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This dissertation examines how transnationalism can affect Islamists’ moderation in both Egypt and Morocco. In this dissertation, I do an in-depth comparative case study analysis to assess the prospects of moderation of two Islamists political entities, the Muslim Brotherhood as a transnational social movement and the Morocco Party of Justice and Development (JDP), which has no transnational ties. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and PJD came to power after the Arab uprising in 2011 and were key players in the democratic transitions in both countries; however, the entities are not related. Further, the dissertation will explore the moderation level of the Muslim Brotherhood and PJD. Current literature on Islamists and moderation theory focuses on political inclusion, political learning and repression as factors that would affect the moderation of an Islamist group. Looking at Islamists as a transnational social movement is a new aspect in the study of Islamism. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

The Arab Spring of 2011 revealed stark variation in the durability of different types of authoritarian regimes. Kings and emirs demonstrably outperformed their republican peers. This paper provides a qualitative study of the Moroccan monarchy in order to better explain this pattern. The findings of an original media content analysis support the paper's thesis that Morocco's King Mohammed VI maintained his throne by effectively using a historically derived position of concentrated power and immense wealth to manipulate potential opposition and dominate public discourse. This multi-causal mechanism of manufactured consent helped create and sustain the monarch's domestic legitimacy while alienating his opponents. Importantly, the illusion of a free media bolsters his image with Western political elites, thus, drawing greater external support and reducing the cost of repression.

Why do revolutions happen? What role do structures, institutions, and actors play in precipitating (or preventing) them? Finally, What might compel social mobilization against a regime in the face of potentially insurmountable odds? These questions are all fundamentally about state-society (strategic) interactions, and elite and societal preference formation over time. The self-immolation of Muhammad Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid on December 17, 2010, served as a focal point upon which over twenty years of corrupt, coercive authoritarian rule were focused into a single, unified challenge to the Ben Ali regime. The regime's brutality was publicized via social media activism and satellite television, precipitating mass mobilization across Tunisia and, eventually, throughout the region and beyond. In light of the rapid and unforeseen nature of these events, scholars writing about the causes of the Arab Spring have focused their critiques on scholarship that they felt overemphasized the role of institutions and elite-level actors over 'under the radar' changes within society. This paper essentially agrees with this point of view, but is not content to simply 'throw out' institutionalism. As Timur Kuran (1991) argued in the wake of the unforeseen collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, one cannot understand revolution without understanding the 'true' preferences of social actors. In this way, the inevitability of revolutionary surprises seems a given so long as analysts continue to look from the top-down. Yet, this paper contends that institutions do still matter. They matter because different institutional arrangements incentivize and constrain regime strategies, which, in turn, inform the strategic calculations and preference orderings within society. These two societal variables are determined - in part - by the degree of regime flexibility, and they affect whether, how, and where social actors choose to vent their dissent. This paper proposes a model for the development of contentious social mobilization under authoritarianism. In order to do so, two models - one game-theoretic, and the other rooted in the contentious politics subfield of political sociology - are synthesized toward elucidating how altered societal preferences affect strategic interactions between the regime and society over time and during acute contentious episodes. The synthesized model is then illustrated through narrative case studies of two North African states that experienced divergent outcomes in the wake of the Arab Spring: Tunisia and Morocco. The limited spaces and institutions for the expression of dissent in Tunisia gradually changed societal preferences over time. In 2010, Tunisians' preferences shifted from various socioeconomic demands and other issue-specific grievances toward a galvanized demand for the fall of the regime. In Morocco, on the other hand, social actors, by and large, continued to prefer limited reforms to a complete upheaval of the political system. This paper contends that this divergence in preferences and therefore outcomes was in part determined by the variation in the two regimes' respective strategic mixes of concessions and/or coercion. To the extent that such strategies and institutions were more flexible - i.e. were more permissive of (limited) political contention and contestation - social movements were less likely to become emboldened against the regime.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Partant du constat de la constitution de la promotion de la démocratie comme enjeu des relations internationales et de politique étrangère, la présente recherche s’interroge sur les politiques menées en la matière par l’Union européenne dans le cadre des relations avec ses voisins méditerranéens, particulièrement le Maroc et la Tunisie. L’analyse se concentre sur l’Instrument européen pour la démocratie et les droits de l’homme, sur la période 2007-2012.<p>L’objectif est de comprendre et d’expliquer les pratiques des différents groupes d’acteurs impliqués dans ces politiques, au sein de la Commission (DG Relex/SEAE, DG Devco, délégations) et du Parlement (sous-commission DROI).<p>La position défendue est la suivante :les pratiques européennes de promotion de la démocratie au Maroc et en Tunisie sont fonction de l’identité des groupes institutionnels qui les mettent en œuvre. Pour chaque groupe institutionnel, peuvent être mis en évidence des normes, intérêts et ressources qui contribuent à défendre et renforcer l’identité institutionnelle. Dès lors, des pratiques qui peuvent paraître incohérentes au premier abord (pourquoi agir au Maroc et pas en Tunisie ?pourquoi créer l’IEDDH et, parallèlement, évincer l’objectif de promotion de la démocratie de la coopération bilatérale avec la Tunisie ?) prennent tout leur sens lorsqu’on parvient à restituer la fonction sociale qu’elles assurent.<p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished