This thesis examines the way in which traditional accounts of gender differences in the self-concept have relied on distal explanatory factors, and have thus conceptualised the gendered self as stable across both time and situation. This notion of a stable, gendered self has been implicated as underlying of a range of psychological gender differences (e.g., Cross & Madson, 1997), such as those in moral reasoning (e.g., Gillian, 1982) and ways of knowing (e.g., Belenky et al., 1989). As a result, these behaviours are also seen to be stable across time and context.¶ An alternative perspective is investigated, which looks to social identity theory and self-categorisation theory for a conceptualisation of both gender and the self-concept as being malleable and context-dependent (e.g., Turner et al., 1987). The social identity perspective describes the way in which proximal aspects of the social context affect the expression of gender-related behaviours, attitudes, and beliefs. In this way, the social identity perspective provides an analysis of group membership, group norms, and social influence which can not only account for the differences that are observed between men and women, but can also offer an analysis of the context-dependence of these difference and an approach by which gender differences can be mollified.¶ A series of nine empirical studies are reported, investigating the way in which individuals (a) define themselves, (b) approach moral reasoning, and (c) approach knowledge and learning, across a number of different social contexts. Together, the results suggest that the self-concept, moral orientation, and ways of knowing are neither stable nor inherently gendered, but are malleable and dependent on the nature of the self-other relationship as defined by the proximal aspects of the social context. The implications for traditional theories of gender differences are discussed, as are the broader implications for feminism and social change.

This thesis aims to clarify the nature of the relationship between moral reasoning, as per the neo-Kohlbergian DIT approach of Rest and his colleagues, and liberalism-conservatism. Moral reasoning and liberalism-conservatism are consistently found to be related but the resultant interpretation that liberals are more moral-cognitively advanced than conservatives has been challenged by Emler and his colleagues who argue that the DIT is liberally biased. Subsequent research on this issue has produced a methodological quagmire that this thesis aims to proceed beyond. The specific aim of this thesis is to test several different (or competing) hypotheses purporting to explain the relationship between Kohlbergian moral reasoning and liberalism-conservatism. These are (1) that liberals are more morally advanced than conservatives; (2) that "advanced moral reasoning" is merely social presentation; (3) that moral reasoning is separately constrained by moral development and conservatism; (4) that moral development and liberalism represent distinct paths to postconventional reasoning preference; (5) that moral reasoning differences between liberals and conservatives are broader than usually thought; (6) that the political content of moral issues affects moral reasoning differences between liberals and conservatives; and (7) that moral reasoning instruments have exaggerated moral reasoning differences between liberals and conservatives. Study 1 found that a non-ipsative, indirect moral reasoning measure was correlated with liberalism-conservatism thus disconfirming hypotheses 2 and 7. Additionally, hypothesis 5 was not supported by several DIT findings. Opposing hypotheses 2 and 6, Study 2 found that a conservative version of the DIT was correlated with liberalism-conservatism although a potential methodological issue arose. Study 3 developed an objective measure of moral comprehension, broader in scope than previous moral comprehension measures, which demonstrated acceptable reliability and validity. Employing this measure, Study 4 found that moral comprehension and liberalism were weakly correlated and that they independently predicted moral reasoning, although their interaction did not. Together, these findings provide some support to hypotheses 1 and 4 but not hypotheses 3 and 6. Overall these findings reveal that liberals appear more moral-cognitively advanced than conservatives but, compared to conservatives, liberals appear to indicate preference for advanced moral reasoning earlier in their moral-cognitive development. This latter mechanism appears stronger and suggests that, although DIT scores are still somewhat reflective of moral-cognitive development, the DIT�s estimate of liberals� moral-cognitive development is elevated. Future research can continue to explore these hypotheses (e.g., via longitudinal and/or "faking" studies) and, in so doing, further clarify the relationship between Kohlbergian moral reasoning and liberalism-conservatism.

<p>This thesis aimed partly to examine the effects of gender on conversation dynamics, partly to investigate whether interaction between participants with contrasting opinions promotes cognitive development on a moral task. Another objective was to explore whether particular conversational features of interaction would have any impact upon a pair’s joint response or on each child’s moral development. The conversations were coded with regard to simultaneous speech acts, psychosocial behaviour and types of justifications used. The results show no gender differences regarding psychosocial processes, but the boys used more negative interruptions, more overlaps and significantly proportionately more justifications in the form of assertions than the girls in the study. Gender differences were often more pronounced in same-gender as opposed to mixed-gender pairs, but children also altered their behaviour to accommodate to the gender of their conversational partner. Children who participated in the interaction phase of the study showed more overall progress on an eight-weeks delayed post-test than those who did not. However the only conversational feature that was related to the outcomes of conversation and development was the use of expiatory force justifications which were associated with a more advanced reply immediately after interaction as well as two weeks later.</p>

