Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: History is often manipulated to achieve contemporary goals. Writing or narrating history is not merely a recoding or a narration of objective facts, but a value-laden process often conforming to the goals of the writer or narrator. This study examines the ways in which the history of the Mabudu chiefdom has been manipulated to achieve political goals. Through an analysis of the history of the Mabudu chiefdom and the manner in which that history has been represented, this study illustrates that history is not merely a collection of verifiable facts, but rather a collection of stories open to interpretation and manipulation. In the middle of the eighteenth century the Mabudu or Mabudu-Tembe was the strongest political and economic unit in south-east Africa. Their authority only declined with state formation amongst the Swazi and Zulu in the early nineteenth century. Although the Zulu never defeated the Mabudu, the Mabudu were forced to pay tribute to the Zulu. In the 1980s the Prime Minister of KwaZulu, Mangusotho Buthelezi, used this fact as proof that the people of Maputaland (Mabudu-land) should be part of the Zulu nation-state. By the latter part of the nineteenth century Britain, Portugal and the South African Republic laid claim to Maputaland. In 1875 the French President arbitrated in the matter and drew a line along the current South Africa/ Mozambique border that would divide the British and French spheres of influence in south-east Africa. The line cut straight through the Mabudu chiefdom. In 1897 Britain formally annexed what was then called AmaThongaland as an area independent of Zululand, which was administered as ‘trust land’ for the Mabudu people. When deciding on a place for the Mabudu in its Grand Apartheid scheme, the South African Government ignored the fact that the Mabudu were never defeated by the Zulu or incorporated into the Zulu Empire. Until the late 1960s the government recognised the people of Maputaland as ethnically Tsonga, but in 1976 Maputaland was incorporated into the KwaZulu Homeland and the people classified as Zulu. In 1982 the issue was raised again when the South African Government planned to cede Maputaland to Swaziland. The government and some independent institutions launched research into the historic and ethnic ties of the people of Maputaland. Based on the same historical facts, contrasting claims were made about the historical and ethnic ties of the people of Maputaland. Maputaland remained part of KwaZulu and is still claimed by the Zulu king as part of his kingdom. The Zulu use the fact that the Mabudu paid tribute in the 1800s as evidence of their dominance. The Mabudu, on the other hand, use the same argument to prove their independence, only stating that tribute never meant subordination, but only the installation of friendly relations. This is a perfect example of how the same facts can be interpreted differently to achieve different goals and illustrates that history cannot be equated with objective fact.

The southern Mozambique/ South Africa borderland is a landscape epitomised by fluctuation, contradiction and constant transformation. It is a world betwixt-and-between Mozambique and South Africa. The international border, imposed on the landscape more than a century ago, gives life to a new world that stretches across and away from it. The inhabitants of this transitional zone constantly shape and reshape their own identities vis-à-vis people on the opposite and same side of the border. This border, which was delineated in 1875, was to separate the influence spheres of Portugal and Britain in south-east Africa. On the ground it divided the once strong and unified Mabudu-Tembe (Tembe-Thonga) chiefdom. At first the border was only a line on a map. With time, however, it became infused with social and cultural meaning as the dividing line between two new worlds. This was exacerbated by Portuguese and British colonial administration on opposite sides of the border, Apartheid in South Africa and socialist modernisation and war and displacement in Mozambique. All these events and factors created cultural fragmentation and disunion between the northern and southern sides of the borderland. By the end of the Mozambican War in 1992 the northern side of the borderland was populated by displaced refugees, demobilised soldiers and bandits, as well as returnees from neighbouring countries. Many of these people did not have any ancestral ties to the land nor kinship ties to its earlier inhabitants. Whereas a common Thonga identity had previously united people on both sides of the border, South African policies of Apartheid increasingly promoted the Zulu language and culture on the southern side of the border. The end of warfare in Mozambique and of Apartheid in South Africa facilitated contact across the border. Social contact between the inhabitants of the borderland is furthermore fostered by various economic opportunities offered by the border, such as cross-border trade and smuggling. The increase in social and economic contact has in turn dissolved differences between the inhabitants of the borderland and promoted homogeneity and unity across the political divide. Fragmentation and homogeneity characterises daily life in the borderland. Inhabitants of the frontier-zone play these forces off against each other, now emphasising the differences across the border, later emphasising the similarities. The borderland is a world of multiple identities, where ethnicity, citizenship and identity, already fluid and contextual concepts in their own rights, become even more so as people constantly define and redefine themselves in this transitional environment. / Thesis (DPhil (Anthropology))--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Anthropology and Archaeology / unrestricted