, outlining the matter this way also aids in identifying precisely what are the points of contact between Lonergan's thoughts on God and religion and the issues presently discussed by philosophers of religion. The conclusion offers an example of this at the level of "philosophy of," the formal component of Lonergan's philosophy of religion in the generic sense in which I understand it. It represents steps toward a larger project, which I adumbrate in the appendix.

Thesis (S.T.L.)--Catholic University of America, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-120).

Thesis (Th. D.)--Concordia Seminary, 1989. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 307-322).

Thesis (S.T.L.)--Catholic University of America, 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-120).

Thesis--Münster--State university, 1974.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago Divinity School, August 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union, 1977. / Bibliography: leaf 166.

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union, 1978. / Bibliography: leaves 200-206.