The EU jurisdictional scheme, known as the “Brussels Regime”, confers competence to national courts to adjudicate over international matters. The main rule in Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation sets out that the defendant should generally be sued in the courts of the Member State where he is domiciled. For certain subject matters, the scheme allows the action to be brought elsewhere. The raison d’être is to provide an adequate counterbalance to the one-sided rule of Article 4(1). Articles 7(1) and (2) enable the claimant to launch the suit, “in matters relating to a contract”, at the court of the Member State where the contractual obligation was to be fulfilled, and, in “matters relating to tort”, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred. Whether to invoke Article 7 is entirely the claimant’s choice, but the final decision on its interpretation is vested in the Court. Thereby, the manner in which the Court views the provisions will effectively decide the extent of the claimant’s choice to invoke so-called special jurisdiction. It also means that greater emphasis on special jurisdiction will reduce the importance of the main rule in Article 4. Conversely, if the Court were to interpret Article 7 narrowly, its intended effect within the system would be denied. In both cases, the balance between Articles 4 and 7 has been upset. In the former case, the claimant is favoured because of the increased possibilities to choose the forum for the dispute, while in the latter case, the defendant is favoured because he retains the advantage of litigating in his home turf. The starting point for this essay is this very idea of a purported balance between litigants’ interests in EU cross-border litigation. The thesis analyses whether the Court’s case-law on general vis-à-vis special jurisdiction has transitioned from being generally defendant-friendly to claimant-friendly. It is argued that already from the first judgments rendered on the original Brussels Convention in 1976, increasingly more disputes have been launched at special fora, which has amounted to a claimant-friendly scheme. It is also argued that this development has been at the expense of the defendant. Greater choice for the claimant means in turn that the defendant’s ability to foresee before what courts he may be sued has been largely impaired. The thesis highlights how this imbalance is the result of inherent challenges in the Brussels Regime, particularly in relation to how the relevant connecting factors are designated. It is proposed that the unwanted effects of the Court’s practice as well as the shortcomings of the scheme itself are to be considered in the Commission’s evaluationof the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which is presently in the works.