From angry torch-swinging Parisians attacking the Bastille and Russian workers rising up against the Tsar to outraged Chinese peasants exacting revenge on their landlords and Cuban guerrillas battling Batista’s army, revolutions without violence have in the past been near inconceivable. But when unarmed Iranians after an extended popular struggle forced Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the last king of Iran, to flee Tehran on January 16, 1979, they had gifted the world a new and seemingly paradoxical phenomenon: a nonviolent revolution. Far from a historical oddity, such revolutions have since occurred on almost every continent. Over the past thirty years the function of guerrilla tactics, military coups, and civil war has increasingly been replaced by demonstrations, boycotts, and strikes. How can social scientists account for this “evolution of revolution” that have so altered the appearance of the phenomenon that by Arendt’s definition events in places like Iran, the Philippines, Chile, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine may not even qualify as revolutions? Yet, the popular overthrows of authoritarian regimes in each and every one of those countries were nothing less than revolutionary. The dissertation seeks to understand this recent development in the nature of revolutions by historically examining the phenomenon’s signal case, the Iranian Revolution. The core question asked is: what are the structural and historical forces that caused the Iranian Revolution to be the world’s first nonviolent revolution? The central argument is that both the emergence and success of the nonviolent Iranian Revolution can be explained by its internationalization. In other words, the Iranian Revolution turned out to be successfully nonviolent because, unlike previous revolutions, it was a global affair in which the revolutionaries intentionally and strategically sought to bring the world into their struggle against the state. Indirectly, the aim of this study is to generate the genesis of a theoretical framework that can explain more broadly the emergence and success of nonviolent revolutions in the late 1970s and beyond. / text

The White Revolution was a set of six reform measures put to the Iranian people via referendum on 6 Bahman 1341 (26 January 1963), based on a plan for social justice linked with economic development, encased in the concept of a bloodless revolution from the top. This did not happen unexpectedly; it was the culmination of events spanning several years, which accelerated during the John F. Kennedy Presidency. Various plans and reforms paved the way for the White Revolution and certain events as well as political and economic developments encouraged reform. There were similarities between plans and some reforms influenced others, or were shaped to suit different agendas. All played a part in instigating the White Revolution. This included Prime Minister ʻAlī Amīnī’s 15-point plan, the Shah’s Royal Farmān, the Third Development Plan, and the six-points of the White Revolution itself. The question this thesis seeks to answer is to what extent the Kennedy administration was responsible for instigating the White Revolution by influencing the various steps that paved the way for the 6 Bahman referendum?The United States had at its disposal various means by which it might apply pressure and influence development. This included, economic aid, military assistance, numerous advisers, agencies on the ground, plus support for the Shah and other Iranians. Given the Kennedy administration’s association with modernisation and development, the existing historiography has portrayed this period in US-Iranian relations as one of increased pressure on the Shah to reform with the White Revolution being the result of such pressure. This thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by challenging this portrayal by providing the first detailed, analysis of the period 1961-63, utilising a vast array of newly released documents. This is not the first study to conclude agency on the part of Iran for the White Revolution, but is the first to do so though a detailed, balanced approach, which doesn’t ignore the significance of the US-Iranian relationship. Thus, this thesis is at the forefront of revisionist accounts of US-Iranian relations during the Cold War critiquing the portrayal of the Shah and others as mere tools of the US and reaching the conclusion that contrary to widely held beliefs it was Iranians rather than Americans who instigated the White Revolution by initiating and directing reform.