FundaÃÃo de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Cearà / The objective of this study is about the individual within Max Stirner from the immanent reading of his main work The Ego and Its Own (1844). The theme involving the individual is central in Stirner's work, yet so little is known and studied. Stating in an objective way, the individual for Stirner possesses an unconditional, entirely free existence, occupying a central spot, singular, unique in the world. In other words, the individual is in a Stirnerian sphere in which nothing is before or after him, where no power is imposed, no conditioning restricts him, he is free from any constraints, obligations or duties. The novelty presented by Stirner consists, apart from a defense of the individual, especially a defense of his individuality. For Stirner, the constitutive character of individuality is not social, but natural, whereas since the first contact with the world, the individual struggles to affirm himself, to the point where he becomes aware of himself as a purely selfish existence. Stirner intends to create conditions for each individual to rebel against all entities that try to suppress the power and the individual strength. Our philosopher will make use of terms like Ego or Its-own to designate this example of irreducible individuality, unrepeatable and owner of himself and the world. As Stirner's thinking was forgotten for a long time, or misrepresented by most of his critics, we chose to perform an immanent reading of the featured work without, however, discard those contributions who preceded us in the subject of this study. / O objetivo desta dissertaÃÃo consiste no estudo acerca da questÃo do indivÃduo em Max Stirner a partir da leitura imanente de sua principal obra O Ãnico e sua Propriedade (1844). A temÃtica envolvendo o indivÃduo à central na obra stirneriana, contudo, pouco conhecida e estudada. De forma objetiva, o indivÃduo para Stirner goza de uma existÃncia incondicionada, inteiramente livre, ocupando um lugar central, singular, Ãnica no mundo. Em outros termos, o indivÃduo stirneriano encontra-se numa esfera na qual nada lhes à anterior ou posterior, em que nenhum poder se lhe impÃe, nenhum condicionamento o restringe, sendo livre de quaisquer constrangimentos, imposiÃÃes ou deveres. A novidade apresentada por Stirner consiste, para alÃm de uma defesa do indivÃduo, principalmente uma defesa de sua individualidade. Para ele, o carÃter constitutivo da individualidade nÃo à social, mas natural, ao passo que, desde o primeiro contato com o mundo, o indivÃduo luta para se afirmar, atà o ponto no qual toma consciÃncia de si, como existÃncia puramente egoÃsta. Stirner intenta criar condiÃÃes para que cada indivÃduo se revolte contra todas as entidades que tentam reprimir o poder e a forÃa individuais. Nosso filÃsofo farà uso dos termos Ãnico ou Eu-proprietÃrio para designar este exemplar de individualidade irredutÃvel, irrepetÃvel e proprietÃria de si e do mundo. Como o pensamento de Stirner fora esquecido por muito tempo, ou deturpado pela maioria de seus crÃticos, optamos pela realizaÃÃo de uma leitura imanente da obra em destaque sem, no entanto, descartarmos as contribuiÃÃes daqueles que nos antecederam no estudo da temÃtica em questÃo.

Max Stirner has historically been charged with nihilism, narcissism, and nominalism. Yet there exists another Stirner—a Stirner attentive and responsive to the intricate uncertainty of existence. I argue that we can find in his destructive an-archism a spirited celebration of creativity and experimentation; in his wild anti-humanism, a gentle sympathy for the human life; in his aggressive atheism, an unwavering clemency for the heathen. Stirner’s vagabond ontology, egoist ethics, and insurrectionary politics culminate in a singular, joyful affirmation: there are other ways of being.