Cognitive and emotional processes both seem to contribute in the production of moral judgments, but how they interact is still under investigation. Greene’s dual-process model suggests that these processes constitute dissociable systems in the brain, which are hypothesized to give rise to two qualitatively different ways of moral thinking characterized by two normative moral theories, consequentialism and deontology. Greene indicates that this research undermine deontology as a normative theory. The empirical investigation of moral judgments implies that the dual-process model only seems to accurately predict and explain moral judgments in moral dilemmas involving physical harmful intentions. Regardless of the models empirical support, the empirical findings in the study of moral judgments could have normative and metaethical implications.

Based on the importance of environmental ethics in both causing and solving many of the environmental problems, the present study aimed to (1) Examine moral reasoning patterns (i.e. ecocentric, anthropocentric, non-environmental) of pre-service science teachers toward local and non-local environmental problems, (2) Investigate the effects of gender and grade level on moral reasoning patterns, and (3) Explain the factors that may have led to the observed differences in participants&rsquo / moral reasoning patterns. Throughout 2008-2009 Fall and Spring semesters, environmental cases regarding local and non-local environmental problems were distributed to a convenience sample of 120 pre-service science teachers who were enrolled in Middle East Technical University and moral decision-making interviews (MDMIs) were carried out with a sub-sample of 16 pre-service science teachers. In accordance with the purpose of the study, descriptive statistics, paired-samples t-tests, and multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) tests as well as qualitative analysis of the interviews were utilized. Analyses demonstrated that participants of the study mostly exhibited ecocentric moral reasoning for both local and non-local environmental problems, and their ecocentric and anthropocentric concerns showed statistically significant difference with regard to problems&rsquo / locality. Moreover, while gender did not have a statistically significant effect on participants&rsquo / moral reasoning patterns, grade level did have a statistically significant effect. Finally, analysis of the interviews revealed sixteen factors effective in participants&rsquo / environmental concerns and their moral reasoning regarding environmental issues.

In this study I examine the arguments made by Martha Nussbaum in Poetic Justice in defence of a positive role for literary engagement in the process of moral and political judgement formation. Nussbaum argues that novel reading offers a unique chance to engage our empathy in morally beneficial ways, because it stands as a kind of practice run for appropriate moral judgement through the adoption of an emotionally engaged yet critically distant “Judicious Spectator” stance when reading. I examine her account of the activity and purported benefits of reading and argue that her use of the Judicious Spectator concept is incompatible with her claims about the structure of novels and the experience of reading. I suggest examining an alternative set of fictions, namely the genre of science fiction and in particular Ursula K. Le Guin’s novel The Left Hand of Darkness as a means to assess whether Nussbaum’s account plausibly captures the moral value of reading fiction. I argue that even a charitable reading of Nussbaum’s Judicious Spectator concept cannot explain the central thought experiment at the heart of Le Guin’s novel, as it invites readers to contemplate a re-evaluation of their own self-identities or foundational assumptions, allowing them to abandon beliefs and understandings that have perhaps unwittingly coloured their previous moral reasoning without undergoing the scrutiny of justificatory rigour. This resulting type of re-evaluation is, I argue, primarily self-reflective in nature and not externally directed to programmatic outcomes like the possible interpretations of the novel available to Nussbaum. This good, which I label ‘appropriate doubt’, is defended as a general feature of certain kinds of novel reading, and as worthy of moral attention. I conclude that this shows Nussbaum’s account of engagement with fiction to be at best, incomplete.

