This Master's thesis analyzes the subject of moral distress of Czech primary school teachers. It is divided into two parts. The first theoretical part clarifies key concepts and terms of ethics in education. Aside from more general terms like ethics, morals, and stress, it also covers crucial terms like moral distress and critical events. The second, practical part analyzes a qualitative dataset to describe and categorize different forms of moral distress. It records a variety of ways of solving critical situations and their potential influence on the psyche and professional development of educators. The aim of this work is to serve as a base for additional research or as a material for creating strategies to overcome similar situations. KEYWORDS Moral values, ethics, social influences, critical situations, dilemmas, moral distress, stress

Time raises a host of difficult ethical questions. This doctoral project focuses on two: 1. How are "static" comparative principles (e.g. equality, desert) to be understood over time? (The Problem of Fairness & Time) 2. How might separation (in time) between agents, objects, and threats affect claims to the relevant resources? (The New Problem of Temporal Distance) My work begins with a simple observation: our prima facie intuitions about the value of simple distributions change depending on whether such cases are presented as static (occurring at one time) or dynamic (extended over time). Further examination of more complicated distributions leads to the proposal of a new theory, Weighted Progressive Egalitarianism. This theory has two features: only past-regarding complaints matter (a scope restriction), and a comparative complaint between persons located at a great temporal distance matters less than a complaint between contemporaries (a weighting restriction). This theory provides one plausible answer to the first question, the Problem of Fairness & Time. The evaluation of this theory relies on and reveals some non-standard answers to the second question, the New Problem of Temporal Distance. I conclude by arguing that the theory’s application to a few puzzles in population axiology merits further investigation.

Can contemporary liberalism justify antidiscrimination law? The question seems impertinent until we consider contemporary liberalism’s commitment to limited government. Once we do, we realize that contemporary liberals may not complacently assume that their theories justify antidiscrimination law simply because discrimination based on race or sex is so obviously wrongful. Rather, they must scrutinize antidiscrimination law just as they do other regulation of individual conduct. Providing such scrutiny, this thesis argues that three of the most prominent contemporary liberal doctrines of political legitimacy—John Rawls’s “political liberalism,” an antiperfectionist version of the “harm principle,” and Joseph Raz’s “liberal perfectionism”—all fail to justify core applications of antidiscrimination law, applications that we intuitively consider perfectly legitimate. In light of this failure, contemporary liberalism faces a dilemma: it must jettison either its commitment to comprehensive, uniform antidiscrimination regimes or its antiperfectionism and overriding commitment to personal autonomy. This thesis argues for the latter course by providing an account of the wrongfulness of discrimination based on race or sex that condemns all instances of the conduct. According to this account, discrimination is wrong because acting on discriminatory intentions is wrong. More specifically, by taking another person’s race or sex as a reason to treat her less favorably than one would treat people of other races or the other sex, one fails to respect her as a person, to regard her as a being of ultimate value. Unlike contemporary liberal accounts, this account is fully perfectionist, since it defines discrimination in terms of the intentions of discriminators, and the intentions of discriminators in terms of their attitudes, which partly constitute their moral characters. So long as we remain committed to antidiscrimination law in its current form, we must attend to discriminators’ characters. And to attend to discriminators’ characters, we must be willing to espouse perfectionism.

