Motor Third Party Liability Insurance has appeared some years after serial production of cars was started. This kind of insurance was made obligatory in many European countries after it was noticed, that not all the drivers, who did harm to others or damaged their property, were able to suit civil liability claims and compensate damage. The Lithuanian Motor Third Party Liability Insurance Law was accepted on June 14, 2001 and came into force on January 1, 2002; the demand to insure vehicle came into force after 3 months, on April 1. Lithuania was the last country in Europe, which brought into practice this obligatory kind of insurance. In this work insurance markets of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are being compared. These markets were chosen because of economical and political situation: ex-members of USSR, similar living standards, no insurance market. After retrieving independence insurance companies were established little by little. The aim of this work is to show how insurance markets that started in the same conditions, later developed differently and to compare their present situation. Both: annual and average data is being used for the comparison. In the first part of this work statistical data of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian insurance markets are compared: the number of insurance companies, average installment for a habitant, etc. In the second part the contracts, signed by Lithuanian insurance companies each quarter, are studied as time series. Several time... [to full text]

In this paper the hypotheses related to individual variables used for segmentation of Motor Third Party Liability (MTPL) insurance by Czech insurance companies are tested. Summary of papers focused on this topic and development of insurance market segmentation in European Union are presented in the first part of this thesis. The first part of this paper is extended by the analysis of actual MTPL segmentation in Czech Republic. The estimation of marginal effects of exogenous variables on probability of occurrence a claim is described in empirical part. For the estimation of parameters I use the logistic regression. Specific models for small and large claims are created. The most significant variables positively correlated with probability of occurrence a claim are engine capacity, young age and region Prague. The most significant variables negatively correlated with probability of occurrence a claim are historical car, old age, number of months without any claim and region South Moravia. My results are compared to the results of other papers.

This thesis is focused on the question whether implementing of a malus policy into a bonus-malus system encourages drivers to be more responsible on the road. The drivers should be motivated to change their behaviour be aimed at decrease of reported insurance events because this system increases their premium whenever they are in an accident. To answer the given problem I used regression analysis with a random effects model and I analysed the drivers registered at insurance company Allianz in years 2000 - 2005. The result of this analysis shows that there was no change in the behaviour since the malus policy was introduced. The examined impact has been detected in case which was interacting with a different variable. The malus policy had the impact on a reduction of accidents in regions below 10 000 inhabitants. This thesis is also focused on the influence of driver characteristic and technical properties of his vehicle on reported insurance events. Tested variables are sex of the drivers, region of driver's residence, age and engine capacity. All explanatory variables have effect on the reported insurance events.

The diploma thesis is focused on the motor damage and the motor third party liability insurance profitability evaluation of the czech insurance market. In the first part both the czech market devolopment and the current law-making issues with the evaluation of the czech market key indicators are briefly described. Next part of the thesis is focused on the non life insurance market quantitative characteristic in the period from 2003 to 2015. Next part of the thesis deals with the motor damage and the motor third party liability insurance characteristics. In the last two chapters the thesis examines the motor damage and the motor third party liability market with the following evaluation of their profitability by using the combined ratio indicator.

The aim of this thesis is to determine the premium of motor third party liability insurance. Thesis explores both direct approach to premium cal- culation and calculation using separately calculated claims frequency and claims severity. Emphasis is put on the use of generalized linear models whose theory is also present. Described approaches to calculation are applied on real world data, compared with each other and then final model for premium calculation is selec- ted. Premium is determined with the inclusion of IBNR reserves and expenses. Keywords: generalized linear model, claims frequency, claims severity, net pre- mium, gross premium, motor third party liability insurance, bonus-malus. 1

