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The matter of the self in Max Stirner / A questÃo do indivÃduo em Max StirnerSandro Soares Rodrigues 11 September 2015 (has links)
FundaÃÃo de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Cearà / The objective of this study is about the individual within Max Stirner from the immanent
reading of his main work The Ego and Its Own (1844). The theme involving the individual is
central in Stirner's work, yet so little is known and studied. Stating in an objective way, the
individual for Stirner possesses an unconditional, entirely free existence, occupying a central
spot, singular, unique in the world. In other words, the individual is in a Stirnerian sphere in
which nothing is before or after him, where no power is imposed, no conditioning restricts
him, he is free from any constraints, obligations or duties. The novelty presented by Stirner
consists, apart from a defense of the individual, especially a defense of his individuality. For
Stirner, the constitutive character of individuality is not social, but natural, whereas since the
first contact with the world, the individual struggles to affirm himself, to the point where he
becomes aware of himself as a purely selfish existence. Stirner intends to create conditions for
each individual to rebel against all entities that try to suppress the power and the
individual strength. Our philosopher will make use of terms like Ego or Its-own to designate
this example of irreducible individuality, unrepeatable and owner of himself and the world.
As Stirner's thinking was forgotten for a long time, or misrepresented by most of his critics,
we chose to perform an immanent reading of the featured work without, however, discard
those contributions who preceded us in the subject of this study. / O objetivo desta dissertaÃÃo consiste no estudo acerca da questÃo do indivÃduo em Max
Stirner a partir da leitura imanente de sua principal obra O Ãnico e sua Propriedade (1844). A
temÃtica envolvendo o indivÃduo à central na obra stirneriana, contudo, pouco conhecida e
estudada. De forma objetiva, o indivÃduo para Stirner goza de uma existÃncia incondicionada,
inteiramente livre, ocupando um lugar central, singular, Ãnica no mundo. Em outros termos, o
indivÃduo stirneriano encontra-se numa esfera na qual nada lhes à anterior ou posterior, em
que nenhum poder se lhe impÃe, nenhum condicionamento o restringe, sendo livre de
quaisquer constrangimentos, imposiÃÃes ou deveres. A novidade apresentada por Stirner
consiste, para alÃm de uma defesa do indivÃduo, principalmente uma defesa de sua
individualidade. Para ele, o carÃter constitutivo da individualidade nÃo à social, mas natural,
ao passo que, desde o primeiro contato com o mundo, o indivÃduo luta para se afirmar, atà o
ponto no qual toma consciÃncia de si, como existÃncia puramente egoÃsta. Stirner intenta criar
condiÃÃes para que cada indivÃduo se revolte contra todas as entidades que tentam reprimir o
poder e a forÃa individuais. Nosso filÃsofo farà uso dos termos Ãnico ou Eu-proprietÃrio para
designar este exemplar de individualidade irredutÃvel, irrepetÃvel e proprietÃria de si e do
mundo. Como o pensamento de Stirner fora esquecido por muito tempo, ou deturpado pela
maioria de seus crÃticos, optamos pela realizaÃÃo de uma leitura imanente da obra em
destaque sem, no entanto, descartarmos as contribuiÃÃes daqueles que nos antecederam no
estudo da temÃtica em questÃo.
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Max Stirner: Ontology, Ethics, PoliticsGuvenc, Deniz Ali Woloshin 22 February 2019 (has links)
Max Stirner has historically been charged with nihilism, narcissism, and nominalism. Yet there exists another Stirner—a Stirner attentive and responsive to the intricate uncertainty of existence. I argue that we can find in his destructive an-archism a spirited celebration of creativity and experimentation; in his wild anti-humanism, a gentle sympathy for the human life; in his aggressive atheism, an unwavering clemency for the heathen. Stirner’s vagabond ontology, egoist ethics, and insurrectionary politics culminate in a singular, joyful affirmation: there are other ways of being.
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Die Kategorie van die enkeling by Soren Kierkegaard en Max StirnerDu Toit, Andrew Pieter January 1971 (has links)
Die tema van hierdie verhandeling is 'n vergelykende
studie van die kategorie enkeling by Soren Kierkegaard en Max
Stirner met die doel om punte van ooreenkoms en basiese verskille
uit te wys. Daar word gepoog om deur 'n analise van
begrippe wat binne die kategorie van die enkeling val, nuwe
lig te werp op die twee denkers se filosofie. Hierdie probleemstelling
bring mee dat daar gedurig vergelykend gewerk
word, maar dat die uiteensetting ook beperk word tot daardie
basiese begrippe wat die vergelyking duidelik na vore bring.
