This thesis examines the emergence and development of national consciousness and identity in the East African nation Tanzania. A work in the science of humanity, it connects traditional social sciences through the approach of mentalism. To date, research on African nationalism centers on the nation-state and national party, and on the teleological assumption that nation building implies cultural unification within the boundaries of the state's territory. National sovereignty is seen as a natural desire; nationalism in Africa is conflated with anti-colonialism and treated as the inevitable transition from the colonial to post-colonial order. Yet this approach to the study of African nationalism cannot account for many important processes, such as why many African states have failed, why corruption is rampant, and why authoritarian regimes predominate. I argue many aspects of modern African history are impossible to understand without recognizing that nationalism ushers in modernity and transforms and affects the major cultural institutions. I show how the process of national identity formation within Tanzania was the same process that occurs elsewhere. Nationalism did not exist in Tanzania among the native inhabitants prior to independence. Moreover, the creation of a shared sense of national identity began only after independence: the independent state was not a nation. In examining the national image created by several integral Tanzanian intellectuals, I reflect both on the significance they placed on their narratives and how it shaped the wider social world and the identities of those they influenced. My argument regarding Tanzania may apply to Africa more generally. The processes I described appear true of social and political developments across the continent. Many in Africa do now see themselves as equal members of sovereign societies and believe that the people are the ultimate source of political legitimacy. This work provides a methodology and argument that can be applied to address additional questions of how specifically nationalism has transformed African societies.

This dissertation seeks to examine the essential nature of time--both the concept in physics, biology, and philosophy, and the phenomenon in life and culture--with the ultimate goal of deepening our understanding of the empirical manifestation of time in human mental experience. It thus engages with both philosophy and with empirical science, natural as well as humanistic, in the paradigms of history, social theory, fundamental (or philosophical) anthropology, as well as with human neuroscience. The central argument is that while time is not an empirical phenomenon in physics - time itself is not an absolute quality of matter - one can make a certain argument for the real existence of time in biology, and still a different argument for a unique, linear phenomenon of time that derives from the specific human, cultural, experience. To make these arguments the dissertation devotes attention to the analysis of both the concept of time and the empirical phenomenon to which it refers successively in physics, biology, philosophy and history/sociology. Arriving at the conclusion that the linear concept of time (the causally significant relationship between the past, present and future) reflects a phenomenon that is uniquely human and suggests the ways in which this experience is necessarily reflected in the brain. / 2022-02-26T00:00:00Z

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<div>Philosophers who affirm the existence of propositions contend that the contents of declarative sentences, beliefs, doubts, and so on are entities (the things picked out by the term “propositions”), and that these entities have truth-values. Unsurprisingly, there’s rampant disagreement among those philosophers about sorts of things are called “propositions”. Propositions have been identified with sui generis abstract objects, interpreted facts, properties, and types of cognitive acts (this is not an exhaustive list). Despite this debate, most agree that propositions are representations (this is how they come to have truth-values), and that propositions are not to be identified with token mental representations. I agree that propositions are representations, but argue that propositions are mental representation tokens. The view I defend has sparse contemporary support, but has an impressive pedigree—ancestral views were widely popular in the late medieval, and early modern periods. In this dissertation I argue at length against contemporary criticisms that this view is still credible.</div><div>In chapter one, I defend a mentalist semantics; that is, I argue that linguistic representation is parasitic on mental representation: for a sentence to mean that p is for it to express (or be conventionally used to express) the thought that p. Once this is established, I argue in chapter two that mental representations (as opposed to non-mental ones) are ideal candidates to serve as the contents of sentences and propositional attitudes. I compare my preferred view, that propositions are token mental representations, against rival views (sorted into two groups) and show that a cost benefit analysis of each favors my position. In chapter three, I start exploring what these mental representations might be like. I argue that they’re structured entities whose constituents are modes of presentation of the things represented. I decline to analyze the relation which unites these modes of presentation, but argue (contra some contemporary philosophers) that this relation is not predication. Finally, in chapter four, I argue against the widely popular view that propositions have the things they’re about as constituents. I show that such a view cannot accommodate thoughts about nonexistent entities. I propose that the modes of presentation which are constituents of propositions are non-descriptive, but criticize the mental file conception of non-descriptive modes of presentation.</div>

