Can the success of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq be applied to other counter-insurgency conflicts, or is it an exemplary case? Using case studies including Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be examined whether or not militias can be can be used to fight counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and generally to other conflicts. It may not work in Afghanistan, and certainly presents a Catch-22 situation, but it may be applicable in certain situations in other conflicts under certain conditions.

Can the success of the Sunni Awakening in Iraq be applied to other counter-insurgency conflicts, or is it an exemplary case? Using case studies including Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be examined whether or not militias can be can be used to fight counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and generally to other conflicts. It may not work in Afghanistan, and certainly presents a Catch-22 situation, but it may be applicable in certain situations in other conflicts under certain conditions.

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No description available.

A la suite de la Conférence de la Baule en 1990, le Congo Brazzaville opte en 1991, pour une Conférence nationale. C’est un rendez-vous de l’Histoire, préludant à la démocratie. On a cru que la Conférence, serait un moyen de sortie de crise sociale et identitaire, l’expression d’un sursaut politique et économique. Hélas, chacun pense faire partie de l’entourage du roi qui comme dans la Société de cour va faciliter son enrichissement illicite et personnel. Cette Conférence, la plus longue, donne lieu à une impulsion belliqueuse et développe un état agonal. C’est la mise en route de l’extraversion qui conduit les ennemis politiques à armer les jeunes déscolarisés et sans ressources. Cette démarche teintée de confusion, fera naître des milices d’Etat et privées, puis trois guerres adventices, jeter de milliers des personnes dans les savanes et les pays étrangers, sans espoir de retour au pays natal. L’art de la guerre devient une politique qui livre des batailles. Puisque le sous-sol congolais présente un intérêt économique évident, les multinationales financent les trois guerres. Elles obligent à l’errance, à la peur de l’Autre et de l’étranger. Le chemin du retour sera rude pour les femmes violées et pour les jeunes. Or les responsables de crimes, retrouvent leur légitimité. La figure du chef se trouve ainsi galvaudée, voire désacralisée. A terme, de l’individuel ou familial, nous avons traité du global et de l’organisationnel. Nous a avons cherché à comprendre comment les institutions se sont délitées suite aux guerres adventices, qu’il s’agisse du monde économique ou qu’il s’agisse des institutions publiques comme l’école, voire l’Eglise.Enfin, nous avons voulu comprendre la venue d’un ordre sauvage : celui du meurtre et du viol, sur fond de tueries avec dans la ligne de mire : la mort des innocents? Pourquoi la femme porteuse de la vie en Afrique, devient-elle le trophée des puissants et des forts. Si la guerre a un côté tragique, pourquoi suscite-t-elle tant d’engagement? La guerre a sans doute sa grammaire, mais pas sa propre logique. / Following the conference of La Baule in 1990, Congo-Brazzaville opted in 1991, for a national conference. It was an appointment with History, a prelude to democracy.The conference it was assumed, would be the means of the exit from a social and identity crisis, the expression of a political and economic burst.Alas, everyone thought they belonged to the king’s entourage who, as in a court society, would facilitate their personnal and illicit enrichment. This conference, the longest in Africain countries, gave rise to a belligerent impulse and developed an agonal state. It was the start of the extroversion which led political opponents to arm resourceless out-of school youths.This action, tinged with confusion, was to give birth to state and private militia, then to three adventitions wars, driving thousands of people into savannahs and foreigh countries without any hope of retourning to their native country. The art of war became a policy which waged battles.Since the Congolese subsoil represented an obvious economic interest, multinationals financed all three wars. They compelled people to wander, to fear the other, the stranger the journey back home will prove hard for raped women and young people. Hower, those responsible for crimes regainned their legitimacy. The leader’s figurewas thus tarnished even desacralized.We have sought to understand how the institutions crumbled owing to the adventitions wars whether it be the economic sphere or public institutions like school or the church. Finally, our aim was to understand the emergence of a savage order : the order of murder and rape against a background of slanghters with, as target, the death of innoncents.Why has woman, the bearer of life in Africa become the trophy of the powerful and the strong ? If war has a tragic side, why does it arouse so much commitment? War has undoubtedly its grammar, but not its owen logic.

This paper seeks to continue the research started by scholars such as W. Liebeschuetz and P. Bell in order to challenge the traditional argument put forth by Al. Cameron, namely that the circus factions did not have a political role in society. The objective of this study is to examine the political importance of the circus factions from the reign of Anastasius (491-518) to Heraclius (610-641). Furthermore, it explores the political motivations behind the factions’ violent behaviour, the evidence for their involvement in the military, and their role in accession ceremonies. The methodology includes establishing a typology for sixth century riots, an examination of the hippodrome and its role as a medium between people and emperor, tracing the shift in the focus of imperial ideology, and a re-evaluation of the primary sources, with a focus on the literary and epigraphic evidence, to determine if there was a political aspect to the factions. The study concludes that Cameron did undervalue the factions’ political importance and outlines the conditions that were influential in their rise in importance.

This paper seeks to continue the research started by scholars such as W. Liebeschuetz and P. Bell in order to challenge the traditional argument put forth by Al. Cameron, namely that the circus factions did not have a political role in society. The objective of this study is to examine the political importance of the circus factions from the reign of Anastasius (491-518) to Heraclius (610-641). Furthermore, it explores the political motivations behind the factions’ violent behaviour, the evidence for their involvement in the military, and their role in accession ceremonies. The methodology includes establishing a typology for sixth century riots, an examination of the hippodrome and its role as a medium between people and emperor, tracing the shift in the focus of imperial ideology, and a re-evaluation of the primary sources, with a focus on the literary and epigraphic evidence, to determine if there was a political aspect to the factions. The study concludes that Cameron did undervalue the factions’ political importance and outlines the conditions that were influential in their rise in importance.

This thesis is preoccupied with the development of Iraqi political Shi'a after the fall of Ṣaddām Ḥusayn. Its main area of interest is the comparison of three Shi'i political movements - Dac wa Party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic revolution in Iraq and the movement of Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr on the background of broader historical development of Shi'i community in Iraq. Although this thesis is written in English, it uses both English and Arabic sources and literature with occasional excursions into French and Persian sources. The thesis deals with the ideological transformation of the parties, formation of alliances, utilization of militias for political goals and the relations with the USA and Iran. The conclusion of the thesis is that the Iraqi Shi'i political scene is deeply fragmented, strongly influenced by Iran and its parties are often vehicles for personal political ambitions of its leaders which effectively prevents any unification of Shi'i political position and creation of strong central Iraqi government.

No / The title asks, but inside, these historians and political scientists from Africa and Europe assert that all across Africa the problems, challenges, and implications posed by civil militias¿Sudan's Janjaweed currently most in the news¿have elevated them into the continent's intractable security menace. Between discussions of a theoretical construction of the militias as a social phenomenon, and of international experiences and implications, they cite examples. Among these the Kamajor in Sierra Leone, a comparison of Nigeria and Indonesia, threats to national and human security in West Africa, Darfur of course, anti-gang militias in Cameroon, and Uganda since 1986. Annotation ©2006 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

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