Die tema van hierdie verhandeling is 'n vergelykende studie van die kategorie enkeling by Soren Kierkegaard en Max Stirner met die doel om punte van ooreenkoms en basiese verskille uit te wys. Daar word gepoog om deur 'n analise van begrippe wat binne die kategorie van die enkeling val, nuwe lig te werp op die twee denkers se filosofie. Hierdie probleemstelling bring mee dat daar gedurig vergelykend gewerk word, maar dat die uiteensetting ook beperk word tot daardie basiese begrippe wat die vergelyking duidelik na vore bring. So word in hoofsaak dan die volgende behandel: Die probleem van denke en syn soos dit by die twee denkers voorkom, word ondersoek. Beide Kierkegaard en Stirner stel die eksisterende enkeling as die sentrale begrip in die soeke na 'n relasie tussen denke en syn. Belangrike verwante eksistensiebegrippe kom voorts onder bespreking; die stel van die self en selfkeuse, selfbewussyn, moontlikheid en wording, eksistensie, essensie, reele en ideele syn. By die ontleding van hierdie begrippe word duidelik aangedui hoe verskillend die antwoorde was wat Kierkegaard en Stirner gegee het in die lig van die filosofiese probleme van hulle tyd. Wanneer Kierkegaard die enkeling stel as eindig-oneindig word die moontlikheid meteen gestel vir 'n relasie van die enkeling tot God, terwyl Stirner die enkeling slegs as oneindig sien. Die begrippe "sprong" en "oomblik" gee die sleutel tot die verstaan van Kierkegaard se filosofie en stel meteen ook die moontlikheid dat 'tiie enkeling voor God" kan staan. Stirner en Kierkegaard se beskouing van "gees" is wyd ui teenlopend en illustreer duidelik Stirner se negatiewe denke en Kierkegaard se positiewe siening. Kierkegaard stel die begrip subjektiwiteit as antwoord op die vraag na die waarheid, terwyl Stirner ook van hierdie prinsipe uitgaan, maar 'n heel ander resultaat bereik. Kierkegaard stel die moontlikheid van 'n etiese lewe waarin die enkeling hoër as die universele is. Be ide Stirner en Kierkegaard trek te velde teen die moraliteit van hulle tyd, maar op heel verskillende wyse - dit blyk veral uit die inhoud wat hul gee aan begrippe soos "vryheid" en "massa". Kortliks word aangedui hoe Kierkegaard se filosofie uitloop op die finale stadium van religieusiteit deur die stel van begrippe soos sonde, skuld, angs ens. Stirner verwerp alle vorme van godsdiens as blote verbeeldingsvlugte. Die resultaat van die studie is dat hoewel daar enkele ernstige besware ingebring kan word teen Kierkegaard se siening van die "enkeling", hy nogtans 'n baie belangrike bydrae tot die filosofie lewer. Die positiewe van sy siening lê juis daarin dat die "enkeling" oop is vir 'n relasie tot die jy en veral die U. Stirner se beskouing loop uit op 'n volslae skeptisisme en is volledig onvrugbaar. Stirner en Kierkegaard se uiteindelike siening van die "enkeling" is wyd uiteenlopend en die basiese verskil kan reeds aangetoon word in die gebruik van die terme "Einzige" en "Einzelne"; Kierkegaard se "enkeling" is uniek en enig op 'n heel ander wyse dan Stirner se "enkeling". / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 1971. / gm2014 / Anthropology and Archaeology / unrestricted

The main objective of this thesis is to examine conscientious objection to military service as a case of resistance to modern power in relation with the possibilities of &ldquo / self&rdquo / . In this context, Max Stirner&rsquo / s theory of &ldquo / ego&rdquo / and Michel Foucault&rsquo / s conceptualisations of modern power and modern subject are critically analyzed. In accordance with the relation between conscientious objection and the possibilities of self, Foucault&rsquo / s theories of &ldquo / power over life&rdquo / and &ldquo / ethics of care of self&rdquo / are discussed by examining disciplinary power and bio-power in relation with militarized society characterized by universal male conscription. On the other hand, Stirner&rsquo / s theory of &ldquo / the union of egoists&rdquo / and his conceptualization of &ldquo / Ownness&rdquo / is employed in order to investigate the possibilities of constituting an autonomous self. This study reveals that the act of conscientious objection overlaps objector&rsquo / s endeavour of creating an autonomous self. It is argued that following Stirnerian and Foucauldian conceptualisations of &ldquo / self&rdquo / , the objector, by refusing external power over his/her will in militarized society, indeed, engages in a struggle to constitute his/her own definition of self and his/her way of life.