Ce mémoire a pour but de caractériser la conception moderniste du nationalisme chez la sociologue américaine Liah Greenfeld. Celle-ci fait une contribution significative à la littérature sur le nationalisme, notamment par son approche pluridisciplinaire que l'on peut diviser en trois axes principaux : philosophique, historique et psychologique. Le mémoire propose donc une synthèse de l'œuvre de l'auteure tout en accordant comme il se doit une place prépondérante à l'axe philosophique de sa pensée. On définira dans un premier temps la conception «mentaliste» et empiriste du monde que Greenfeld développe et qui est inspirée de Max Weber, en prenant le temps de distinguer celle-ci des autres conceptions canoniques (idéalisme, réalisme, structuralisme, etc.). Cela permettra d'établir sur des bases philosophiques et sociologiques solides la conception de la nation et du nationalisme de Greenfeld, tout en démontrant que le nationalisme est selon elle l'élément fondamental qui caractérise la modernité. On analysera ensuite les différents types de nationalismes mentionnés par la sociologue, en soulignant l'importance qu'elle accorde à la composante économique du nationalisme. On terminera en soulevant les enjeux philosophiques qui se trouvent au cœur de la description historiciste et psychologisante que fait Greenfeld pour analyser l'émergence, le déploiement et la perpétuation du nationalisme dans le monde à travers différentes nations modernes (principalement Angleterre, France, Russie, États-Unis, Allemagne). Le mémoire se termine en soulevant quelques critiques. / This thesis aims to characterize the modernist conception of nationalism in the work of the American sociologist Liah Greenfeld. This author makes a significant multidisciplinary contribution to the literature on nationalism that explores three main areas : philosophy, history and psychology. I synthesize her work focussing on the philosophical dimension of her thinking. I define her "mentalist" and empiricist approach inspired by Max Weber and distinguish it from other canonical philosophical approaches (idealism, realism, structuralism, etc.). I then explain how Greenfeld's conceptions of nation and nationalism are built on this approach, showing that, according to her, nationalism is the fundamental element at the basis of modernity. I analyze the different types of nationalism she introduces, stressing the importance she attaches to the economic component of nationalism. I also raise philosophical issues that lie at the heart of the historicist and psychologising description that has led her to analyze the emergence, deployment and perpetuation of nationalism in the world through different nations (mainly examining England, France, Russia, United States and Germany). I conclude by raising some criticisms on Greenfeld's work.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:18:15Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Raquel Melo Golfeto.pdf: 4135779 bytes, checksum: 0f3803f9587a0cb972c2ff638f38f677 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005-06-02 / The tact is a verbal operant in which the response is emitted under control of an antecedent non-verbal stimulus and is maintained by generalized conditioned reinforcement. Technically, a verbal report and an explanation can be considered tacts. Among the tacts one emits, those in which the speaker behaves verbally under the control of another person s behavior (or his/her own behavior) are important. According to this point of view, mentalistic/internalistic descriptions or explanations of behavior would consist of verbal responses emitted under the control of relations in which variables assumed to occur inside the organism are interpreted as controlling this organism s responses. The emission of this type of verbal response (internalistic explanations) would be mainly evoked when the antecedent stimulation that controls the verbal behavior has certain features. The present study s goals were to verify: (1) if variations in the antecedent/consequent stimulation of an observed behavior would alter its explanation, (2) if changes in the explanation could be considered a product of changes in the controlling variables of the observed behavior, and (3) if explanations of human behavior would be mostly mentalistic. Six adults were instructed to explain the behavior of two individuals working at a computer, clicking a mouse. Each person was shown clicking the mouse in one of two different films, and the behavior of each person was under the control of a different schedule of reinforcement (MULT VR4/DRL10s and MIX VR4/DRL10s). The verbalizations/ explanations were classified and the moment of its occurrence was superimposed to a cumulative record of the behavior being explained.. The verbalizations were classified according to seven classes.. Three of them were labeled internalistic , three externalistic , and one was referred to as explanation of the observer s own behavior . The results show that the verbalizations in which the observers talked about their own behavior were the most frequent ones. The second most frequent category were internalistic verbalizations , which referred to a state or current condition of the person being observed. There was no significant difference (in number or type) between verbalizations emitted during the different films. This result