Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Magisterarbeit, 2002

Thesis (M.A.)--Brigham Young University. Dept. of English, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 113-116).

In this paper I present, and offer a solution to, a heretofore unacknowledged textual puzzle that arises from Margaret Cavendish's use of inconceivability to make claims about what is metaphysically impossible. On the one hand, Cavendish asserts that objects or events she cannot conceive of are impossible in nature (i.e., inconceivability entails impossibility in nature). On the other hand, she writes that there are some things that exist or occur in nature that are inconceivable to humans (i.e., inconceivability does not entail impossibility in nature). Put simply, Cavendish seemingly contradicts herself. This textual puzzle not only threatens to undermine Cavendish's philosophical method; it also calls her opposition to human exceptionalism into question. By asserting that what is inconceivable to her is impossible in nature, Cavendish implies by contraposition that she can conceive of everything that is metaphysically possible. In so doing, she seems to make an exception at least for herself: though she believes that other parts of nature cannot conceive of everything in nature, she implies that she can. Ultimately, I argue that Cavendish thinks we can sometimes tell why something is inconceivable. In some cases, something is inconceivable because it lies beyond the limits of humans' mental capacities. In other cases, something is inconceivable because it is contradictory. This interpretation solves the textual puzzle, as it is consistent for Cavendish to maintain that some objects and events in nature are beyond our mental limits and that we can derive the impossibility of some object or event in nature from its contradictoriness. My interpretation preserves Cavendish's opposition to human exceptionalism, moreover, as no part of nature can conceive of contradictions. That is, Cavendish's claim is not merely that what is inconceivable to her is impossible in nature, but rather that what is inconceivable to her and to every other part of nature is impossible in nature. / Master of Arts / Margaret Cavendish, a seventeenth century philosopher, makes two seemingly contradictory claims throughout her philosophical works. On the one hand, she implies that if something is inconceivable to her — that is, if she cannot form a mental picture of it — that thing is impossible in nature. On the other hand, she writes that there are plenty of things that exist or occur in nature which are inconceivable to humans. A textual puzzle therefore arises: Cavendish seems to simultaneously maintain (1) that something is impossible in nature if she cannot conceive of it, and (2) that something is not necessarily impossible in nature if she cannot conceive of it. In this paper, I propose that Cavendish believes humans can at least sometimes determine why something is inconceivable. That is, we can at least sometimes diagnose our inability to form a mental picture of something. In some cases, Cavendish thinks, we cannot form a mental picture of something because of our limited, human mental capacities. (We might think, for example, that this is why we cannot form a mental picture of all the colors butterflies see.) In other cases, we cannot form a mental picture of something because that thing is contradictory. (We might think, for instance, that this is why we cannot form a mental picture of an apple that is both red all over and not red all over.) I further argue that Cavendish only asserts that something is impossible in nature if it is inconceivable because it is contradictory. On my account, the textual puzzle I presented above is in fact not so puzzling. Cavendish thinks that if something is inconceivable because it is contradictory, then it is impossible in nature. She also thinks that there are plenty of things in nature that we cannot conceive of because of our limited human mental capacities. Thankfully, these two claims are not in tension.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2005. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains v, 220 p. Vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 205-217).

William Shakespeare and Margaret Cavendish each published plays and poems focusing on the precarious implications and cultural enactments of female chastity in their time. Their lives and writing careers bookend a time when chastity's place in English politics, religion, and social life was perceived as crucial for women while also being challenged and radically redefined. This paper engages in period-specific definitions of virginity and chastity, and with modern scholarship on the same, to explore the historicity of chastity and how representations of self-enforced chastity create opportunities for female political power in certain fiction contexts. Through a comparison of the female protagonists of Measure for Measure and Assaulted and Pursued Chastity—Isabella and Travellia—I argue that both characters are able to assert and gain practical forms of power within their respective systems of government, and not just in spiritual or economic spheres.

