Le peintre, soldat et mémorialiste Louis-François Lejeune (1775-1848) entendait faire de son corpus de peintures de bataille et de ses Souvenirs d’un officier de l’Empire (1851) des témoignages historiques de la période napoléonienne, destinés à la postérité. Or, cette conjugaison entre peintures et mémoires renvoie aussi à la dualité médiale de la propagande napoléonienne, qui diffuse un récit unique des événements militaires à l’aide d’organes d’information inédits tels que les Bulletins de la Grande Armée. Ce récit, déjà médiatisé comme étant historique, est repris en images par le mécénat impérial. Ce mémoire vise à démontrer comment Lejeune contribue à ce récit historicisant, d’abord à un niveau individuel en construisant son identité par rapport à sa participation aux guerres napoléoniennes, puis aussi à un niveau étatique. Son Bivouac d’Austerlitz, présenté au Salon de 1808, est une commande du gouvernement. Il sera question de la façon dont ce tableau de Lejeune s’insère d’abord dans sa carrière, ensuite dans son corpus de peintures de bataille, puis finalement dans le récit napoléonien sur Austerlitz. La forme épisodique du tableau, empruntée à la ligne narrative du 30e bulletin de la Grande Armée, où Napoléon rapporte la victoire d’Austerlitz, peut s’expliquer par la complémentarité voulue entre récit textuel et visuel. Ce tableau contribue ainsi à la construction historique de la bataille. Au milieu des transformations profondes du monde académique et de la hiérarchie des genres, la dualité peintre-soldat de Lejeune répond en tous points à la vocation historique attribuée à la peinture sous Napoléon. / Painter, soldier, and memorialist Louis-François Lejeune (1775-1848) conceived his battle paintings and his memoirs, Souvenirs d’un officier de l’Empire (1851), as historical testimonies of the Napoleonic period, destined for posterity. This twinning of paintings and memoirs mirrors the duality of Napoleonic propaganda as a whole, which disseminates a single version of military events with the help of unprecedented information tools such as the Bulletins de la Grande Armée. This written narrative, already thought of as historical, is picked up again in the paintings commissioned by the government. This master’s thesis argues that Lejeune contributes in a unique way to this historical narrative, first at an individual level by constructing his identity from his participation in the Napoleonic wars, and also at a state level. His Bivouac d’Austerlitz, presented at the 1808 Salon, was commissioned by the government as part of a larger order. It is shown that this painting fits first into Lejeune’s career, then into his cycle of battle paintings, and finally into the narrative of Austerlitz that Napoleon himself promoted. The episodic form of this painting can be explained by the deliberate pairing of written and pictorial narratives, which borrows from the 30th bulletin de la Grande Armée where Napoleon recounts the victory at Austerlitz. This painting thus contributes to the historical construction of the battle. As deep transformations threatened the academic genre hierarchy at the turn of the nineteenth century, the duality of Lejeune’s persona as soldier and painter helped promote the historical function given to paintings under Napoleon.

On 1 February 1793, the National Convention of Revolutionary France declared war on Great Britain and the Netherlands, expanding the list of France's enemies in the War of the First Coalition. Although British Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger had predicted fifteen years of peace one year earlier, the French declaration of war initiated nearly a quarter century of war between Britain and France with only a brief respite during the Peace of Amiens. Britain entered the war amid both a nadir in British diplomacy and internal political divisions over the direction of British foreign policy. After becoming prime minister in 1783 in the aftermath of the War of American Independence, Pitt pursued financial and naval reform to recover British strength and cautious interventionism to end Britain's diplomatic isolation in Europe. He hoped to create a collective security system based on the principles of the territorial status quo, trade agreements, neutral rights, and resolution of diplomatic disputes through mediation - armed mediation if necessary. While his domestic measures largely met with success, Pitt's foreign policy suffered from a paucity of like-minded allies, contradictions between traditional hostility to France and emergent opposition to Russian expansion, Britain's limited ability to project power on the continent, and the even more limited will of Parliament to support such interventionism. Nevertheless, Pitt's collective security goal continued to shape British strategy in the War of the First Coalition, and the same challenges continued to plague the British war effort. This led to failure in the war and left the British fighting on alone after the Treaty of Campo Formio secured peace between France and its last continental foe, Austria, on 18 October 1797.