So word in hoofsaak dan die volgende behandel:
Die probleem van denke en syn soos dit by die twee denkers
voorkom, word ondersoek. Beide Kierkegaard en Stirner stel
die eksisterende enkeling as die sentrale begrip in die soeke na 'n relasie tussen denke en syn. Belangrike verwante eksistensiebegrippe
kom voorts onder bespreking; die stel van die self en selfkeuse, selfbewussyn, moontlikheid en wording,
eksistensie, essensie, reele en ideele syn. By die ontleding
van hierdie begrippe word duidelik aangedui hoe verskillend
die antwoorde was wat Kierkegaard en Stirner gegee het in die
lig van die filosofiese probleme van hulle tyd. Wanneer
Kierkegaard die enkeling stel as eindig-oneindig word die
moontlikheid meteen gestel vir 'n relasie van die enkeling
tot God, terwyl Stirner die enkeling slegs as oneindig sien.
Die begrippe "sprong" en "oomblik" gee die sleutel tot die
verstaan van Kierkegaard se filosofie en stel meteen ook die
moontlikheid dat 'tiie enkeling voor God" kan staan. Stirner
en Kierkegaard se beskouing van "gees" is wyd ui teenlopend en
illustreer duidelik Stirner se negatiewe denke en Kierkegaard
se positiewe siening. Kierkegaard stel die begrip subjektiwiteit
as antwoord op die vraag na die waarheid, terwyl
Stirner ook van hierdie prinsipe uitgaan, maar 'n heel ander
resultaat bereik.
Kierkegaard stel die moontlikheid van 'n etiese
lewe waarin die enkeling hoër as die universele is. Be ide
Stirner en Kierkegaard trek te velde teen die moraliteit van
hulle tyd, maar op heel verskillende wyse - dit blyk veral uit
die inhoud wat hul gee aan begrippe soos "vryheid" en "massa".
Kortliks word aangedui hoe Kierkegaard se filosofie uitloop
op die finale stadium van religieusiteit deur die stel van
begrippe soos sonde, skuld, angs ens. Stirner verwerp alle vorme van godsdiens as blote verbeeldingsvlugte.
Die resultaat van die studie is dat hoewel daar
enkele ernstige besware ingebring kan word teen Kierkegaard
se siening van die "enkeling", hy nogtans 'n baie belangrike
bydrae tot die filosofie lewer. Die positiewe van sy siening lê juis daarin dat die "enkeling" oop is vir 'n relasie tot
die jy en veral die U. Stirner se beskouing loop uit op 'n
volslae skeptisisme en is volledig onvrugbaar. Stirner en
Kierkegaard se uiteindelike siening van die "enkeling" is
wyd uiteenlopend en die basiese verskil kan reeds aangetoon
word in die gebruik van die terme "Einzige" en "Einzelne";
Kierkegaard se "enkeling" is uniek en enig op 'n heel ander
wyse dan Stirner se "enkeling". / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 1971. / gm2014 / Anthropology and Archaeology / unrestricted
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Understanding Conscientious Objection As Resistance: Theories Of Self In Stirner And FoucaultCol, Berna 01 October 2011 (has links) (PDF)
The main objective of this thesis is to examine conscientious objection to military service as a case of resistance to modern power in relation with the possibilities of &ldquo / self&rdquo / . In this context, Max Stirner&rsquo / s theory of &ldquo / ego&rdquo / and Michel Foucault&rsquo / s conceptualisations of modern power and modern subject are critically analyzed. In accordance with the relation between conscientious objection and the possibilities of self, Foucault&rsquo / s theories of &ldquo / power over life&rdquo / and &ldquo / ethics of care of self&rdquo / are discussed by examining disciplinary power and bio-power in relation with militarized society characterized by universal male conscription. On the other hand, Stirner&rsquo / s theory of &ldquo / the union of egoists&rdquo / and his conceptualization of &ldquo / Ownness&rdquo / is employed in order to investigate the possibilities of constituting an autonomous self. This study reveals that the act of conscientious objection overlaps objector&rsquo / s endeavour of creating an autonomous self. It is argued that following Stirnerian and Foucauldian conceptualisations of &ldquo / self&rdquo / , the objector, by refusing external power over his/her will in militarized society, indeed, engages in a struggle to constitute his/her own definition of self and his/her way of life.
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