Les limitations d’atterrissage des hélicoptères ne sont pas valables dans l'environnement à bord d’un navire. Il n'existe aucune méthodologie approuvée de l'analyse ou de la simulation pour évaluer la compatibilité des hélicoptères-navires et préparer les essais de qualification hélicoptères-navires. Dans ce contexte, le présent travail présente le développement et l'analyse d'une méthodologie hors ligne pour déterminer les limites opérationnelles hélicoptères-navires, SHOLs, en fonction des prédictions d’un modèle de pilote humain. Pour cela, des essais pilotés par des humains sont effectués au simulateur de l’ONERA, Salon de Provence. Sur la base des résultats de ces tests, une méthodologie innovante est validée pour déterminer la limitation de la charge de travail de pilotage, à partir des mesures des déplacements des contrôles d'hélicoptère. En outre, sont validés des modifications innovantes sur un modèle de pilote humain pour pouvoir suivre les trajectoires souhaitées et fournir le même niveau d'activité aux contrôles qu'un véritable pilote. Un ensemble de critères objectifs, correspondant aux marges de sécurité, s'ajoute aux critères subjectifs, correspondant aux limitations de la charge de travail du pilote. Une routine de simulation hors ligne, appelée SholSim, est programmée pour réaliser des simulations avec le modèle pilote et vérifier l'acceptabilité des conditions de vol, selon les critères subjectifs et objectifs. Par conséquent, le présent travail présente la première estimation, dans la littérature, des SHOLs entièrement obtenus à partir d'outils hors ligne, basés uniquement sur les prédictions de modèle pilote. / Helicopter land-based limitations are not valid in the shipboard environment. There is no analytical or simulated approved methodology for evaluating shipboard helicopter compatibility issues and preparing for at-sea flight tests. In this context, the present work presents the development and analysis of an offline methodology to determine the Ship-Helicopter Operating Limitations, SHOLs, based on pilot model predictions. For this, pilot-in-the-loop simulation trials are performed at the engineering fixed-base simulation facility of ONERA, Salon de Provence. Based on these test results, an innovative methodology is proposed and validated to determine the safe pilot workload limitation, from the measurements of the helicopter control displacements. In addition, it is proposed and validated innovative modifications on a classical pilot model enabling to follow complex predefined desired trajectories and provide the same level of control activity of a real pilot. A set of objective criteria, corresponding to the safety margins, is established in addition to the subjective criteria, corresponding to the safe pilot workload limitations. An offline simulation routine, so-called SholSim, is coded to run all models and verify the acceptability of the flight conditions, according to the subjective and objective criteria. Therefore, the present work presents the first estimation, in the literature, of the SHOLs fully obtained from offline tools, based only on pilot model predictions. The proposed methodology is promising, confirmed by predicting coherent limits when compared to the ones defined by the pilot-in-the-loop simulation trials.

Many smaller ports in Cornwall and Devon (CAD) are situated in environmentally sensitive habitats and generate benefits for stakeholders and local communities. Such ports are often embedded in tourist based economies. Increasing environmental legislation is placing a strain on the resources of smaller ports making compliance a threat to profitability and thus the future of some ports and local economies. Over-reliance on environmental management systems (EMS) across the ports industry has predominated over the importance of holistic sustainability. This project develops and disseminates a port sustainability management system (PSMS) in CAD, assisting ports to plan marine and maritime operations more sustainably, to facilitate mitigation of potential risks, to increase knowledge and awareness of port sustainability, and to promote the adoption of a proactive stance towards sustainable port management. A constructivist philosophy suited a multiple methods research design which included ethnographic content analysis (ECA), statistical verification of qualitative coding, nine scoping interviews, and eight semi-structured interviews during the main phase of data collection. The seven Harbour Masters (HMs) in this phase represented all port governance types found in the UK. Charmaz’s grounded theory (GT) methodology guided the collection and analysis of primary data between August 2012 and February 2013 to create new theory using an inductive constructivist approach. Validation by fifteen of the thirty local HMs during industry testing revealed numerous advantages and benefits of deploying PSMS which is estimated to generate £50,000 worth of benefits per port annually, and £3,865,005 for the 15 participating ports over 5 years. A new model of smaller port sustainability has emerged. PSMS has eleven pillars of sustainability which underpin the spectrum of port operations. Within this model, each pillar is equally important in contributing to the overall sustainability of a port, and neglect of one could jeopardise sustainability overall and potentially cause a chain reaction with other pillars.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) regarding the operation of aircraft from ships of the RAN and from RAAF shore bases. The effects of the separate intellectual development of maritime doctrine in the RAAF and RAN, and the efforts of the two Australian services to transfer theory into practice will be considered in the pre- (and post) World War II period, with due consideration of the experience of the services in both wars. The thesis will also discuss the problems that were faced by the RAAF and RAN to develop mutually acceptable operational procedures to enable the efficient use of aircraft in a maritime setting. The influence and effect on RAAF and RAN doctrine and equipment procurement, as a result of the special relationships that developed between the Air Force and Navy of Australia and Britain will be critically examined. A similar approach to the post war US/Australian relationship, and its effect on the Australian services, will also be critically examined. The thesis being propounded is that the development of a unique Australian maritime policy was retarded due to a combination of the relationship with Britain and the United States, lack of suitable equipment, lack of clear operational concepts in both the RAAF and RAN and the parochial attitude of the most senior commanders of both Services. The study has been based on Department of Navy, Department of Air and Department of Defence documents held in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and Melbourne. In addition, relevant documents from the Admiralty and Air Ministry related to the development of naval aviation on RAN vessels during World War I, the attitude of the RAF toward the deployment of RAAF units to Singapore, and the negotiations that resulted in the procurement of HMA Ships Sydney and Melbourne, have been perused. Wartime operational records of the RAAF have been examined to obtain data to enable a critical study to be made of the RAAF anti-submarine campaign, torpedo bomber operations and the maritime campaign undertaken from bases in North Western Area during World War II. The influence of the commander of the United States 5th Air Force has also been incorporated in the discussion. The research uncovered procedural and operational variations between the two Services, the diversion of key elements from Australian command and the priority given to the American line of advance that resulted in Australian operations being given a secondary, supportive, status. A conclusion reached as a result of this research has been that the development of a unique Australian maritime aerial capability was restricted by the requirement of Britain to deploy flying units to Singapore in 1940. Similarly, the pressure exerted on the RAN by the Admiralty to purchase the Light Fleet Carriers in the late 1940s was more in the interests of the RN and British foreign policy than that of the RAN. Overall, the relationship with the Britain and the United States masked the real weakness in Australia???s maritime operations and retarded its development.