Abstract  In this study I explore everyday leadership in a philosophical and existential perspective, based on a field study with three deep interviews with leaders for non-profit organisations that offers alternative social, school and care activities as a complement to the welfare that society provides. A fourth voice that is contributing to the study material and running throughout the text in reflections, discussions and analyses is mine, and thus my professional experiences are also part of the research material. Existentialism and the book of Simone de Beauvoir For the moral of ambiguity, together with Aristotle's thoughts of virtue and practical knowledge, are the basis in my philosophical approach to the field study in which I attempt to explore everyday leadership in the welfare sector. Factual evidence is taken from scientific reports, as well as from scientific literature. These are used for comparisons regarding the actuality of the study and the definition of concepts such as leadership. With the interview questions I seek to encourage conversations and reflections on how it is to be a leader in the encounter between one’s own inner conviction and the external circumstances in which the leader is located. The intention is to seek better understanding of leadership in a social organisation, and how the professional role interacts with the person who takes this role. Through conversations and reflections I investigate in what way the moral approach of leadership and how the interviewee relates to the context in which he or she is active. The leaders' experience, thoughts and reflections on their professional role constitute the basis for discussion and analysis. The conversation reflects the moral values ​​and approaches of the interviewed leaders in the profession and, conversely, the impact of the professional role in the personal sphere. / Sammanfattning   I denna essä som bygger på en fältstudie bestående av tre djupintervjuer med ledare för social och idéburen verksamhet inom vård, skola och omsorg utforskas vardagens ledarskap i ett filosofiskt och existentiellt perspektiv. Begreppet idéburna organisationer syftar till enskilda organisationer, vilka bedriver icke vinstdrivande verksamhet i syfte att komplettera samhällets insatser inom välfärdssektorn. En fjärde röst i essän som bidrar till studiematerialet och löper genom texten i reflexion, diskussion och analys är min egen, och mina yrkeserfarenheter utgör också en del av empirin. Existentialismen och filosofen Simone de Beauvoirs bok För en tvetydighetens moral är, tillsammans med Aristoteles’ tankar gällande dygd och praktisk kunskap, filosofiska ansatser i analysen och diskussionen av fältstudien om vardagligt ledarskap. Faktaunderlag hämtat från forskningsrapporter tillika med vetenskaplig litteratur utgör bollplank för jämförelser gällande studiens aktualitet till dagens situation och bestämning av begrepp som till exempel vad ledarskap innebär. Intervjufrågorna söker bjuda in till samtal och reflektioner om hur det är att vara ledare i mötet mellan en egen inre övertygelse och yttre omständigheter. Intentionen är att söka utforska hur det är att vara och arbeta som ledare för en social verksamhet, och hur den professionella rollen samverkar med människan som intar denna roll. I samtal och reflektioner undersöks hur ledarskapet och den intervjuades moraliska förhållningssätt relaterar till det sammanhang ledaren är verksam i. Ledarnas erfarenheter, tankar och reflektioner om sin yrkesroll är utgångspunkt för diskussion och analys. Samtalen speglar de intervjuade ledarnas moraliska värderingar och förhållningssätt i yrkesutövandet, och omvänt, vilken inverkan yrkesrollen har i den personliga sfären.

The aim of this thesis is to explore Bernard Williams' moral philosophy in its entirety. This objective is motivated by the critique which is sometimes being forced against Williams. This criticism is based on the objection that his thinking is thoroughly destructive in relation to philosophical ethics. The purpose to explore Williams' thinking in its entirety implicitly questions such an objection for it basically consists in the identification of the constructive moments of Williams' thinking and linking them with his skeptical attitudes. Accordingly, the project of this thesis is to show how Williams' attack on morality and moral system is being completed in notions of shame, truthfulness, and authenticity, which he develops in his late work and which delineate the alternative conception of ethics and ethical life to prevailing legalistic model.

The development of predictive biomarkers in neuroscience is increasingly enabling bioprediction of adverse behavioural events, from psychosis to impulsive violent reaction. Because many brain-based disorders can be thought of as end-states of a long development, bioprediction carries immense therapeutic potential. In this thesis, I analyse issues raised by the development of bioprediction of brain-based disorder. I argue that ethical analysis of probabilities and risk information bioprediction provides is confounded by philosophical and social structures that have, until recently, functioned nominally well by assuming categorical (binary) concepts of disorder, especially regarding brain-disorder. Through an analysis of the philosophical concept of disorder, I argue that we can and ought to reorient disorder around probability of future harm and stratify disorder based on the magnitude of risk. Rejection of binary concepts in favour of this non-binary (probability-based) one enables synergy with bioprediction and circumnavigation of ethical concerns raised about proposed disorders of risk in psychiatry and neurology; I specifically consider psychosis and dementia risk. I then show how probabilistic thinking enables consideration of the implications of bioprediction for two areas salient in mental health: moral responsibility and justice. Using the example of epilepsy and driving as a model of obligations to protect others against risk of harm, I discuss how the development of bioprediction is poised to enhance moral responsibility. I then engage with legal cases and science surrounding a predictive biomarker of impulsive violent reaction to propose that bioprediction can sometimes rightly diminish responsibility. Finally, I show the relevance of bioprediction to theories of distributive justice that assign priority to the worse off. Because bioprediction enables the identification of those who are worse off in a way of which we have previously been ignorant, a commitment to assign priority to the worse off requires development of and equal access to biopredictive technologies.

This diploma thesis deals with the Aristotelian virtue ethics and its renaissance in the twentieth century. Ethics is first defined generally as a separate science which belongs to the practical sciences. Subsequently, the emphasis on virtue ethics as one of the directions of normative ethics. A key part of the thesis deals with the ethics of virtue in Aristotle and interpretation corresponding more or less to the interpretation of the work of Nicomachean Ethics. The emphasis is on concepts of virtue, bliss and goodness. The development of u virtue ethics from the time of Aristotle until the twentieth century is also mentioned. The last part deals with the form of virtue ethics in the twentieth century, including the process how the ethics of virtue acquired its present form. It is also compared to the interpretation of virtue ethics in Aristotle and in the works of modern moral philosophers, particularly the work of Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue is emphasized.