This thesis aims to clarify the nature of the relationship between moral reasoning, as per the neo-Kohlbergian DIT approach of Rest and his colleagues, and liberalism-conservatism. Moral reasoning and liberalism-conservatism are consistently found to be related but the resultant interpretation that liberals are more moral-cognitively advanced than conservatives has been challenged by Emler and his colleagues who argue that the DIT is liberally biased. Subsequent research on this issue has produced a methodological quagmire that this thesis aims to proceed beyond. The specific aim of this thesis is to test several different (or competing) hypotheses purporting to explain the relationship between Kohlbergian moral reasoning and liberalism-conservatism. These are (1) that liberals are more morally advanced than conservatives; (2) that "advanced moral reasoning" is merely social presentation; (3) that moral reasoning is separately constrained by moral development and conservatism; (4) that moral development and liberalism represent distinct paths to postconventional reasoning preference; (5) that moral reasoning differences between liberals and conservatives are broader than usually thought; (6) that the political content of moral issues affects moral reasoning differences between liberals and conservatives; and (7) that moral reasoning instruments have exaggerated moral reasoning differences between liberals and conservatives. Study 1 found that a non-ipsative, indirect moral reasoning measure was correlated with liberalism-conservatism thus disconfirming hypotheses 2 and 7. Additionally, hypothesis 5 was not supported by several DIT findings. Opposing hypotheses 2 and 6, Study 2 found that a conservative version of the DIT was correlated with liberalism-conservatism although a potential methodological issue arose. Study 3 developed an objective measure of moral comprehension, broader in scope than previous moral comprehension measures, which demonstrated acceptable reliability and validity. Employing this measure, Study 4 found that moral comprehension and liberalism were weakly correlated and that they independently predicted moral reasoning, although their interaction did not. Together, these findings provide some support to hypotheses 1 and 4 but not hypotheses 3 and 6. Overall these findings reveal that liberals appear more moral-cognitively advanced than conservatives but, compared to conservatives, liberals appear to indicate preference for advanced moral reasoning earlier in their moral-cognitive development. This latter mechanism appears stronger and suggests that, although DIT scores are still somewhat reflective of moral-cognitive development, the DIT�s estimate of liberals� moral-cognitive development is elevated. Future research can continue to explore these hypotheses (e.g., via longitudinal and/or "faking" studies) and, in so doing, further clarify the relationship between Kohlbergian moral reasoning and liberalism-conservatism.

This thesis aimed partly to examine the effects of gender on conversation dynamics, partly to investigate whether interaction between participants with contrasting opinions promotes cognitive development on a moral task. Another objective was to explore whether particular conversational features of interaction would have any impact upon a pair’s joint response or on each child’s moral development. The conversations were coded with regard to simultaneous speech acts, psychosocial behaviour and types of justifications used. The results show no gender differences regarding psychosocial processes, but the boys used more negative interruptions, more overlaps and significantly proportionately more justifications in the form of assertions than the girls in the study. Gender differences were often more pronounced in same-gender as opposed to mixed-gender pairs, but children also altered their behaviour to accommodate to the gender of their conversational partner. Children who participated in the interaction phase of the study showed more overall progress on an eight-weeks delayed post-test than those who did not. However the only conversational feature that was related to the outcomes of conversation and development was the use of expiatory force justifications which were associated with a more advanced reply immediately after interaction as well as two weeks later.

Humans express complex moral behaviour, from altruism to antisocial acts. The investigationof the neural and cognitive mechanisms underlying our moral minds is of profoundimportance for understanding these behaviours. By reviewing recent findings in cognitive andmoral neuroscience, along with other relevant areas of research, the current study aims to: (1)Investigate the neural correlates of moral intuition and moral reasoning, and see how thesetwo systems relate to moral judgement and moral behaviour. (2) Examine how the moralintuitive system and the moral reasoning system relate to one another. Neuroscientificevidence suggests that these two systems are supported by different areas in the brain. Whiletheir relationship is argued to be both sequential, integrative and competitive, evidenceindicates that the moral reasoning system primarily functions as a post hoc rationalization ofour intuitive-driven judgements and behaviours. While our moral intuitive system motivateskin altruism, both moral intuition and moral reasoning serve to uphold reciprocal altruism.

Ethical behavior and moral judgment are fundamental issues facing the accounting profession today. Changes in the ethical culture of accounting have brought about a crisis of ethical misconduct in the profession. External forces for better ethics in accounting, represented by Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) legislation, and internal forces, represented by increased educational coverage encouraged by state societies and the AACSB, are attempts to influence the current crisis. Research in the field of ethics and moral judgment in the accounting profession continues as researchers continue to examine factors influencing the ethical reasoning abilities of accountants and accounting students. The results of these studies may assist accounting schools and the accounting profession in controlling and improving the ethical orientation of the accounting profession. This study examines the possible relationship of ethics education and moral reasoning of undergraduate and graduate accounting students. Limited previous research on these two variables has provided mixed results. This study examined undergraduate and graduate accounting students at six colleges and universities in the upper mid-west and southern region of the United States. The variable of ethics was measured with Rest's DIT-2 instrument and ethical education by completed ethics courses. The results of this study demonstrate a significant relationship between ethics education and the moral reasoning of accounting students. However, the results were not in the expected direction, with the accounting students completing ethics education having a significant lower level than the accounting students without ethics education. In addition, this research found that accounting students who are 22 years of age or younger possess higher levels of ethical reasoning than accounting students who are older than 22 years of age. However, the findings show that there are no significant differences in the ethical maturity levels of accounting students when grouped by gender and education level. These findings support the need for further research into determining factors influencing moral judgment in undergraduate and graduate accounting students.