was interpreted as showing that variables present only in the Multiple Schedule Film or exclusively in the Mixed Schedule Film were not responsible for the emission of verbalizations, either the non-internalistic or internalistic ones. The superimposition of the participants verbal responses on the the cumulative records of the clicking responses showed that for 4 of the 6 participants, the low occurrence of reinforcers and the low rate of clicking response seemed to control the emission of verbalizations, independently on the label they received. Finally, the terms that controlled the experimenters behavior of classifying verbalizations as internalistic were classified: the results showed that the terms that referred to cognitive processes or mood/internal states were the most frequent ones. Results are discussed considering possible controlling aspects of the film for the emission of explanatory verbal responses internalistic or not / O tato é o operante verbal no qual a resposta é emitida sob controle de um estímulo antecedente não verbal e mantida por reforço condicionado generalizado. Tecnicamente, relato verbal e explicação podem ser considerados tatos e entre os tatos que emitimos são importantes aqueles em que o falante responde verbalmente sob controle do comportamento de outro ou dele mesmo. Nessa perspectiva, descrições ou explicações mentalistas/internalistas do comportamento envolveriam respostas verbais sob controle de relações inferidas pelo tateador nas quais variáveis que supostamente ocorreriam dentro do organismo controlariam as respostas do organismo. A ocorrência desse tipo de resposta verbal (explicações internalistas) seria evocada especialmente quando a estimulação antecedente que controlaria o comportamento de explicar tivesse certas características. O presente estudo pretendeu verificar se: (1) mudanças na estimulação antecedente/conseqüente a um comportamento observado, alterariam as respostas verbais chamadas de explicação do comportamento, (2) alterações na explicação poderiam ser consideradas como produto das alterações das variáveis que controlam o comportamento observado e (3) se explicações do comportamento humano seriam predominantemente mentalistas. Participaram do estudo 6 adultos que receberam uma instrução para explicar o comportamento de clicar o mouse de 2 indivíduos mostrados em 2 diferentes filmes, cada um deles clicando o mouse sob controle de um esquema de reforçamento distinto (um múltiplo VR4/DRL10s e um misto VR4/DRL10s). As verbalizações foram classificadas e sobrepostas a um registro cumulativo do comportamento explicado. Foram propostas 7 classificações para as verbalizações . Três dessas classificações foram agrupadas como explicações 'internalistas' do comportamento observado, outras 3 foram classificadas como explicações 'externalistas' e 1 classificação foi referida como 'explicação do comportamento do próprio observador'. Os resultados mostraram a maior ocorrência para a classificação em que os observadores falavam do seu próprio comportamento. A segunda maior ocorrência de verbalizações foram aquelas classificadas como verbalizações internalistas que faziam referência a um estado ou condição momentânea do personagem observado . Não houve diferença significativa (no número ou tipo) de verbalizações emitidas nos diferentes filmes (que mostravam o clicar o mouse mantido por diferentes esquemas de reforço), sugerindo que as variáveis presentes somente no Filme Múltiplo ou no Filme Misto não foram responsáveis pela emissão de verbalizações predominantemente não-internalistas ou internalistas para a maior parte dos participantes. A distribuição das falas dos participantes no registro cumulativo dos filmes mostra que, para 4 dos 6 participantes, a presença de poucos reforçadores e a baixa taxa de respostas de clicar o mouse pareceram controlar a emissão de verbalizações, independentemente das classificações que elas receberam. Finalmente, os termos que serviram de base para a classificação das explicações como 'internalistas' foram reclassificados: os resultados mostraram que termos classificados como fazendo referência a processos cognitivos e ao humor/estado dos personagens foram os mais freqüentes. Os resultados são discutidos em termos de possíveis aspectos dos filmes que teriam controlado a emissão de respostas verbais de explicações - internalistas ou não

This thesis outlines the three phases of cognitivism, which emerged in the first half of the 20th century as a reaction to the anti-mentalist tradition of philosophical thinking (represented by Charles S. Peirce and Charles Morris), and which was made possible in particular by the so- called linguistic turn in science (especially within analytic philosophy), which replaced mental units, regarded as non-scientific, with linguistic units, conceived as reflecting mental states and, moreover, allowing for adequate investigation. The thesis is largely guided by Thomas C. Daddesio's On Minds and Symbols, which is considered to be one of the first explicit attempts to formulate a cognitive-semiotic perspective, and wherein the author traces the previous development of the cognitive paradigm. Thus, first the factors that made the emergence of cognitivism possible are described, followed by an account of its development, which can be divided into two phases, as per Daddesio's model. This paper, however, goes beyond Daddesio's book and establishes a third phase, where cognitivism emerges as a separate field of inquiry within semiotics, i.e., cognitive semiotics. Within this development, the work traces in particular the transformation of the conception of the relationship between language and mind, which is...

