In this article, we combine two so far separate strands of the economic literature and argue that democratization leads to a real exchange rate appreciation. We test this hypothesis empirically for a sample of countries observed from 1980 to 2007 by combining a difference-in-difference approach with propensity score matching estimators. Our empirical results reveal a strong and significant finding: democratization causes real exchange rates to appreciate. Consequently, the ongoing process of democratization observed in many parts of the world is likely to reduce exchange rate distortions.

This dissertation examines the effect of various corporate governance mechanisms on firm risk taking. The first essay examines the effect on firm risk through the CEO ability channel, while the second essay examines the effect on firm risk through the institutional investor channel. This first essay investigates CEO risk management ability. Using CEO education as a proxy for ability I examine the relationship between CEO education and various types of risk: (1) market risk, (2) credit risk, and (3) operational risk. Propensity score methods are used as a way to deal with the endogenous matching problem which exists in the executive compensation literature. These methods are proposed as an alternative to the managerial fixed effects approaches such as ``spell fixed effects'' and the mover dummy variable method (MDV). While the managerial fixed effects methods would fail when the explanatory variables of interest are time-invariant, it is possible to capture this variation in managerial effects by using propensity score methods. I find that the effect on the various types of risks varies by the type of risk and by the type and quality of education. Firms with CEOs that have law degrees and actuarial credentials are associated with fewer operational risk events. While firms with CEOs that have MBA degrees are able to manage market risk better than their peers. Overall, the quality of CEO education matters, and in many cases it is associated with a simultaneous reduction in firm risk and increase in firm value. This second essay investigates the impact of institutional shareholder ownership on firm risk taking. I find a negative relationship between the aggregate institutional ownership percentage and firm risk taking. I also find that institutional ownership concentration induces risk taking. In addition, the effect on firm risk is stronger when institutional shareholders have majority control. The results provide support for both the prudent-man law and the large institutional shareholder hypotheses. Furthermore, the results are robust to quasi-experimental approaches including propensity score matching and doubly robust estimation. These findings provide additional evidence on the benefits and incentives of institutional shareholder monitoring. / Business Administration/Risk Management and Insurance

Dans cette thèse, nous dépassons le cadre binaire de l’évaluation et nous nous plaçons dans celui de plusieurs traitements, à l’instar de Brodaty et al. [2001], Larson [2000], Imbens [1999]. Les estimations effectuées portent sur les politiques de l’emploi en vigueur en France pendant la période 1997-1999. Trois programmes sont étudies : CIE (Contrat Initiative Emploi) emploi subventionné dans le secteur marchand, CES (Contrat Emploi-Solidarité) création d’emploi dans le secteur non marchand et SIFE (Stage d’Insertion par la Formation et l’Emploi). L’efficacité de ces dispositifs est évaluée non seulement sur le taux de retour à l’emploi des bénéficiaires mais aussi sur divers autres critères qui répondent à différentes questions intéressantes économiquement et économétriquement : i) la politique active de l’emploi atteint-elle les demandeurs d’emploi les plus prioritaires parmi les prioritaires ? ii) Comment les entreprises utilisent-elles les programmes de la politique active (effet d’aubaine, de substitution,...) ? iii) Pouvons-nous mesurer la qualité d’un contrat aidé ? Comment évaluer l’efficacité relative d’un contrat aidé (plus spécifiquement) non marchand comparativement à celui du secteur marchand ?, impact marginal, effet propre, bien-être, , etc. / We evaluate the ALMP’s with a particular attention to the differentiation of impacts by categories of programmes and categories of beneficiaries. These two forms of heterogeneity can in fact lead to erroneous evaluations or too partial:i) The heterogeneity of programmes proposed, in particular their characteristics (type of contract, duration, remuneration, training, etc.) are an important source of complexity in behavior of self-selection of job seekers: behaviors can be multiples and strategic.ii) The heterogeneity of target-populations (low-skilled, youth, women, priority category, first-job seekers, etc.) is an important source of complexity in the behavior selection of employment advisor.There is finally no reason that different types of programmes have the same average effect on various public as well. We evaluate so ALMP’s on multiple criteria of effectiveness (heterogeneity of criteria).