Made available in DSpace on 2008-05-13T13:17:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2283.pdf: 381935 bytes, checksum: 205e49c7b64cdc887299296e76e57446 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-09-22 / This dissertation shows that brazilian monetary policy had two main objectives in the last fty years: before 1994 the main goal was to - nance the public de cit and since 1994 to control the in ation rate. This dissertation also explains the main aspects of the monetary policy instru- ments and procedures of the Central Bank. In particular, it describes how day-to-day monetary policy was implemented in di¤erent environments. We estimate the La¤er Curve for Brazil and we identify the interest rate stochastic processes at di¤erent periods.

Submitted by João Paulo Carvalho Aveiro (joaoaveiro@gmail.com) on 2013-03-04T21:54:29Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese.pdf: 465880 bytes, checksum: cdd3bccd1924aa197532a369970ae371 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-04-03T17:56:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese.pdf: 465880 bytes, checksum: cdd3bccd1924aa197532a369970ae371 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-04-03T17:56:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese.pdf: 465880 bytes, checksum: cdd3bccd1924aa197532a369970ae371 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-06-25 / In this work, we studied the literature of the interbank market and how a central bank can improve its functioning. We developed a framework that could accommodate the different models of the interbank market and central bank intervention created from Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). With this we show that, in most cases, banks with access to the interbank market are unable to provide the efficient allocation for its consumers. In this environment we find a role for a central bank that, by intervening in the interbank market, is able to induce banks to offer the same allocations that would be provided by a social planner, that is, efficient allocations. / Neste trabalho, estudamos a literatura de mercado interbancário e como um banco central pode melhorar o seu funcionamento. Criamos um framework que pudesse acomodar os diferentes modelos de mercado interbancário e intervenção do banco central criados a partir de Bryant (1980) e Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Com isso mostramos que, em grande parte dos casos, os bancos com acesso ao mercado interbancário são incapazes de prover a alocação eficiente para os seus consumidores. Nesse ambiente, encontramos uma função para um banco central que, ao intervir no mercado interbancário, é capaz de induzir os bancos a oferecerem as mesmas alocações que seriam providas por um planejador central, ou seja, alocações eficientes.

Submitted by Weichao Wang (weichao.wang@fgv.edu.br) on 2018-05-11T16:03:27Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618673 bytes, checksum: dc1254edf6febf9dacf740dc3f7d48a8 (MD5) / Rejected by Diego Andrade (diego.andrade@fgv.br), reason: A ordem dos documentos está errada. on 2018-05-14T18:11:37Z (GMT) / Submitted by Weichao Wang (weichao.wang@fgv.edu.br) on 2018-05-14T18:24:47Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618806 bytes, checksum: add9b0e474645e1acb2fd7f4b86eb1f2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2018-05-15T16:30:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618806 bytes, checksum: add9b0e474645e1acb2fd7f4b86eb1f2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-05-18T12:30:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Wang2018_Thesis_TARP_Interbank_Risk_May9.pdf: 2618806 bytes, checksum: add9b0e474645e1acb2fd7f4b86eb1f2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-05-09 / I investigate how the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) affected the stressed interbank money market trading during the recent financial crisis via a difference-in-difference (DiD) design. I find that the TARP capital injection significantly enlarged the interbank exposure for the TARP recipients relative to others, particularly for banks in smaller size, with lower level of interbank trading and located in relatively poor economic conditions. I further test whether the distorted interbank liquidity position of the TARP recipients stimulated their credit risk appetite. I find that TARP recipient banks with larger interbank exposure also significantly shifted to riskier credit portfolios than others after the TARP implementation, suggested by estimates on forward- and backward-looking risk measures. Results are robust to the instrumental variable analysis, the sample self-selection model, the propensity score matching analysis, various placebo experiments and alternative econometric models. My results are most consistent with the “capital spillover” hypothesis that banks used the TARP capital to develop more interconnected interbank relationships, and the moral hazard effect that higher future bailout expectation and increased systemic relevance jointly construct a “new government safety net” for the TARP beneficiaries to take excessive credit risks under the implicitly perceived “too interconnected to fail” protection.