The main purpose of this study of a pearl and cameo diadem, given by Napoleon to his first wife Josephine in 1809, is to follow its representation in portraiture from Paris in 1812 to Stockholm in 2010, and explore how the iconography develops during these 200 years. From the earlier years, the diadem is found only in miniatures, then after coming to the new royal family in Sweden, the Bernadottes, it is given a role of an heirloom representing history and families in grand paintings, arriving to the present well-known wedding hairpiece, covered by modern media, where the diadem is more of a crown than the open, forehead-covering piece of fashion jewellery it was during the Napoleonic era in France. The portraits from 1812, 1814, 1836, 1837, 1877, 1976, 2000/2003 and 2010 also portray a development of the female role model of its time. Just like the hair piece attains an iconography which comprises not only the highest dress codes but also a possibility of status transformation for the people involved in ceremony, the role of the country’s First Lady is about to change into a higher, more egalitarian position of present days.

Activité prisée des rois de France depuis l'époque médiévale, la chasse était devenue pour les derniers Bourbons plus une passion dévorante qu'une simple distraction. Louis XV et Louis XVI furent critiqués par l'opinion publique naissante, qui considérait que leurs chasses onéreuses les éloignaient du gouvernement. Après la chute de la monarchie, les chasses royales disparurent. Elles furent remises au goût du jour par Napoléon Ier, soucieux de s'approprier les apparences de la légitimité monarchique. Le maréchal Berthier fut ainsi nommé Grand veneur en 1804. Grâce à lui, Napoléon put faire de ses chasses un instrument politique puissant, une distraction de Cour prisée, le tout avec une économie substantielle de moyens. La Restauration, au lieu de revenir à l'organisation d'Ancien Régime, choisit de conserver l'équipage de chasse et l'administration mise en place pour Napoléon, qui fonctionnèrent jusqu'en 1830. Naquit ainsi le paradoxe d'une Restauration affichant, à la suite de l'Empire, la volonté de renouer avec la tradition monarchique, mais cela grâce à un équipage formé pour Napoléon. C'est cette continuité, humaine, budgétaire, mais aussi politique et symbolique qu'il convient d'étudier au travers des éléments constitutifs des chasses : une implantation autour de Paris permettant une circulation de la Cour autour de différentes résidences de chasse, une pratique régulière destinée à la distraction du souverain et de ses proches, des invitations de personnages politiquement importants, qui donnent à certains jours de chasse bien précis une résonance particulière. Autant d'aspects qui se retrouvent dans les sources : archives, journaux, mémoires, œuvres d'art. / Hunting had always been the privileged activity of kings since the mediaeval period, and for the later Bourbons it became a consuming passion. Indeed Louis XV and Louis XVI were to be criticized by a proto public opinion ; it was thought that hunts were expensive and that they distracted the rulers from the duties of government. The royal hunts disappeared with the fall of the monarchy. But Napoleon, with his desire to appropriate the outward show of monarchical legitimacy, brought it back. Marshal Berthier was appointed Grand veneur and given the task of organizing the imperial hunt in exactly the same way as it had been done under Louis XVI. Napoleon made the hunts a powerful political instrument and a Court indulgence whilst at the same time making considerable savings. The Restoration in fact chose not to revive Ancien Régime customs but preserved the Napoleonic hunting administration. This gave rise to the paradox of a Restoration attempting to reinvigorate monarchical traditions but using structures created by Napoleon. This is that strong continuity, human, budgetary, but also political and symbolic, inside a geographical field concentrated around Paris that made it possible for the Court to circulate around the different imperial hunting residences, to dedicate certain days to the hunts, and to invite some important political figures. All of these aspects are to be found in the sources : archives, newspapers, autobiographies, artworks.