[pt] Este trabalho apresenta uma reflexão sobre a comensurabilidade entre as perspectivas chomskyana e wittgensteiniana da linguagem em geral e, em particular, no que diz respeito à questão do sentido. O objetivo da pesquisa foi examinar, nos textos do Wittgenstein maduro, nos desenvolvimentos mais recentes de Chomsky — levando em consideração as sucessivas mudanças na teoria gerativa — e nas obras de outros autores que se alinham com as ideias de um e outro ou se dedicam a estudá-los, convergências e divergências relevantes entre eles. A pesquisa adotou uma perspectiva pragmática e antiessencialista da linguagem, mais especificamente a versão dessa perspectiva oferecida pela filosofia mais madura de Wittgenstein, sobretudo nas suas Investigações filosóficas. Sem renunciar a essa perspectiva, foram analisadas as teorias sobre a linguagem humana defendidas por Noam Chomsky, geralmente tidas como opostas às do filósofo vienense, partindo da hipótese de que fosse possível encontrar, no diálogo entre elas, possíveis complementações para uma melhor compreensão do funcionamento da linguagem humana. As teses que resultam do trabalho são as seguintes: (1) Que os pontos de vista de Chomsky e Wittgenstein sobre a linguagem não são inteiramente irreconciliáveis e podem existir convergências, divergências e possíveis complementações que valem a pena serem exploradas, (2) Que as versões contemporâneas das teorias de Chomsky estão mais abertas à aproximação com Wittgenstein do que versões passadas, (3) Que algumas contradições entre as análises de Wittgenstein e Chomsky podem ser atribuídas à diferença entre o ponto de vista e os métodos de um filósofo e os de um cientista da linguagem, ou a confusões conceituais provocadas pelas armadilhas da própria linguagem — termos usados por eles próprios ou por seus mais destacados comentadores de formas que parecem altamente contraditórias, podendo nos levar à conclusão de que existe uma incompatibilidade insuperável entre seus pontos de vista, (4) Que, ao menos parcialmente, algumas dessas contradições podem ser atribuídas ao choque entre a tese chomskyana da autonomia da sintaxe e a preocupação quase exclusiva de Wittgenstein pelo sentido. Entre outros aspectos relevantes das ideias de ambos os pensadores, analisamos o uso que eles fazem de termos como representação, mente, descrição e explicação; de questões fundamentais para ambos, como suas ideias sobre o que seja aprender uma língua e seguir uma regra, e de algumas noções distintivas do pensamento de cada um, como a noção wittgensteiniana de forma de vida e a hipótese inatista de Chomsky. Por último, analisamos de forma mais aprofundada duas controvérsias explícitas entre Chomsky e Wittgenstein, a partir de dois textos do primeiro que fazem detalhadas críticas a aspectos importantes da filosofia do segundo: o argumento da linguagem privada e a crítica à ideia de que existem processos cerebrais correlacionados com o pensamento. / [en] This work reflects on the commensurability between the Chomskyan and the Wittgenstenian perspectives of language in general, and in particular it deals with issues on meaning. The goal of the research was to examine, in the mature texts of Wittgenstein, in the most recent developments of Chomsky — taking into consideration the successive changes in generative theory — and in the works of other authors that align themselves with the ideas of one or the other or devote themselves to study them, convergences and divergences relevant to them. The research adopted a pragmatic and anti-essentialist approach to language, more specifically the version of this approach offered by Wittgenstein s more mature philosophy, mostly in his Philosophical Investigations. Without renouncing this approach, the theories of human language supported by Noam Chomsky were analyzed, which are generally considered as opposed to those of the Viennese philosopher, starting from the hypothesis that it is possible to find, in the dialog between them, possible complementarities for a better understanding of how human language works. The present work are guided by following thesis: (1) Chomsky s and Wittgenstein s points of view about language are not completely irreconcilable and there can be convergences, divergences and possible complementarities that are worth exploring; (2) the contemporary versions of Chomsky s theories can be more open to a rapprochement with Wittgenstein than past versions; (3) some contradictions between the analysis of Chomsky and Wittgenstein can be attributed to the difference between the points of view and methods of a philosopher and those language of a scientist, or to conceptual confusions originated in the tricks of language itself – terms used by them or by their more outstanding commentators in ways that seem highly contradictory, leading us to the conclusion that there is an insurmountable incompatibility between their points of view; (4) at least partially, some of those contradictions can be attributed to the conflict between the Chomskyan hypothesis about the Autonomy of Syntax and the almost exclusive preoccupation of Wittgenstein for the meaning. Among other relevant aspects of the ideas of both authors, we will analyze how they use terms like representation, mind, description and explanation; fundamental questions for both, like their ideas about what