Global ETD Search

1	Hemisphere differences in lexical decision and in semantic priming effect: an attempt to expand ourunderstanding of the right hemisphere ability in processing theChinese language Ho, Sai-Keung. January 1987 (has links) published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / Educational Psychology / Master / Master of Social Sciences Mind-brain identity theory. Chinese language - Acquisition.
2	Children's beliefs about what it means to have a mind Davis, Debra Lee 28 August 2008 (has links) Not available / text Philosophy of mind in children Philosophy of mind Mind-brain identity theory
3	Children's beliefs about what it means to have a mind Davis, Debra Lee. Woolley, Jacqueline, January 2004 (has links) (PDF) Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisor: Jacqueline Woolley. Vita. Includes bibliographical references. Also available from UMI.
4	Making sense of biological naturalism Hodges, Jennefer Anne January 2014 (has links) Searle’s theory of Biological Naturalism has been largely ignored in the philosophical literature and Searle’s commentators are confused by his seemingly contradictory views. In this dissertation I attempt to make sense of Biological Naturalism. In chapter 2 I will ascertain which concerns prevent Searle’s readers from understanding his position. The remaining chapters aim to dissolve the tensions and dispel any confusion. Chapter 3 considers Searle’s notion of first-person ontology, finding that it expresses a belief that experiences are essentially subjective and qualitative. In chapter 4 I consider the notions of levels of description, causal reduction and what Searle means by causation and realisation. Chapter 5 turns to the question of how to categorise Searle’s position. Many of his critics charge him with being a property dualist. By highlighting the difference between the meaning of irreducibility intended by the property dualist and Searle I show that there is sufficient difference in their use of the term so as to reject an interpretation of Biological Naturalism as a form of property dualism. Chapter 6 is where I turn to the other end of the physicalism/dualism spectrum and assess whether Searle should be seen as holding a form of identity theory. I first argue for a neutral form of identity that I call real identity, which does not include the inherent reductive privileging of standard identity. I then argue that Searle should be seen as advocating a form of real identity theory; a form of token identity theory which does not privilege the physical over the mental. In chapter 7 I return to the main barriers to making sense of Biological Naturalism which I identified in chapter 2 and lay out my response to each. I conclude with a coherent interpretation of Searle’s position. 149
5	A Critique of the Learning Brain Olsson, Joakim January 2020 (has links) The guiding question for this essay is: who is the learner? The aim is to examine and criticize one answer to this question, sometimes referred to as the theory of the learning brain, which suggests that the explanation of human learning can be reduced to the transmitting and storing of information in the brain’s formal and representational architecture, i.e., that the brain is the learner. This essay will argue that this answer is misleading, because it cannot account for the way people strive to learn in an attempt to lead a good life as it misrepresents the intentional life of the mind, which results in its counting ourselves out of the picture when it attempts to provide a scientific theory of the learning process. To criticize the theory of the learning brain, this essay will investigate its philosophical foundation, a theory of mind called cognitivism, which is the basis for the cognitive sciences. Cognitivism is itself built on three main tenets: mentalism, the mind-brain identity theory and the computer analogy. Each of these tenets will be criticized in turn, before the essay turns to criticize the theory of the learning brain itself. The focus of this essay is, in other words, mainly negative. The hope is that this criticism will lay the groundwork for an alternative view of mind, one that is better equipped to give meaningful answers to the important questions we have about what it means to learn, i.e., what we learn, how we do it and why. This alternative will emphasize the holistic and intentional character of the human mind, and consider the learning process as an intentional activity performed, not by isolated brains, but by people with minds that are extended, embodied, enacted and embedded in a sociocultural and physical context. Learning Brain Learning Cognitivism Representational Theory of Mind Computational Theory of Mind Mentalism Mind-Brain Identity Computer Analogy Scientism Anthropological Holism Enactivism Intentionality Intentional Action Phenomenology Philosophy of Mind Cognitive Science Capabilities Practical Knowledge Bildung Wolf Singer Kurt W. Fischer Jerry Fodor Vincent Descombes Ludwig Wittgenstein Elizabeth Anscombe Evan Thompson Philosophy Filosofi

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