Over the last two decades, US corporate governance has witnessed a significant increase in the incidence and influence of shareholder activism. Shareholder activism, however, has been found to be inconsistent with US corporate governance which is framed within director primacy theory. In this theory, the board is able to carry out a unique combination of managerial and monitoring roles effectively, and shareholders are only capital providers to companies. Shareholder activism is normatively found inimical to effective and efficient decision-making, i.e. the board's authority, and to the long-term interests of public companies. The increasing willingness of institutional shareholders to participate into the decision-making processes of their portfolio companies is at odds with US corporate governance. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to examine whether director primacy theory should be softened to accommodate greater shareholder activism in US corporate governance. This thesis presents an analysis of the legal rules that reflect director primacy theory. In this respect, US shareholders have traditionally had limited participatory power. The way in which the courts perceived the board's authority also stymied shareholder participation. This thesis considers not only legal and regulatory developments in the wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, but also the governance developments through by-law amendments which could potentially make an overall change in the balance of power between shareholders and the board. Shareholders are slowly moving to the centre of corporate governance in the US. History has shown that the board of directors often failed to prevent manager-induced corporate governance failures. This thesis argues that shareholder activism is necessary for improving the web of monitoring mechanisms and for a well-functioning director primacy model. Shareholder activism forces the board to more critical about management, which is a prerequisite for the director primacy model. Therefore, this thesis argues that shareholder activism should therefore be accommodated into US corporate governance. The proposed approach addresses accountability problems more effectively than the current director primacy model while recognising the board authority and enhances decision-making processes of public companies. In this regard, it makes several recommendations to soften the current director primacy model: establishing a level playing for private ordering, adopting the proxy access default regime, the majority voting rule, the universal proxy rules, and enhancing the disclosure requirements of shareholders. The present research also demonstrates that contemporary shareholder activism involves many complexities. It contains different types of shareholder activism, which differ by objectives, tools, and motives. It could be used for purely financial purposes or non-financial purposes or both. Furthermore, the concept of stewardship has been developed to address public interest concerns, namely short-termism in the market and pressures by activist funds through shareholder activism. In this way, this thesis develops a complete positive theory about shareholder activism rather than focussing on a specific type of activism. This complete analytical framework constitutes more reliable basis to draw normative conclusions rather than focussing on a particular type of activism.

Submitted by Cristiane Shirayama (cristiane.shirayama@fgv.br) on 2011-06-02T19:09:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100238.pdf: 680454 bytes, checksum: 38184d6f6453052e7092f60631e97b3f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-02T20:20:11Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100238.pdf: 680454 bytes, checksum: 38184d6f6453052e7092f60631e97b3f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-02T20:41:50Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100238.pdf: 680454 bytes, checksum: 38184d6f6453052e7092f60631e97b3f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-06-03T18:56:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100238.pdf: 680454 bytes, checksum: 38184d6f6453052e7092f60631e97b3f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-01-21 / Este trabalho estuda a formação dos Bookbuildings em emissões de ações no Brasil, também conhecidos como 'Livro de Ofertas', o último e mais importante estágio de um processo de IPO. Testam-se hipóteses de assimetria de informação, monitoramento e liquidez e conflito de interesse para o caso brasileiro em um conjunto de 18 emissões, todas oriundas de IPO’s emitidos no mercado de capitais brasileiro, sob a ótica das 5 variáveis mais significativas: Tipo de Investidor – curto e longo-prazo; Nacionalidade – Investidores dos Estados Unidos e locais; Participações em ofertas; Tamanho das ofertas; e Preço das emissões. O nosso banco de dados analisa todas as 209 operações de listagem primária e secundária dos últimos 7 anos, desde 2004, na Bovespa. São 209 ofertas públicas. Aprofundamo-nos em 18 delas, das quais possuímos todas as informações de formação de livro de ofertas. Demonstrou-se que em todas essas 18 ofertas o volume de ofertas feitas por investidores estrangeiros de fato 'ancorou' as operações (representando mais do que 67% das ordens dos livros), fato que teve uma função muito importante, de 'sinalizar' a força das determinadas ofertas em termos de demanda. Das 18 operações, o livro de ofertas de 39% excedeu mais do que 3 vezes a quantidade ofertada pela empresa issuer ao mercado. Em 56% dos casos, a demanda foi maior do que o dobro do número de ações oferecidas pelo issuer. Em 72% dos casos, a demanda excedeu a oferta em pelo menos 50%. A média de demanda das 2.229 ofertas de compra, divididas nos 18 IPO’s estudados, foi de quase 4 vezes o número de ações ofertadas, ou 394%, conforme tabela 11 deste trabalho. Os resultados obtidos seguem na direção das teorias de preferência por investidores de longo prazo em detrimento de investidores de curto prazo. Encontramos que o preço e a participação em diversos IPO’s não são determinantes para explicar as diferenças nas alocações, distanciando nossos resultados das teorias de assimetria de informação. Já as variáveis que exprimem características dos investidores mostraram-se bastante relevantes para explicar as diferenças nas alocações. Primeiramente, o tipo de investidor mostrou-se uma variável decisiva na alocação. Nas hipóteses testadas, encontramos