The Committee of 100 (C100) (1960 – 68) were a British anti-nuclear protest group who campaigned for mass non-violent direct action (NVDA) in an effort to force the government to revise its defence policy. The formation of C100 created tensions with the already-established Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), whose leaders objected to C100's commitment to civil disobedience. The two anti-nuclear campaigns had some membership overlap but always remained separate. Until now, any investigation of C100 has been incorporated within wider studies of CND or has been quantitative in method. This thesis therefore addresses a historical gap by employing a life history approach to examine C100 as a distinct group. Drawing upon oral history interviews with twenty-four C100 members the resulting analysis reveals new aspects of C100's innovative structure and method, and identifies the particular nature of those who joined the campaign. A new image of first wave anti-nuclear activists emerges when focusing on C100 protestors. The respondents reveal motivations for campaign engagement that contrast with those of earlier representations of CND supporters. They were inspired by a common interest in global civil rights concerning human health and survival and a need to actively challenge rather than merely petition the authorities. Significantly, many C100 members came from left-wing, progressive or anarchist backgrounds. They were an erudite group with regard for knowledge, despite many putting conventional education on hold to fully engage in the campaign. This thesis examines C100's libertarian nature, and the extent to which its membership managed to be anti-hierarchical in structure, ethos and policy. It explores tensions within C100 concerning limits and definitions of NVDA that changed over time and came to radicalise the campaign. A biographical approach also reveals significant factors around C100 prison experience concerning issues of class and gender. This thesis serves to situate C100 for the first time in its own right on the socio-political map, both historically and globally.

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La question de l'intervention armée pour établir la démocratie avait été étudiée par les libéraux au XIXème siècle. Certains d'entre eux l'avaient combattue au nom du principe selon lequel la liberté devait être uniquement l'apanage des peuples qui la conquièrent eux-mêmes et non par le bon vouloir de nations étrangères. On a souvent parlé d'ingérence humanitaire pour défendre l'idée que l'assistance humanitaire imposait une intervention dans un État en dépit du fait que celui-ci ne l'avait ni sollicité, ni acceptée. Dans le même sens, d'aucuns ont fait référence à l'hypothèse de l'ingérence démocratique et donc à là démocratisation de l'État par la coercition militaire quand une assistance extérieure se prétend légitime pour renverser un régime puis instaurer une démocratie. La promotion de la démocratie a été invoquée à plusieurs reprises lors de la création de missions internationales de maintien de la paix et a pu justifier des opérations d'assistance et de vérifications des élections. Si la démocratie demeure un objectif légitime, pour autant, le droit international ne la consacre pas comme un droit objectif. À la veille de l'opération américaine « Liberté en Irak » du 20 mars 2003, il n'est pas démontré une opinio juris en faveur d'une nouvelle exception à la règle d'interdiction du recours à la force posée par la Charte des Nations Unies. À l'héritage brutal du régime baasiste d'antan a succédé tout aussi brutalement un héritage américain qui rythme désormais le quotidien irakien devenu otage des effets aléatoires d'une « greffe démocratique ». / The question of the armed intervention in order to establish democracy had been studied by the liberals in the XIXth Century. Some of them had fought it in the name of the principle according to which the freedom had to be only the privilege of peoples who conquer it themselves and not by the goodwill of foreign nations. We often spoke about humanitarian intervention to defend the idea that assistance imposed an intervention in a State in spite of the fact that this one did not have it either requested or accepted. In the same direction, some people made reference to the hypothesis of the democratic intervention and thus to the democratization of the state by the military coercion when an outside assistance claims itself justifiable to overthrow a regime then establish a democracy. The promotion on democracy it has been put forward several times during the creation of international missions of preservation of the peace and was able to justify operations of assistance and checks of elections. If democracy remains a legitimate objective, however, the international law does not dedicate it as an objective right. On the eve of the American operation "Iraqi Freedom" of march 20th 2003, it is not demonstrated that an opinio juris in favor of a new exception in the rule of ban on the resort to force laid down by the Charter of the United Nations. The rough inheritance of the baath regime of former days has been followed brutally by an American inheritance which gives rhythm from now on to the Iraqi everyday life which has become a hostage of the random effects of a "democratic transplant".

The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group’s (and its supporting elements’) decision-making calculus. In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it offers in dynamically drawing upon all instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary. However, strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate terrorist organizations. As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable. The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the Balance Theory of strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and C) Isolation of popular support. It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as the sine qua non for success in countering an NSTO’s campaign of violence and effectively manipulating its decision-making process. Implementation of these three elements, moreover, must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other. The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis. In pursuing this end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of the methods of focused, structured comparison. The cases examined are those of: 1) The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present). The dissertation concludes with an examination of how the Balance Theory may provide insights for the formulation of counter-terrorism strategy against Al Qaeda in the current "War on Terror".