This dissertation quantitatively evaluates selected labor market policies in a search-matching model with skill heterogeneity where high-skilled workers can take temporary jobs with skill requirements below their skill levels. The joint posterior distribution of structural parameters of the theoretical model is obtained conditional on the data on labor markets histories of the NLSY79 respondents. The information on AFQT scores of individuals and the skill requirements of occupations is utilized to identify the skill levels of workers and complexity levels of jobs in the job-worker matches realized in the data. The model and the data are used to simulate the posterior distributions of impacts of labor market policies on the endogenous variables of interest to a policy-maker, including unemployment rates, durations and wages of low- and high-skilled workers. In particular, the effects of the following policies are analyzed: increase in proportion of high-skilled workers, subsidies for employing or hiring high- and low-skilled workers and increase in unemployment income.

近年來許多學者研究家庭經濟狀況對於孩子發展的影響，根據先前諸多學者的研究，顯然家庭經濟狀況是對於孩子各方面的發展是一個重要影響因素。由於近年來大學學歷越來越普遍，大學又與高中以前的教育方式不同，偏向專業化，因此如何選擇科系也逐漸成為重要議題。 本文使用NLSY79 Child & Young Adult之樣本，研究孩子成長階段的家庭經濟狀況對於是否就讀大學的影響。本文以美國官方定義之貧窮標線（poverty guidelines）判定家庭經濟狀況是否為貧窮，並將孩子成長過程劃分成三階段：0至6歲、7至12歲、13至18歲，探討每個階段的家庭經濟狀況對於孩子是否就讀大學的影響。使用Logit model之實證結果為，成長過程當中任一階段若曾經屬於貧窮，皆會降低孩子就讀大學的機率。 本文進一步探討家庭經濟狀況與科系選擇，採用Current Population Survey (CPS) CEPR之職業薪資資料、National Opinion Research Center (NORC)之職業聲望資料、Occupational Information Network (O*NET)之職業工作特性資料，並利用The National Survey of College Graduates(NSCG)之樣本，將各年份各科系之出路職業比例做為權重，加權計算將職業特性轉換為科系特性。本文探討四種科系特性，分別為：科系預期薪資報酬、科系預期職業聲望、科系預期未來工作所需人才（個人能力）、科系預期未來工作所需人才（社交方面）。使用OLS model之實證結果為，成長階段家庭曾經屬於貧窮的孩子傾向選擇預期薪資報酬較低的科系，但貧窮經驗不影響孩子對於預期職業聲望的追求。至於人才類型方面，貧窮經驗對於孩子是否選擇注重個人能力之科系影響並不顯著，但貧窮經驗會使得孩子較不會選擇注重社交能力之科系。

This research is a systematic comparison of youth migration experiences between two birth cohorts, using the first ten rounds of two national longitudinal surveys of youth, NLSY79 and NLSY97. Results show both changes and continuities in youth migration patterns across cohorts for ages16-25. Specifically, youth today have a delayed but stronger migration momentum than the late baby boom generation, the dividing point being at age 22. Women are more likely to migrate than men in the recent cohort, but not in the older cohort. Whites migrate considerably more than blacks and Hispanics consistently across cohorts. The likely life events in youth's transition to adulthood are important indicators of youth's migration propensity for both cohorts. Particularly, graduating with a bachelor's degree is the most powerful predictor of youth's migration propensity. Other life events such as getting married; becoming separated, divorced, or widowed; dropping out of college; and losing a job are also significantly associated with youth migration. In general, the effects of these life events on youth's migration propensity are weakened across cohorts, but the importance of having a college degree on migration propensity has been increasing.

Past research has established a marital wage premium among men, and more recently, among women of the baby boom generation. It is unknown whether: 1) the marriage premium holds among more recent cohorts of men and women, 2) it differs by intensity of work hours among husbands and wives, and 3) cohabiters receive wage bonuses. Using fixed-effects models and data from the 1979-1989 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) and the 1997-2010 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97), this paper compares cohort differences in the gendered marriage premium. While both women and men receive marriage premiums and these premiums are larger for more recent cohorts, men’s premiums are consistently higher and have doubled from the late baby boomers cohort (NLSY79) to the late Generation X (Gen X) cohort (NLSY97). While there was no wage premium for cohabitation among baby boom cohort women, I observe a premium among Gen X men and women. Household specialization matters: while among baby-boomers the marriage premium did not vary by household type, among the Gen X cohort men’s marriage premium is significantly larger among male breadwinner households, and surprisingly, I find marriage penalties for men in female-breadwinner households. Similarly, Gen X female breadwinners and female dual-earners receive the marriage premium while Gen X women in male-breadwinner households experience marriage penalty. In addition, the more highly educated receive larger marital bonuses.