There has been considerable research over the years regarding the relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth, yet much less is known about the link between natural resource abundance and prevalence of poverty. This thesis examines the question of whether mineral resource rents have helped to reduce poverty rates in countries with an extensive mineral base in a cross country case study analysis involving Botswana, Nigeria, Zambia, Bolivia, Chile, and Venezuela. The link between mineral rents and poverty is studied in the context of four major mechanisms; (1) the redistribution of resources across sectors of the economy (‘Dutch Disease’), (2) the distribution of rents between the domestic country with the natural resources and foreign extraction firms, (3) the allocation of resources among citizens, and (4) the reallocation of rents over time (for precautionary saving). While none of the countries have achieved substantial economic diversification, Chile emerges as the best performer in this case study. Chile has utilized its extensive mineral base to achieve strong economic growth as well as significant poverty reduction. Facilitating an encouraging private investment climate or a mix of public and private ownership that does not sacrifice productivity and efficiency seems to work in appropriating a stable and fair share of mineral rents. Rents that are prudently invested in the domestic economy, in foreign assets for precautionary saving, and in targeted policies designed to redistribute resources more equally among citizens can significantly reduce poverty, and increase social and economic development.

Submitted by Lorreine Messias (lorreinesmessias@gmail.com) on 2017-04-17T17:59:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 201702_Lorreine.pdf: 1272431 bytes, checksum: a8d83b75c5cec0b36c5e019ddcc4e982 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Pamela Beltran Tonsa (pamela.tonsa@fgv.br) on 2017-04-17T19:56:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 201702_Lorreine.pdf: 1272431 bytes, checksum: a8d83b75c5cec0b36c5e019ddcc4e982 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-17T20:50:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 201702_Lorreine.pdf: 1272431 bytes, checksum: a8d83b75c5cec0b36c5e019ddcc4e982 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-22 / O boom de preços globais de commodities ao longo da década de 2000 elevou consideravelmente os repasses de royalties (CFEM) aos municípios brasileiros produtores de commodities metálicas. Este choque positivo e exógeno de receitas criou uma situação interessante, ao permitir avaliar empiricamente as preferências de gastos dos políticos locais entre (i) provisão de bens públicos e (ii) práticas de patronagem (verificadas a partir dos gastos com o funcionalismo público). Os resultados alcançados em nosso estudo permitem afirmar com rigor econométrico que os prefeitos alocaram recursos de CFEM em despesas com pessoal, outras despesas correntes, despesas com saúde e saneamento e despesas com gestão ambiental. Esta evidência de que os prefeitos destinaram parte dos recursos da CFEM para aumentar gastos com pessoal contraria a Lei 7.990/1989 – a qual discorre sobre as possibilidades de aplicação das receitas de CFEM. Desse modo, os resultados encontrados reforçam as conclusões de estudos anteriores, os quais apontam que os municípios gastam mal as receitas oriundas de transferências incondicionais, sinalizando falhas no modelo de descentralização fiscal brasileiro. / Over the decade of 2000, the commodity prices super-cycle increased considerably the grants of mineral royalties (CFEM) to Brazilian commodity producers municipalities. This positive and exogenous revenue shock has created an interesting situation, by allowing to evaluate empirically the local political preferences for spending between (i) public goods provision and (ii) practices of patronage (enlarge the public sector, by hiring more employees and increasing wages). The results obtained show that mayors allocate CFEM revenues to public service payroll, other current expenses, health and sanitation expenses and on environmental management expenses. This finding that the mayors spent CFEM resources to increase public service expenses violates Law 7990/1989 – which limits the possibilities of CFEM recipes application. Thus, the results reinforce the findings of previous studies, which indicate that the municipalities spend the revenues of unconditional grants in inappropriate ways, suggesting problems in the Brazilian fiscal decentralisation model.