Submitted by Danielle Cavalcante Duarte (dc.duarte@gmail.com) on 2016-01-21T15:37:14Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2016.01.18_Conflitos.de.Agência.no.Consórcio.DPVAT_pós.defesa.pdf: 898489 bytes, checksum: a4aaf912a30b7b1326ac452f6227997e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by BRUNA BARROS (bruna.barros@fgv.br) on 2016-02-03T18:17:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2016.01.18_Conflitos.de.Agência.no.Consórcio.DPVAT_pós.defesa.pdf: 898489 bytes, checksum: a4aaf912a30b7b1326ac452f6227997e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Almeida (maria.socorro@fgv.br) on 2016-02-11T18:40:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2016.01.18_Conflitos.de.Agência.no.Consórcio.DPVAT_pós.defesa.pdf: 898489 bytes, checksum: a4aaf912a30b7b1326ac452f6227997e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-02-11T18:41:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2016.01.18_Conflitos.de.Agência.no.Consórcio.DPVAT_pós.defesa.pdf: 898489 bytes, checksum: a4aaf912a30b7b1326ac452f6227997e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-01-11 / Diferentes arranjos institucionais resultam em diferentes incentivos para a realização de trocas econômicas. Com efeito, estruturas regulatórias implementadas em determinado contexto histórico-econômico podem resultar em consequências diversas daquelas originariamente pretendidas, impondo ao regulador a necessidade de constante monitoramento e de intervenções com vistas a diagnosticar e corrigir ou minimizar possíveis distorções nas relações entre os atores envolvidos. Assim, esta dissertação tem por objetivo analisar o funcionamento do Consórcio do Seguro DPVAT como mecanismo de conexão entre seus diversos stakeholders. Pretende-se analisar a existência de conflitos de interesses derivados das diversas relações entre as partes interligadas – geradas pelo arranjo institucional firmado para a gestão dos recursos arrecadados com os prêmios pagos pelos proprietários de veículo automotor para o Seguro de Danos Pessoais Causados por Veículos Automotores de Via Terrestre, ou por sua carga, a Pessoas Transportadas ou Não (DPVAT) – que possam suscitar intervenção regulatória no sentido de evitá-los, ou, ao menos, mitigá-los. A pesquisa é conduzida a partir da identificação dos comportamentos esperados de agentes econômicos autointeressados, tendo por referência os pressupostos da Nova Economia Institucional sob a perspectiva da Teoria da Agência, e do exame das principais mudanças legislativas havidas na estrutura do seguro obrigatório de trânsito no Brasil nos últimos 50 anos. Na sequência, com base em elementos teóricos e empíricos, foram identificados e analisados três conflitos de agência entre os stakeholders do Consórcio DPVAT: o primeiro seria aquele havido entre a entidade gestora do Consórcio DPVAT (agente) e as sociedades seguradoras consorciadas (principal); o segundo conflito observado refere-se à relação mantida entre a entidade gestora do Consórcio DPVAT (agente) e o órgão regulador (principal); e, por fim, o conflito de agência existente entre a seguradora que administra o referido consórcio (agente) e os proprietários de veículo automotor (principal). / Different institutional arrangements result in different incentives for performing economic exchanges. Indeed, regulatory frameworks implemented in a particular historical and economic background may produce results different from those originally intended, therefore imposing to the regulator the need for constant monitoring and intervention in order to diagnose and correct or minimize possible distortions in the relationships among actors. Thus, this dissertation is proposed to analyze the operation of the DPVAT Consortium as a connecting mechanism between its various stakeholders. The goal is to check potential conflicts of interest that may arise from the various relationships between these stakeholders – set up by the institutional framework established to the management of the premiums paid by motor vehicle owners for their mandatory motor third-party liability insurance (known as DPVAT insurance in Brazil) – that may foster regulatory intervention in order to avoid such conflicts or, at least, to mitigate them. The survey is based on identifying the expected behavior of economic agents in their own interest, according to the assumptions of the New Institutional Economics from the perspective of the Agency Theory, and on the examination of the main legislative changes in mandatory motor third-party liability insurance in Brazil over the last 50 years. Subsequently, three agency conflicts between DPVAT Consortium stakeholders were identified and analyzed based on theoretical and empirical evidence, arising from: (1) the relationship between the managing body of the DPVAT Consortium (agent) and the insurance companies that are an integral part of the Consortium (principal); (2) the relationship between the managing body of the DPVAT Consortium (agent) and the regulatory body (principal); and (3) the relationship between the insurance company that operates the DPVAT Consortium (agent) and the motor vehicle owners (principal).