Thesis--Wisconsin. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 284-301).

Thesis (M.A.)--Western Michigan University. / Bibliography: p. 89-91.

Thesis (M.A.)--Western Michigan University. / Bibliography: p. 89-91.

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 200-203).

Thesis (M.S.)--University of North Texas, May, 2008. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

On April 11, 1951, President Harry S. Truman dismissed General Douglas MacArthur as Commander of United Nations forces in Korea. Since the dismissal, contemporaries of the Truman-MacArthur era and historians have tried to make sense of Truman's momentous decision to relieve one of America's greatest military heroes. While a great number of studies have devoted attention to the controversy, few if any have placed the Truman-MacArthur conflict within the context of the unprecedented militarization of American foreign policy that took place during the early cold war. This study departs from the traditional "blame-casting" that has dominated Truman-MacArthur scholarship in the past and concludes that General MacArthur was a casualty who was dismissed because he failed to grasp the global nature of the post-World War II American foreign policy agenda.Chapter One analyzes the literature dealing with the Truman-Macarthur controversy and illustrates why historical scholarship has failed to grasp the larger forces at work in American foreign policy while MacArthur was UN Commander in Korea. Chapter Two traces the tumultuous events of the controversy from the outbreak of war in Korea to MacArthur's April 11 dismissal. Finally, Chapter Three analyzes the Senate hearings that followed MacArthur's dismissal, illustrates the importance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's testimony, and explores the broader, global issues the Truman Administration faced in transforming its foreign policy while General MacArthur failed to grasp the nature of this transformation. / Department of History

The dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur on April 11, 1951, from all of his commands by President Truman furnished the impetus for this survey of editorial opinion and reaction. The newspaper editorial opinion represents five major daily newspapers with broad geographic coverage of the State of Indiana, plus a wide range of political reaction to the topic. The editorial opinion is also representative ofea diverse socio-economic base.Of the five newspapers, the Evansville Courier was one of two that retained a consistently rational outlook toward the American scene during the Truman-MacArthur conflict. It took the position early that the Korean War should not be expanded, that the chance of an expanding war with China was to be avoided. The Courier expressed its dissatisfaction with the Truman foreign policy record, including the loss of China. It supported executive privilege and roundly attacked MacArthur.The Fort Wayne News Sentinel was very conservative, expertly vindictive, and at times somewhat irrational in its editorial opinion. At other times, its tenor was completely opposite. After fighting had been stabilized at the 38th parallel, it advised moving no further north,thus supporting limitation of the war. The News Sentinel supported MacArthur to the hilt and generally, deplored American negotiations and her "cringing" under Russian communism.The Gary Post Tribune's record in regard to the Truman Administration was that it had failed in its Far Eastern foreign policy and that the policy was unclear. It called MacArthur's dismissal unfortunate, but added that the move was supported in the interest of preserving civilian supremacy and the western alliances. Early in the Senate hearings, it applauded the conduct of those proceedings but as they ground on, pleaded for their end. Imploring its readers to rational thinking, the Post Tribune insisted "Cold Reason Must Rule" and deplored the fact that it felt that negotiation was becoming synonymous with appeasement.The Indianapolis Star's production of editorial opinion was prolific, in comparison to the other newspapers. The Star maintained a consistent conservative Republican approach to all issues. The Truman Administration was condemned for loss of the World War II "Pacific victory," for appeasement and defeatism, and for the formulation and execution of its Far Eastern foreign policy. Russia was seen as the real enemy of America, and early in the Korean War, military limitations were supported but later those same limitations were attacked vigorously. The concept of limiting the war was said to encourage further aggression. The Star advocated the protection of executive privilege, and as the Senate hearings progressed, informed its readers that no new information could be gained from the testimony.Of the five newspapers, the Palladium Item was the most reactionary and irrational. Although, at times, emotionalism and an occasional case of irrationality overcame the News Sentinel and Star, the Palladium Item made a steady diet of those "entrees." In describing the toll of American lives in the Korean War, the paper revealed its nature in the editorial, the "Truman Meat Grinder." Allies were seen as worthless and Truman as a "puppet" of England. The paper insisted that Truman's "hatchet-men" were trying to smear the General's character, because he was a "champion" against "traitorous" elements in America.The editorial reaction of the five papers was conservative and condemned the Truman Administration foreign policy, especially in the Far East. The Evansville Courier and the Gary Post Tribune presented well thought-out opinions based on a rational approach to the frustrations of Americans in the Korean War and adherence to the concept of limited war. The Republican newspapers, the Indianapolis Star, the Fort Wayne News Sentinel, and the Richmond Palladium Item, adhered to the Republican condemnation of the Truman Administration.

Was Douglas MacArthur directly responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Philippine military during the Philippine campaign of 1941-1942? This question is still a point of debate among historians. During the six years that preceded the United States entrance into the Second World War, the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines attempted to implement a national defense plan devised by Douglas MacArthur. The end goal of MacArthur's plan was the creation of a professional Filipino military force that would be able to adequately defend the Philippines against invasion. From late 1935 until mid 1941 , MacArthur served as the official United States military adviser to the Commonwealth government. When war with Japan occurred in late 1941 the Philippine military was in dismal shape. The argument that MacArthur was directly responsible for the ineffectiveness of the Philippine military in the Philippine campaign of 1941-1942 is strongly supported by historical evidence of events that occurred during the creation, development, and fielding of the Philippine military in 1934-1941. An investigation of historical evidence shows that MacArthur is responsible for making a series of errors that caused rampant financial problems and an inadequate training program. These factors directly contributed to the ineffectiveness of Philippine military units during the 1941-1942 campaign.

Thesis (Master of Military Art and Science)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006. / AD-A463 797. Includes bibliographical references.

This work examines the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first year of the Korean War. Officially created in 1947, the Joint Chiefs saw their first true test as an institution during the conflict. At various times, the members of the JCS failed to issue direct orders to their subordinate, resulting in a divide between the wishes of President Truman and General MacArthur over the conduct of the war. By analyzing the interaction between the Joint Chiefs and General Douglas MacArthur, the flaws of both the individual Chiefs as well as the organization as a whole become apparent. The tactical and strategic decisions faced by the JCS are framed within the three main stages of the Korean War.