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Critical theory has historically situated the beginning of the “modern” era of subjectivity near the end of the seventeenth century. Michel Foucault himself once said in an interview that modernity began with the writings of the late seventeenth-century philosopher Benedict Spinoza. But an examination of early modern English utopian literature demonstrates that a modern notion of subjectivity can be found in texts that pre-date Spinoza. In this dissertation, I examine four utopian texts—Thomas More’s Utopia, Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis, Margaret Cavendish’s Description of a New World, Called the Blazing World, and Henry Neville’s Isle of Pines—through the paradigm of Jacques Lacan’s tripartite model of subjectivity—the Imaginary, the Symbolic, and the Real. To mediate between Lacan’s psychoanalytic model and the historical aspects of these texts, such as their relationship with print culture and their engagement with political developments in seventeenth-century England, I employ the theories of the Marxist-Lacanian philosopher, Slavoj Žižek, to show that “early modern” subjectivity is in in fact no different from critical theory’s “modern” subject, despite pre-dating the supposed inception of such subjectivity. In addition, I engage with other prominent theorists, including Fredric Jameson, Jacques Derrida, and Donna Haraway, to come to an understanding about the ways in which critical theory can be useful to understand not only early modern literature, but also the contemporary, “real” world and the subjectivity we all seek to attain.

“Circulating Knowledges: Literature and the Idea of the Library in Renaissance England” pairs literary texts and libraries to illustrate how literary creation and library building in England from 1500 to 1700 were deeply invested in one another. The history of English Renaissance libraries has generally been analyzed from the viewpoints of religious history and historiography, seen by scholars as a story of Protestant librarians attempting to preserve (or invent) a history of Protestant England. Many literary critics —citing Thomas Bodley’s notorious distaste for “stage plaies”—have typically reduced institutional libraries to elitist boogeymen hostile to popular or vernacular literature. Revising these narratives, this dissertation brings together a large corpus, including works by Thomas More, John Lyly, Edmund Spenser, Robert Greene, Christopher Marlowe, Francis Bacon, and Margaret Cavendish, to illustrate how literary depictions of England’s fledgling libraries shaped their creation and development, while the practices of these inchoate libraries in turn influenced literary texts. “Circulating Knowledges” advances its argument on several fronts. First, I show that developments (or a perceived lack of development) in library organization, access, and use appeared in literary texts, which often depicted literary libraries in response to these developments. Second, I home in on moments when literary texts that seem not at all interested in libraries become unexpectedly fruitful texts through which to develop literary thinking about libraries. In the process of excavating this literary interest in libraries, I demonstrate that Renaissance literature concerns itself not only with depicting, commenting on, or objecting to the developments in library creation happening during the period, but also in imagining alternative possibilities for how libraries might function, conceptions of a library that often outstripped what was materially possible in the period: these conceptions I term “the idea of the library.” In detailing literature’s preoccupation with developments in Renaissance library systems, I offer new perspectives on the period’s literary attitudes toward the creation, transmission, and protection of knowledge, all questions which the building—or imagining—of a library brings to the forefront.

In the early seventeenth century, a number of female writers began to exercise a strong degree of agency in the materials they published and the discourse in which they participated. Discussions of expanded female education abounded in their writing, and by the end of the century, female writers had become bold enough to write tracts proposing entirely new educational institutions for women. These proposed all-female schools would have provided teachers and students alike with both an intellectual space free from patriarchal strictures and the opportunity to expand their minds unimpeded. Through analysis of works by Rachel Speght, Elizabeth Isham, Margaret Cavendish, Bathsua Makin, and Mary Astell, this thesis traces the broad preoccupation of female writers with female intellectual communities across the seventeenth century. This project adds to current and past scholarly discussions of female reading in the early modern period, notes rhetorical continuities between the works of these various writers, and hopes to contribute to our understanding of early feminist thought.

This dissertation offers a new interpretation of the metaphysics of two seventeenth-century women philosophers – Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673) and Anne Conway (1631–1679) – and brings to light an unnoticed tradition in seventeenth-century philosophy. I argue that both Cavendish and Conway can be understood as panpsychist-materialist monists: despite their other differences, they agree that there is one kind of substance in nature or creation, and that the single sort of substance always displays material features and mental capacities. Further, I propose that Cavendish and Conway are joined by the physician Francis Glisson (1597–1677) and the poet John Milton (1608–1674) as examples of a distinct panpsychist-materialist tendency in early modern England. ‘Panpsychist-materialist monism’ may at first seem too clunky to serve as the moniker of a movement, but it earns its keep by accurately capturing three elements of the figures’ systems that, when studied together as a group of related commitments, reveal the philosophical significance of each person’s views. My reading therefore bears on the project of interpreting Cavendish and Conway on their own terms and changes the way their context should be understood. Moreover, to the extent that contemporary philosophers of mind draw on philosophers from history in the formulation of their current views, the work presented in this dissertation stands to make a difference in present-day philosophy as well.