O presente trabalho analisa as relações de consumo nos planos privados de assistência à saúde a partir dos princípios da vulnerabilidade e da confiança. Aborda o contexto pós-moderno no qual este pacto está inserido e os reflexos que o avançar da idade podem trazer aos serviços médico-ambulatoriais. Analisa o tema a partir da doutrina, legislação e jurisprudência, investigando qual a resposta dada pelos operadores do direito para enfrentar os desafios que o agravamento da vulnerabilidade do consumidor-idoso traz aos planos e seguros de saúde. Busca verificar quais os instrumentos necessários para a tutela da saúde do idoso e de sua confiança, permitindo que ingressem nestes pactos com padrões mínimos e inderrogáveis de proteção, para que haja um desenvolvimento social harmônico e um crescimento econômico equilibrado desta importante parcela do mercado de consumo. Aborda a vulnerabilidade inerente à relação de consumo e a imprescindibilidade de uma hermenêutica jurídica adequada à proteção dos idosos nos contratos de planos e seguros de assistência à saúde, bem como a importância do diálogo das fontes para reconstruir a confiança dos consumidores-idosos. Examina o fenômeno crescente da judicialização da saúde suplementar no Brasil para o controle de cláusulas e práticas abusivas neste importante setor do mercado de consumo. Por fim, ressalta a necessidade de ações afirmativas no campo dos serviços privados médico-assistenciais através do diálogo das instituições como forma de reconstruir e reforçar a confiança do consumidor. / The present work analyzes consumer relations in the healthcare plans and in the health insurance based on the principles of vulnerability and trust. It addresses the postmodern context in which this pact is inserted and the reflexes that advancing age can bring to the medical outpatient services. It analyzes this issue from the doctrine, legislation and jurisprudence, investigating the response given by legal operators to the challenges that the aggravation of the vulnerability of the elderly consumer can bring to health insurance and healthcare plans. It seeks to verify the necessary mechanisms to protect the health of the elderly and their confidence, allowing them to enter in these contracts with minimum and non-derogable standards of protection, so it can be had a harmonious social development and balanced economic growth of this important part of the consumer market. It discourses the vulnerability inherent in the relationship of consumption and the indispensability of proper legal interpretation to the protection of the elderly in healthcare plans and health insurance, and the importance of the dialogue of the sources to rebuild elderly consumer confidence. Examines the growing phenomenon of the development of the number of claims at the Judiciary, associated to matters related to health insurance and healthcare plans in Brazil and to the control of clauses and abusive practices in this important sector of the consumer market. Finally, it emphasizes the need for affirmative action in the field of private medical care services through institutional dialogue to rebuild consumer confidence and strengthen the principle of trust, contributing to a harmonious social development and balanced economic growth. Finally, it emphasizes the need for affirmative action in the field of private medical care services through institutional dialogue to rebuild consumer confidence and strengthen the principle of trust.

This diploma paper in detail describes inventory separately from aspect of Czech accounting legislation and international accounting standards IAS/IFRS. Attention is devoted to meaning, structure and contents of individual legal enactment, qualification and division of inventory, methods of accounting and publication and especially their evaluation. The objective of this thesis is comparison of Czech accounting legislation and IAS/IFRS to find out differences between Czech legislation and IAS/IFRS in qualification, accounting, publication and evaluation of inventory. All determined differences are summarized in closing parts of the work together with classification of individual legal enactment and recommendations for Czech accounting legislation about implementation of some useful elements from IAS/IFRS.