evidências de que investidores de longo prazo, os chamados Long-Only são beneficiados enquanto investidores de curto prazo, em geral hedge-funds e tesourarias, são penalizados nas alocações. Segundo, a nacionalidade do investidor também exprime papel fundamental na alocação. Investidores norte-americanos são beneficiados enquanto investidores brasileiros são penalizados, outro resultado contrário às teorias de troca de alocação por informação, dado que investidores domésticos, em teoria, deveriam ter maior informação do que estrangeiros. Em realidade, se existe um consenso nesse campo de pesquisa é o de que investidores norte-americanos determinam a direção da grande maioria dos recursos destinados a esse mercado e emitem forte sinalização quando 'entram' em negócios dessa natureza ao redor do mundo, o mesmo ocorrendo no caso brasileiro e demonstrado em nossa análise, conforme acima mencionado. Os resultados apenas comprovam que esse tipo de ação de tais investidores tem sido premiado por meio de favorecimento em alocações nas ofertas no mercado brasileiro, principalmente quando controlamos para emissões com alta demanda, os chamados Hot IPO’s. Também encontramos evidências contrárias às teorias de controle. Ao regredir nossa variável Tamanho, encontramos um sinal contrário ao esperado. Isto é, para os dados que dispúnhamos, verificamos o favorecimento de grandes ofertas em detrimento de pequenas, enquanto esperaríamos que os underwriters evitassem concentração de ações, 'protegendo' as empresas emissoras de eventuais problemas de liquidez e até potenciais tentativas de hostile take-overs no futuro. / This work studies the composition of Bookbuildings of IPOs in Brazil. Bookbuilding is the last and most important stage in an IPO process. Hypotheses tested are information asymmetry, liquidity and monitoring conflict of interest for the Brazilian case in a sample of 18 IPOs, considering the4 5 most significant variables: Investor Profile – short and long term investors; Nationality – Local and US Investors; Participation in offering processes; Size of the offerings; and Pricing of the IPOs. Our database analyses all 209 shares emissions both primary and secondary offerings in the last 7 years in Bovespa, since 2004, all public offerings. We detailed 18, those of which we had more complete data available of the Bookbuilding. We learnt that foreign investors “anchored” those 18 IPOs. Foreign investor’s orders represented more than 67% of the offering books. This fact signed the “strength” of those IPOs in terms of demand. Out of the 18 operations, in 39% of the cases the offering book amounted for 3 or more times the number of offered shares by the issuers. In 56% of the cases, the demand was higher than twice the amount of offered shares. In 72% of the cases the demand exceeded the offer by at least 50%. The average demand of the 2.229 bids was almost 4 times the number of offered shares by the issuers, or 394%, showed in the table 11 of this work. The main results of this work point out in the direction of the preference for long-term investors rather than short-term investors. We found that pricing and participation in many IPOs are not determiners for allocations by book runners, putting our results away from information asymmetry theories. Investor profile was found as a very important variable to explain allocations. We found evidences that long-term investors (long-only) are benefited in allocations and short-term investors (hedge-funds and treasuries) are penalized. The investor nationality was also found as very relevant. US investors are benefited while Brazilian investors are penalized, another result that goes against our first beliefs, once we had the perception that Brazilian investors had more information than the US investors about Brazilian companies. Actually, what explains this preference for US investors in the allocation processes is the fact that when an US investor bids for an specific IPO this investor is actually “sending” a sign to the markets of the quality of the issuer (the company is a “worth investing” company), therefore US investors end up determining the direction of an IPO, if it will be Hot IPO of Cold IPO. So underwriters give better allocations to US investors once the US investors sign positively to the markets about an specific IPO as afore mentioned. When doing our regressions we found a sign contrary to our expectation in the variable “size” of the bid order. This evidence goes against the theories of control. According to our database we found that underwriters favored large bid orders rather than small bid orders, whereas we expected underwriters to avoid concentration of allocations, defending the company issuer from liquidity problems and even a potential hostile take-over threat in the future.

本研究探討長期投資人之最適資產配置問題，並著重於通貨膨脹風險之分析。第一部份討論確定提撥退休金制度下，機構投資人或高所得自然人如何擬定投資策略規避通貨膨脹風險，達到極大化期末財富效用期望值。此研究擴展Battocchio與Menoncin (2004)所建構資產模型，不僅探討市場風險，亦考量通貨膨脹不確定性與基金費用誘因、下方風險保護兩機制，研究對資產配置行為之影響，並依動態規劃方法求得投資策略公式解。第二部份則強調下方風險之重要性，檢視在最低保證收益下，長期投資人跨期資產配置之財富管理議題，並回顧Deelstra et al.(2003)之模型架構，依平賭方法求得投資策略公式解，研究結果顯示基金投資策略可表示為最適CRRA(γ,T)型態共同基金與最低收益避險之組合。另一方面，如何估計通貨膨脹風險亦為本文強調之重點。Campbell和Viceira (2001)首次納入通貨膨脹風險並探討跨期投資議題，結論市場缺乏通貨膨脹連動投資標的時，投資人將減碼長期債持有比例。Brennan和Xia (2002)假設通貨膨脹率服從Ornstein-Uhlenbeck過程，結論投資人之避險需求隨持有債券到期日與投資期限改變。但以上結論未將通貨膨脹學習機制納入模型，因此，在第三部份提出依學習機制修正之投資策略可顯著增加財富效用，並分析在不同參數設定下，學習機制對於期末財富效用之影響。 / In this study, we study three essays of asset allocation problem for long term investors, which means that in this discourse we emphasis the importance of inflation risk. In the first topic, we derive the dynamic optimal investment strategy of the defined contribution pension schemes which include two mechanisms of partial floor protection and incentive fees and their benchmarks. We find investors should hold high proportion of stock index fund to hedge the inflation risk; moreover, the ratio of incentive fees to the setting of benchmark will change the optimal investment trend of underlying assets. In the second topic, we introduce the optimal investment portfolio with minimum guarantees and show that the fund manager should adjust the optimal weights of underlying assets with the ratio of the guarantee fund's value to the value of fund. Finally, this work focuses on how to precisely predict the dynamics of inflation rate. We apply learning method to adjust the prediction of inflation process and we use numerical analysis to study the effect of learning mechanism under different parameter setting.