The following thesis is concerned with the way we think of particular objects. More specifically, it is concerned with de re thoughts and beliefs, which are parasitic upon the objects they are about. In ascribing and expressing de re thoughts and beliefs, we employ de re expressions, such as demonstratives and names. There is a pervasive view in the philosophy of language, known as the direct-reference view, that claims that these expressions contribute to thoughts nothing over and above objects themselves. I argue that not only is this view of de re expressions untenable upon reflection on its repercussions for cognitive significance and judgement, but also that the considerations that motivate its genesis rest on a mistaken understanding of the alternative, viz a Fregean understanding of thought that employs a notion of sense. In the first chapter, I present logical difficulties that face accounts of de re belief and a quasi-Fregean response to them. In the second chapter, I focus on two exhaustive interpretations of the cognitive significance of de re expressions on the direct-reference view, and I argue that both interpretations are untenable either because they cannot account for propositional unity, or because they isolate experience from judgement. In the third chapter, I present a holistic interpretation of sense, and argue that it is neither faced by critiques presented by proponents of direct-reference, nor by the difficulties I articulate in the first two chapters. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-21 10:53:33.232

A Research Report submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts / The Epistemological Realist (ER)project, recently initiated by John McDowell in Mind and World and Hilary Putnam in his 1994 series of Dewey Lectures, is an extremely promising one. This project aims to show how a 'commonsense realism' about the world and our relationship to it can be made tenable in a philosophical climate increasingly dominated by various forms of anti-realism. At least part of the reason for the prevalence of anti-realism is the unsatisfactory way in which realism has traditionally been developed. Epistemological Realism departs from Traditional Realism in at least three key areas: (a) its account of how perception enables empirical knowledge, (b) its account of perception itself and (c) its account of how our empirical knowledge claims bear on reality. The ability of the ER theorist to give perfectly satisfactory accounts of (a)-(c) does much to reinstate 'commonsense realism' as a philosophically respectable position. Epistemological Realism 'commonsense realism' Traditional Realism antirealism perception empirical knowledge reality John McDowell Mind and World Hilary Putnam / AC2017

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Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T15:12:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 OsvaldoFAF_DISSERT.pdf: 585143 bytes, checksum: 436ac6c5f30018a45e6dfb3634cd8fae (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-12-23 / Coordena??o de Aperfei?oamento de Pessoal de N?vel Superior / This work deals with the way how the three themes of traditional metaphysics, namely, God, man, and the world, are rethought through the philosophical speculation of German cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). Due to the comprehensiveness of this subject, our dissertation had as a starting point and constant reference the book that the philosopher wrote in 1450, Idiota. De mente, the second written work that makes up the series of the Idiota (Idiotae libri), whose discussion is developed around the theme of the human mind. From the dialogue of the mind we have built our reflection on some issues and theoretical foundations presented in Idiota. De sapientia and De docta ignorantia, extending it to little more than that. According to Nicholas of Cusa, the human mind, in its creative character in the image of the divine mind, transcends the purely functional considerations commonly assigned to it, that is, those that regard its cognitive nature and epistemological role. In addition to these aspects, Cusanus understands the humana mens as a point of articulation of two other main themes of his metaphysics: God and the world. In this context, through the concepts of complicatioexplicatio and imago, as well as with the intercession between the themes of man as imago Dei and the reason of the microcosm, we present here an introduction to Cusan metaphysics / O presente trabalho versa sobre como os tr?s temas centrais da metaf?sica tradicional, a saber, Deus, o homem e o mundo, s?o repensados pela especula??o filos?fica do cardeal alem?o Nicolau de Cusa (1401-1464). Devido ? abrang?ncia dessa tem?tica, nossa disserta??o teve como ponto de partida e referencial constante o livro que o fil?sofo escreveu em 1450, Idiota. De mente, segundo escrito que comp?e a s?rie de di?logos do Idiota (Idiotae libri), e cuja discuss?o se desenvolve em torno ao tema da mente humana. A partir do di?logo De mente n?s constru?mos a nossa reflex?o tomando algumas quest?es e fundamenta??es te?ricas apresentadas no Idiota. De sapientia e no De docta ignorantia, estendendo-a a pouco mais que isso. De acordo com Nicolau de Cusa, a mente humana, em seu car?ter criativo ? imagem da mente divina, transcende as considera??es puramente funcionais que geralmente lhe s?o atribu?das, isto ?, no que se refere ? sua natureza cognitiva e ao seu papel epistemol?gico. Para al?m desses aspectos, o Cusano entende a humana mens como um ponto de articula??o dos outros dois temas que protagonizam a sua metaf?sica: Deus e o mundo. Neste contexto, atrav?s dos conceitos de complicatio-explicatio e imago, bem como da intercess?o entre o tema do homem imago Dei e o motivo do microcosmo, n?s apresentamos aqui uma introdu??o ? filosofia cusana