Officier de cavalerie originaire de la noblesse picarde, Armand de Caulaincourt (1773-1827) gravit rapidement tous les échelons de la cour consulaire puis impériale, devenant en 1804 grand-écuyer de l’Empire. Mais, malgré l’importance de ses fonctions curiales, Napoléon le destine à une carrière de diplomate. Après différentes missions, il le nomme ambassadeur de France en Russie, à la fin de l’année 1807. Fervent partisan de l’alliance de Tilsit, Caulaincourt participe à toutes les grandes négociations franco-russes mais doit assister à la lente dégradation des relations entre les deux empires. À son retour à Paris en 1811, son bilan politique est maigre. Sa défense opiniâtre du tsar Alexandre, mais surtout son opposition à la campagne militaire qui se prépare, irritent Napoléon. Elles lui permettent toutefois d’acquérir une nouvelle stature après le désastre de Russie : pour ses contemporains Caulaincourt devient l’« homme de la paix ». Une image que Napoléon réutilise lorsqu’il le charge de le représenter aux congrès de Prague (1813) et de Châtillon (1814). Le duc de Vicence, devenu ministre des Relations extérieures, ne parvient pas à faire accepter la paix ; il lui faut finalement négocier l’abdication de Napoléon et renoncer, après les Cent-Jours, à toute carrière politique. Cette étude, qui s’appuie sur les archives personnelles de Caulaincourt et ses célèbres Mémoires, entend redonner toute son importance à cette figure majeure du Premier Empire, en insistant sur son action et sa pensée dans le domaine de la diplomatie. L’exemple de ce parcours devant permettre de contribuer à reconsidérer et réévaluer le rôle du personnel diplomatique napoléonien. / A cavalry officer born into Picardy's landed gentry, Armand de Caulaincourt rose rapidly through the ranks of the consular, and later the imperial court, to become in 1804 Grand Squire of the Empire. However, notwithstanding the importance of his curial functions, Napoleon destined him to a diplomatic career. After several missions, he was appointed as Ambassador of France to Russia (1807). Caulaincourt took part in all the major negotiations between France and Russia, but was forced to witness a slow breakdown in relations between the two Empires. At the time of his return to Paris in 1811, his political accomplishments were unimpressive. His stalwart defense of Tsar Alexander, and especially his opposition to the upcoming military campaign, were an irritation to Napoleon. Nevertheless, these stances allowed him to gain new stature after the disaster in Russia : in the eyes of his contemporaries, he became the “Peacemaker”, an image Napoleon used to his advantage by appointing him his representative at the congresses in Prague (1813) and in Châtillon (1814). The Duke of Vicenza, now Minister for Foreign Affairs, could not, however, broker an agreement in favour of peace : he was forced to negotiate Napoleon's abdication and to give up any hope of political career after the Hundred Days. This study, based on Caulaincourt's personal records and famous Memoirs, aims at restoring a major figure of the First French Empire to his due importance, while focusing on his action and thought in the field of diplomacy. The exemplary value of his career should also allow historians to reconsider and reevaluate the role of Napoleon's diplomatic personnel.

「沙皇亞歷山大一世之研究」主要以歷史分析法(History Analysis Method)為主軸，針對俄國沙皇亞歷山大一世（Tsar Alexander Ⅰ）從出生(24 Dec 1777)一直到逝世(26 Dec 1825)的一生事蹟，包括了少年成長時期、執政時期(1801-1825年)的社會情況、內政外交、軍事行為等加以研究分析，以提出對此段歷史的分析解釋以及對其後歷史的影響。 由於凱薩琳大帝精心設計的教育歷程，使得亞歷山大一世成為俄國皇室中有史以來第一位具有啟蒙思想的沙皇並且懷有著改革俄國的夢想。然而亞歷山大一世經常在言行上出現不一致的狀況。舉例來說，少年時代的他曾不只一次地表明本身並不適於擔任沙皇，然而日後他卻在一場弒父的流血政變中登基﹔他宣稱自己熱愛憲政，但卻未能實踐他對憲政主義的理想；他一再地表示對農奴制度極端地憎惡，但卻沒有對這項制度有較為激烈的改革﹔他在外交上表示別無所求只願歐洲和平的想法，卻一再地與法國以及瑞典、顎圖曼土耳其帝國等發生戰爭。因此，為了解釋這種矛盾性，大部分的史家經常將亞歷山大一世描寫為一個謎題一般神秘而且矛盾的人物，或者將他描繪成詭計多端、不真誠的乃至於白癡與精神分裂，以提出對於亞歷山大一世如此矛盾不協調的統治的解釋。除了以這種方式來解釋亞歷山大一世的統治歷程外，本篇文章旨在更進一步地深入瞭解沙皇的性格與人格特質，以及將外在條件的制約納入分析思考的範圍中，以對此段歷史提出更為全面而廣泛地解釋。 終亞歷山大一生，他耗費了相當多的時間在國內改革與外交事務的參與上。1801年即位之始，他便汲汲營營地進行各項改革，然而由於國內改革事務存在的艱困阻礙加上拿破崙的壓力，逐漸促使他遠離內政改革而將心思轉向外交事務上。在提爾斯特條約暫時地解脫亞歷山大一世在外交與軍事上的壓力之後，亞歷山大一世又回到內政改革上，他任命了麥克海爾•史普蘭斯基為國務卿，並且命他進行憲政計劃的草擬。由於許多的原因，史普蘭斯基所提出的計劃沒能夠全盤被執行，而憲政改革又再次陷入了停擺。1812年，俄國面臨了拿破崙侵略的威脅，最終又捲入與法國的戰爭中。在拿破崙經歷了征俄戰爭以及最終受到聯軍的圍剿而徹底失敗之後，亞歷山大一世成為歐洲最有勢力的統治者，他的功績在此時達到最高峰，並且要將歐洲改造成新的局面，最終藉由神聖同盟的設立而完成他的志願。在回到國內之後，亞歷山大一世似乎已經準備好再次面對內政的改革。然而沙皇對於革命的畏懼更勝於他對改革的熱情，1820年代俄國國內的不安以及國外的革命騷亂終究使得他的改革劃下了句點。