La puissance d'achat est appréhendée par le droit européen comme un pouvoir de marché entraînant des effets pro et anticoncurrentiels sur le marché intérieur. Les dispositions de droit positif concernant les pratiques restrictives de concurrence et les concentrations d'une part, ainsi que les abus de domination d'autre part, correspondent à deux hypothèses d'appréhension de la puissance d'achat par le droit de la concurrence. Si les premières relèvent d'une logique structurelle tempérée, les abus de domination obéissent à une logique ordo- structurelle forte teintée d'un élément subjectif afférent au comportement. Dans le premier cas, la puissance d'achat est considérée comme nocive pour la concurrence si son degré est trop important. Dans le second cas, elle est présumée nocive et réprimée si elle est exercée abusivement. Les objectifs de politique concurrentielle européenne de protection de l'efficience globale de marché et les outils normatifs afférents témoignent toutefois d'une approche limitative de la puissance d'achat. Les lois actuelles démontrent certaines faiblesses dans l'appréhension de la puissance d'achat, celle-ci dépassant les situations monopso- ou oligopsonistiques et s'exprimant notamment comme pouvoir de marché relatif. Les modifications législatives proposées dans le sens d'une appréhension de la puissance d'achat dans ses différentes acceptions économiques pourraient toutefois permettre de protéger utilement l'ensemble des acteurs économiques concernés sans se limiter au consommateur final. / European law considers buyer power as a market power able to create pro and anticompetitive effects on the internal market. Buyer power is concerned by the application of competition law in cases of anticompetitive pratices and mergers on the one hand and abuse of dominance on the other hand which differents economic logics. Rules about anticompetitive practices and mergers focuse on the buyer power's degree which define pro and anticompetitive effects. Rules about abuse of dominance focuse on the abuse of a dominant buyer and assume anticompetitive effects. The assessment of buyer power under competition law is substantially influenced by the general competition policy concept which is aimed at maximising consumer welfare. Competition law considers buyer power predominantly as an absolute market power and not in the form of bargaining power exercised bilaterally vis-à-vis individual suppliers. Nevertheless european existing law is not able to consider all situations of buyer power. Monopolistic or oligopolistic situations do not reflect the reality of buyer power which also significate a relative market power. It seems that proposed legislative modifications aiming to consider the economic reality of buyer power on the entire market could lead to a better protection of all concerned competitors and not only the end consumer. / Das europäische Recht tendiert dazu Nachfragemacht als Marktmacht aufgrund ihrer wettbewerbspositiven und -negativen Effekten auf dem Binnenmarkt zu erfassen. Die Nachfragemacht im europäischen Recht wird zum einen durch das Kartellrecht, die Fusionskontrolle und zum anderen durch die Missbrauchskontrolle erfasst. Diese Normen entsprechen alle einer wettbewerbspolitischen Orientierung, können jedoch aufgrund ihrer jeweiligen Wettbewerbssysteme unterschieden werden. Zum einem erfassen das Kartellrecht und die Fusionskontrolle die Nachfragemacht als Marktmacht, die aufgrund ihres Grades positive und negative Auswirkungen auf die Marktstruktur bewirken kann. Zum anderen wird die Nachfragemacht aber auch vom europäischen Missbrauchsverbot erfasst. Es wird anders als im Kartellrecht oder bei der Fusionskontrolle nicht ermittelt, inwiefern Nachfragemacht den Wettbewerb möglicherweise schädigt, sondern ob der Wettbewerb wegen der Ausnutzung dieser Marktmacht geschädigt wird. Jedoch erfassen die europäischen Rechtsnormen den ökonomischen Ansatz der Nachfragemacht auch anhand des Monopsonmodell nur teilweise und stellen deshalb eine begrenzte juristische Analyse dieses Phänomens dar. Dabei schliesst das europäische wettbewerbspolitische Leitbild den Schutz bilateraler Verhältnisse aus seinem Anwendungsbereich aus wohlfahrtsneutralen Gründen aus. In diesem Sinne wird Nachfragemacht prinzipiell als absolute Marktmacht definiert. In der Weise einer vereinfachten aber zugleich wirksamen Erfassung von Nachfragemacht durch das europäische Recht könnten jedoch die vorgeschlagenen Änderungen der aktuellen Rechtsnormen zu einem umfassenden Schutzes aller Marktteilnehmer führen.

This thesis deals with the determination of the player labour market for the American professional sports league Major League Soccer (MLS). In the theoretical part I focus on the description of the league's development along with the salary politics rules. Using the two stages least square method in the empirical part I then provide the model for the estimation of player's marginal productivity (MRP). In the first step I explain the correlation between the percentages of obtained points by teams with player statistics. In the second step I examine the influence of this variable along with other factors on team's revenues from attendance. Afterwards I compare the calculated player's MRP with their salaries and also test some additional factors that might influence players' salaries. Using this model and also some other simple regressions I conclude that MLS labour market is a monopsony market structure. Besides I found out that forwarders market seems to be the closest part of the MLS labour market to the competitive market structure. In conclusion I discuss possible model's weaknesses, which turned out to be especially dependency of players on their co-players' on-field performance.

This paper deals with the question whether the structure of the labor market in NBA is monopson or not. On the data from the NBA season 2011/12 I estimate player's marginal productivity using two stages least square model. In the first step I determine winner-loss ratio based on players' performance statistics. In the second step I use the results from the first model to predict team's revenues. This effect is controlled by other economic and social variables. Based on this model's results I determined that even though this market is not perfectly competitive, the results are not strong enough for monopson. Short player market could be described as winner-take-all market while on the market for centers there is a balance between pivots and owners and players can obtain their salary equal to their productivity. Then I discovered the superstar effect, according to which stars get bonuses to their salary against the rest of players. Finally it was found out that rookie contracts decrease players' rewards. On the market for centers the life cycle hypothesis holds.

This thesis deals with determination of the labor market structure for professional athletes, specifically the market for players of National Hockey League (NHL). The theoretical part focuses on the development of labor market for athletes and changes in rules that affected this development. In the empirical part I present a model for determining the marginal revenue product (MRP) of players. Further I determine the impact of other factors that have an influence on wage differences between players. Taking all the results I specify the type of market structure, which I determined on the basis of the relationship between MRP of players and their wages. I find out that the market for defenders and forwards of NHL is rather competitive, unlike the market for goalkeepers, which is best describable by the "winner-take-all" theory. At the end of the thesis, the possible errors in the model and data that could affect the outcome are summed up.

The thesis analyzes how minimum wage influences unemployment in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the economic theory is researched and the conclusion is that the Czech labour market is very similar to a monopsony market due to the low mobility of the workforce and the low rate of immigration. Another result is that the level of wages in developed economies does not depend on the productivity of the workforce anymore, so minimum wage laws have psychological impacts rather than economical. The following part of this thesis is dedicated to the comparison of labour market indicators between european countries. The last chapter investigates the main hypothesis with a dataset from the Czech Republic between 1993-2014 using the econometric model. A 1% increase of real minimum wage resulted in a 0.01% increase in the general unemployment rate and a 0.1% increase of unemployment among the young population. But if the minimum wage will be raised during the times of real GDP growth, influence on unemployment will be eliminated.

NC, North Carolina State Univ., Diss.--Raleigh, 2003. / Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich. - Enth. 3 Beitr.

Zugl.: Bern, Univ., Diss., 2009