The study was undertaken to assess the relationship between social experience and moral reasoning, and to examine two aspects of Kohlberg's universality claims. The participants were 81 South Africans; comprising 40 Blacks and 41 Whites drawn from four age groups. Moral reasoning was measured by means of The Standard Issue Scoring Manual (Colby et al.,1987 a,b). Social experience was measured by means of various self devised instruments. Results revealed that aside from the 19 - 28 age group there were no significant differences in level of moral reasoning between blacks and whites. Furthermore, blacks and whites showed no significant differences in the use of autonomous moral judgements. On the moral orientations, blacks and whites showed some differences in their pattern of responses. Results also revealed significant age differences in level of moral reasoning, moral orientations and moral type. On the measures of social experience, whites were found to have a more advantaged social experience than blacks. An examination of how social experience and moral reasoning, and age and moral reasoning were related, revealed that irrespective of race, the variables that were consistently related to moral reasoning, were age and education. The combination of variables that best predicted level of moral reasoning were found to be age and social index for whites, and education for blacks. The findings of the present study also provided some support for Kohlberg's universality claims. The results were discussed in relation to the findings of past research and the social realities within the South African context. Limitations of the present study were considered and suggestions were made concerning further research. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1992.

In examining children's moral orientations, the study draws on the work of Carol Gilligan (1982) and Lawerence Kohlberg (1969) focusing on age and gender differences in moral development. This study sought to examine children's moral reasoning about situations involving conflicts and how they can resolve them. The present study is carried out in order to ascertain whether children's choice of moral orientations varies across individual factors such as age and gender. The study was conducted at a primary school in a working class suburb in Pietermaritzburg, province of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. The participants in the study were a group of 72 grade one and two learners. The participants were randomly selected from an alphabetical class list stratified by age (6, 7 and 8 year olds) and gender in that 12 boys and 12 girls were selected in each age group. The pupils were required to respond to three scenarios depicting real life dilemmas. The scenarios were used for obtaining data on the children's moral reasoning. Results have shown that children across gender and age made more care than justice orientation compared to 30% that reflected a justice orientation. An interesting finding was that across age boys' responses reflected a more care orientation (68%) than a justice orientation (32%) which is contrary to Kohlberg's view. However, across age girls' responses reflected a greater care orientation (72%) than a justice orientation (28%), as suggested by Gilligan. Both boys and girls showed a preference for the care orientation because they appear to understand the importance of solving problems in a way that considers the needs and concerns of all individuals. To understand the logic behind the learners determination of who is right and wrong and why, it was necessary to locate and follow the moral language, since the language gives meaning to the learners underlying belief system (Ward, 1988). This study also examined the responses in terms of moral operant concepts, which is defined as the ideas, beliefs, or principles that were used to organize a moral orientation. / Thesis (M.Ed.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2006.

Assuming that moral discourse is prescriptive, what distinguishes it from other types of prescriptive discourse? To say, as Hare does, that it is its overridingness, is subject both to criticisms that assume that overridingness could, in principle, be used to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, and then show that it is doubtful that moral discourse is overriding, and to the criticisms that claim that it is in principle impossible to use overridingness to distinguish one type of prescriptive discourse from another, because all of them are bound to be on a par in respect of overridingness. / It is also impossible to distinguish moral discourse from other types of prescriptive discourse by saying that in it we use arguments based on imaginatively putting oneself in the shoes of others, because such arguments are used in prudential discourse as well. However, we can account for the distinction, if we realize that such arguments can be performed only on certain designated argument-places, and that in moral claims argument-places of two different types are designated for the purpose: those for moral agents and those for moral patients; while in prudential claims argument-places of only one type are designated: those for prudential agents. / If this account is accepted, this raises a number of further questions. Examination of these questions leads to a form of relativism about membership in the sets of moral agents and moral patients. This form of relativism, however, leaves considerable room for rational discussion of membership in these sets and is compatible with the rejection of relativism about the content of moral rules.

Thesis (B.A. Hons. 1977) from the Department of Psychology, University of Adelaide.

Thesis (M.T.S.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 1993. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [101]-103).

Thesis (M.A.)--St. John's Seminary, 1989. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 61-63).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 1997. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Bibliography: leaves 88-94.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1984. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 50-51).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1980. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-155).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1982. / Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 60-63).