it is to learn a language and follow a rule, and about distinctive notions of their thought, like the Wittgenstenian notion of form of life and the Chomskyan innate hypothesis. Finally, we analyze in deep two explicit disputes between Chomsky and Wittgenstein, taking as a starting point two texts of the former that formulate detailed criticism to important aspects of the latter s philosophy: the argument of private language and the criticism of the idea that there are brain processes correlated to thought. / [es] Este trabajo presenta una reflexión sobre la conmensurabilidad entre las perspectivas chomskyana y wittgensteiniana del lenguaje en general y, en particular, en lo que se refiere a la cuestión del sentido. El objetivo de la investigación fue examinar, en los textos del Wittgenstein maduro, en los desarrollos más recientes de Chomsky —teniendo en cuenta los sucesivos cambios en la teoría generativa— y en las obras de otros autores que se alinean con las ideas de uno y otro o se dedican a estudiarlos, convergencias y divergencias relevantes entre ellos. La investigación adoptó una perspectiva pragmática y antiesencialista del lenguaje, más específicamente la versión de esta perspectiva ofrecida por la filosofía más madura de Wittgenstein, sobre todo en sus Investigaciones filosóficas. Sin renunciar a esa perspectiva, fueron analizadas las teorías sobre el lenguaje humano defendidas por Noam Chomsky, generalmente consideradas como opuestas a las del filósofo vienés, partiendo de la hipótesis de que fuese posible encontrar, en el diálogo entre ellas, posibles complementaciones para una mejor comprensión del funcionamiento del lenguaje humano. Las tesis que resultan de este trabajo son las siguientes: (1) Que los puntos de vista de Chomsky y Wittgenstein sobre el lenguaje no son completamente irreconciliables y pueden existir convergencias, divergencias y posibles complementaciones que vale la pena explorar, (2) Que las versiones contemporáneas de las teorías de Chomsky están más abiertas a la aproximación con Wittgenstein que las versiones pasadas, (3) Que algunas contradicciones entre los análisis de Wittgenstein y Chomsky pueden ser atribuidos a la diferencia entre el punto de vista y los métodos de un filósofo y los de un científico del lenguaje, o a confusiones conceptuales provocadas por las armadillas del propio lenguaje — términos utilizados por ellos mismos o por sus más destacados comentadores de maneras que parecen altamente contradictorias, pudiendo llevarnos a la conclusión de que existe una incompatibilidad insuperable entre sus puntos de vista, (4) Que, al menos parcialmente, algunas de esas contradicciones pueden ser atribuidas al choque entre la tesis chomskyana de la autonomía de la sintaxis y la preocupación casi exclusiva de Wittgenstein por el sentido. Entre otros aspectos relevantes de las ideas de ambos pensadores, analizamos el uso que realizan de términos como representación, mente, descripción y explicación; de cuestiones fundamentales para ambos, como sus ideas sobre lo que sea aprender una lengua y seguir una regla, y de algunas nociones distintivas del pensamiento de cada uno, como la noción wittgensteiniana de forma de vida y la hipótesis innatista de Chomsky. Por último, analizamos más profundamente dos controversias explícitas entre Chomsky y Wittgenstein, a partir de dos textos del primero que hacen detalladas críticas a aspectos importantes de la filosofía del segundo: el argumento del lenguaje privado y la crítica a la idea de que existan procesos cerebrales correlacionados con el pensamiento.

The guiding question for this essay is: who is the learner? The aim is to examine and criticize one answer to this question, sometimes referred to as the theory of the learning brain, which suggests that the explanation of human learning can be reduced to the transmitting and storing of information in the brain’s formal and representational architecture, i.e., that the brain is the learner. This essay will argue that this answer is misleading, because it cannot account for the way people strive to learn in an attempt to lead a good life as it misrepresents the intentional life of the mind, which results in its counting ourselves out of the picture when it attempts to provide a scientific theory of the learning process. To criticize the theory of the learning brain, this essay will investigate its philosophical foundation, a theory of mind called cognitivism, which is the basis for the cognitive sciences. Cognitivism is itself built on three main tenets: mentalism, the mind-brain identity theory and the computer analogy. Each of these tenets will be criticized in turn, before the essay turns to criticize the theory of the learning brain itself. The focus of this essay is, in other words, mainly negative. The hope is that this criticism will lay the groundwork for an alternative view of mind, one that is better equipped to give meaningful answers to the important questions we have about what it means to learn, i.e., what we learn, how we do it and why. This alternative will emphasize the holistic and intentional character of the human mind, and consider the learning process as an intentional activity performed, not by isolated brains, but by people with minds that are extended, embodied, enacted and embedded in a sociocultural and physical context.