Ma thèse intitulée “Gouvernance d'entreprise et concurrence sur le marché des produits” est composée de trois chapitres théoriques relevant essentiellement de l'Économie Industrielle. L'objectif principal est d'étudier comment le marché des produits interagit à la fois avec l'intérêt des parties prenantes lorsque l'information est parfaite et avec les incitations managériales (statiques et dynamiques) lorsque l'information est imparfaite.Le premier chapitre porte sur les interactions entre le mode de concurrence sur le marché des produits (Cournot vs. Bertrand) et les relations (conflictuelles ou conciliantes) entre les principaux acteurs (actionnaires, consommateurs et employés) lorsque l'intérêt des consommateurs est pris en compte dans la fonction objectif de la firme. Nous considérons un duopole symétrique où les firmes négocient préalablement avec les syndicats sur le salaire versé aux employés et puis se concurrencent entre elles sur le marché des biens. Nous montrons que l'orientation client (mesurée par le degré de prise en compte du surplus des consommateurs) peut inverser la hiérarchie traditionnelle entre les équilibres de Cournot et les équilibres de Bertrand. Une concurrence en prix (par rapport à une concurrence en quantité) est à même d'atténuer les conflits entre les actionnaires et les consommateurs et entre les actionnaires et les employés.Le deuxième chapitre examine comment les incitations managériales pourraient interagir avec la concurrence sur le marché des produits dans un contexte de sélection adverse et d'aléa moral. Nous considérons un oligopole de Cournot composé de n firmes identiques dont le coût marginal initial est une information privée du manager. L'effort du manager, qui est non observable, réduit indirectement le coût marginal initial. Dans un tel contexte, nous montrons qu'à l'optimum les paiements incitatifs versés aux managers ne sont pas nécessairement influencés par la concurrence sur le marché des produits.Le troisième chapitre étudie comment le contrat optimal entre l'actionnaire et le manager (résolution d'aléa moral répété) peut influencer la stabilité d'un cartel. Nous considérons un cartel composé de deux firmes identiques et dans chaque firme un actionnaire neutre à l'égard du risque offre un menu de contrats à un manager averse au risque. L'effort du manager influence le coût marginal de la firme (comme au chapitre 2) à chaque période. Nous montrons que, contrairement au cas où l'information est parfaite, le degré d'aversion au risque du manager n'impacte pas la stabilité du cartel lorsque le contrat optimal à long terme est mis en place. Le contrat optimal résout le problème d'aléa moral répété et limite également le pouvoir discrétionnaire du manager sur la décision de conduite du marché (collusion, déviation, ou compétition). / My thesis entitled « Corporate governance and product market competition : three essays » is a theoretical research in industrial organization. The primary objective is to investigate how product market (competition or collusion) interacts with the top-level design of corporate governance, which concerns specifically the stakeholders' relationships and managerial incentives (static and dynamic) under imperfect information. It is mainly based on three chapters dealing with different subtopics of this theme.The first chapter examines how social concern and product market competition (Cournot vs. Bertrand) may influence the relationships (conflicting or conciliating) between main stakeholders (shareholders, consumers and employees). We consider two identical firms, both taking care of the interests of consumers in their objective functions and allowing their employees' wages be negotiated with labor unions. We show that social concern may reverse the traditional ranking between Cournot and Bertrand equilibria. Our model also shows that price competition (compared to quantity competition) can to some extent attenuate the shareholders' conflicts with both consumers and employees.The second chapter investigates how managerial incentive payment under both adverse selection and moral hazard might interact with product market competition. We consider a Cournot oligopoly market consisting of n identical managerial firms, of which the initial marginal cost is the manager's private information and his unobservable effort indirectly reduces the initial level of marginal cost. We show with this setting that the optimal incentive payment solving informational problems is not necessarily influenced by product market competition.The third chapter studies how the optimal contract between shareholder and manager (solving repeated moral hazard) may influence the stability of a cartel. We consider a cartel consisting of two identical firms, within each a risk neutral shareholder offers a menu of contracts to a risk-averse manager who may shirk in each period. The manager's unobservable effort influences the firm's marginal cost (as in chapter 2). We show in contrary with the benchmark case (under perfect information) that the degree of risk-aversion plays no longer a role upon the stability of collusion: when the managerial compensation is independent of gross profit, the implementation of the optimal long-term contract solves repeated moral hazard but also constrains the manager's discretion over the decision of market conduct (collusion, deviation, or competition).