雖然亞歷山大一世未能完成他的改革理想，但無可置疑地，他仍是19世紀裡俄國與歐洲歷史上的重要角色。 本文第一章緒論針對研究動機與目的、研究途徑與架構、文獻分析與研究限制與問題提出說明。第二章係對亞歷山大一世之成長背景，主要探討十八世紀末俄國現況，凱薩琳二世及保羅一世對亞歷山大一世成長的影響。第三章則對亞歷山大一世的內政改革，包括農奴政策、憲政改革、以及其他經濟文教的改革加以研究論述。第四章論述亞歷山大一世的外交與軍事作為，包括俄法戰爭、維也納會議、歐洲協調、四國同盟與神聖同盟等問題。第五章針對亞歷山大一世晚期的作為提出綜合檢討與回顧。第六章為結論。 / The Study of Tsar Alexander I mainly explores the history of the whole life of the Russian Tsar Alexander I (1801-1825). This article basically use the historical analysis method to describe and analysis the history from Alexander I's birth (24 Dec 1777) until his death (26 Dec 1825), which covers his childhood, youth, and his behaviors after his ascended to the throne. And finally provides the explanation and analysis of the history about this period of time, and it’s influence for later history. Due to Catherine II’s delicated education, Alexander I was the first tsar who had the enlightened thoughts and had dreams to reform Russia. But his behaviors were usually contradictory to his words. More than once he professed he was unsuitable for the exercise of power, yet he ascended to the throne in a bloody coup which involved the murder of Paul I; He claimed to love constitutions, yet he failed to realize his ideal to implement the constitutional reform; He frequently expressed his abhorrence of serfdom, yet he did little to challenge this institution; He asserted that his only ambition is to promote the peace of the Europe, yet he fought not only with France, but also with Sweden and the Ottoman Empire. Historians usually explained the incongruities of his highly paradoxical reign by portraying Alexander as everything from scheming and insincere to idiotic to schizophrenic. In addition to this kind of explanation for his reign, This article aims at exploring the tsar’s personality and character more deeply and taking the outside constraints on his reign into consideration in order to analysis and explain the history of his lifetime more broadly. Through his lifetime, Alexander I spent most of his time in domestic reforms and diplomatic affairs. After his coronation, he eagerly engaged in domestic reform. However, the difficulties he faced in domestic reforms and the oppressions from Napoleon gradually pushed him to turn away to diplomatic affairs. Until the temporary relief of Tilsit treaty, he proceeded to domestic reforms again. He appointed Mikhail Speransky as the state secretary, and ordered him to draft the plan of constitution. Due to a lot of reasons Speransky’s plan was canceled and the constitution reform was delayed again. In 1812, Russia faced the aggression oeagerly engaged in domestic reform. However, the difficulties he faced in domestic reforms and the oppressions from Napoleon gradually pushed him to turn away to diplomatic affairs. Until the temporary relief of Tilsit treaty, he proceeded to domestic reforms again. He appointed Mikhail Speransky as the state secretary, and ordered him to draft the plan of constitution. Due to a lot of reasons Speransky’s plan was canceled and eagerly engaged in domestic reform. However, the difficulties he faced in domestic reforms and the oppressions from Napoleon gradually pusArakachev to start oppressive and cruel rule until his death. Despite of his failure to fufill all the reforms, generally speaking, he still is a dominant figure in both Russian and European history in the nineteenth century. The construction of this article is as follows：The first chapter focuses on the tropics about motives and intentions of this study, study methods and construction, the article analysis and the study limits. The second chapter explores the background of Alexander I’s growth, which about the tropics of current situations of the end of 18 century, and the influence of Catherine II and Paul I on the growth of Alexander I. The third chapter explores the tropics about the domestic reforms which include the serfs question, the constitutional reform, and other reforms about economy and education. The fourth chapter explores the diplomatic and military behaviors of Alexander I, which includes the tropics of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, the Vienna conference, the European settlement, the Quadruple Alliance and the Holly Alliance. The fifth chapter explores the last years of AlexanderⅠ’s rule, and provide the full analysis and overview. The sixth chapter is conclusion.