Spelling suggestions: "subject:"multionational security""
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The "changing dimensions" of the Australia-Indonesia bilateral relationship from 1996 to October 2002 in the defence and security context /Hunter, Sri Mulyati. January 2002 (has links) (PDF)
Thesis (B.A.(Hons.))--University of Adelaide, Centre for Asian Studies, 2002? / Bibliography: leaves 52-56.
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United States national security policy under presidents Truman and Eisenhower : the evolving role of the National Security Council /Snead, David L. January 1991 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-113). Also available via the Internet.
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Economic interdependence and the formation of a security community in the Asia-Pacific regionZhang, Ming, January 1994 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Purdue University, 1994. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 289-302).
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Geo-strategic approaches to co-operative maritime security in northeast Asia : with particular reference to naval arms control, maritime confidence-building measures and maritime co-operation measuresKim, Duk-Ki January 1998 (has links)
The purpose of this study is to design a co-operative maritime security structure for Northeast Asia through the application of naval arms control and disarmament measures (both structural and operational), maritime confidence-building measures (MCBMs) and maritime cooperation measures (MCMs). In order to construct an analytical framework for such an application it is necessary to introduce sub-objectives. The first is to explore the options for providing co-operative maritime security, such as naval arms control. MCBMs and MCMs, and to assess the value of their contribution to the general co-operative maritime security framework. The second is to examine the particular points of the major regional powers' maritime security policies with a view to considering their relevance to the construction of a system of co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia. The third is to delineate the regional geo-strategic security environment conducive to Northeast Asian co-operative maritime security in the framework of the various types of measures. The final part examines the potential conditions for the application of co-operative maritime security measures and suggests a priority of application on the basis of the regional maritime security environment. In the last decade, the United States and Russia have been forced to change their defence policies, trim their budgets, curtail operations overseas, and re-evaluate their fundamental purposes. Nonetheless, the medium powers, such as China and Japan, continue to build and deploy naval weapons and vessels that others find threatening. Unless they reconsider their positions toward co-operative maritime security, they may miss a critical opportunity to bring stability to the high seas. In Northeast Asia, the main boundary and territorial disputes are maritime in nature, e.g. Russia-Japan (South Kuril IslandslNorthern Territories), Korea-Japan (the Tok Islandsffakeshima), China-Japan (the Senkaku Islandsffiaoyu Tao), as well as Taiwan and, in the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands/Xisha Qundao (Vietnam-China), and the Spratly IslandslNansha Qundao (China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Philippines and Brunei). Multilateral security activities cannot replace formal diplomatic/legal negotiations to settle maritime boundary and territorial disputes, but co-operative maritime security measures may be particularly valuable in minimising the risk of conflict in such circumstances. Among the MCBMs, the most promising areas involve modifying existing INCSEA agreements, and establishing or expanding measures of transparency, such as compliance with the UN or an eventual regional arms register and the regular issue of credible official Defence White Papers. In the current context of strategic uncertainty and maritime force development in Northeast Asia, information exchange measures and communication measures may be the most valuable MCBM, applicable region-wide. Co-operative maritime security measures can offer a number of benefits. The main goals of MCMs are cost reduction through shared efforts or by joint operations for humanitarian purposes, joint development of marine resources, the protection of SLOCs and prevention of sea pollution. MCMs can also be used as confidence-building measures in themselves to maintain communication when tensions heighten. MCMs indicate that neighbouring countries can work together to look after certain problems at the regional or subregional level. This can help not onJy to deter potential adversaries but also to assure extraregional countries that no direct threat would be posed to their sea-borne trade. With functional and operational approaches, MCMs cover marine pollution, search and rescue, illegal activities, including drug smuggling, piracy and fisheries infringement. The first area of naval arms control to be considered covers constraints on naval activities as operational naval arms control measures. General operational arms control measures could be used to cover other naval activities, or they could serve as a model for similar agreements in other areas. The provisions for notification of dangerous activities, for instance, could be broadened to include mandatory notification of all naval exercises. After the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, the United States and Russia developed stabilising rules of behaviour as their navies came into contact with each other across the world's oceans. With the expansion of naval forces in Northeast Asia and the increased likelihood of accident and miscalculation, one could make a case for the negotiation of regional INCSEA agreements, particularly on a bilateral basis. Such agreements already exist in the North Pacific: Canada and Russia, the US and Russia, Russia-Japan and Russia-ROK. The United States and China have also signed a related agreement on maritime consultation. Operational measures at sea could be implemented by imposing restraints on naval activities and geographical limitations. Structural measures, as the second aspect of naval arms control, consist of quantitative and qualitative approaches. A quantitative approach based on ratios would inevitably affect the relative size of forces of different countries. Such agreements are difficult to achieve because of differences in geostrategic goals and asymmetries of naval forces in the region. This thesis argues that the development of co-operative maritime security measures to the point where they become a significant aspect of the regional maritime security framework in Northeast Asia will not be easy. It is a very diverse region, where there are quite different security perceptions and maritime territorial and legitimacy conflicts which require resolution. There is also little tradition of security co-operation, at least on a multilateral basis. The maritime issues themselves are generally complicated, and the practical and operational factors involved in the establishment of effective co-operative maritime security regimes are extremely demanding. Maritime confidence-building measures offer the greatest potentiaL as an initial step. As subsequent steps, maritime co-operation measures and naval arms control measures could be followed. The important question is whether or not the application of co-operative security models can be brought to the point where they can enable the effective management of the increasing complexities and uncertainties which characterise the emerging maritime environment in Northeast Asia. Current fiscal constraints might clearly provide an opportunity for Northeast Asian countries not only to consider more closely their threat perceptions but also to pursue regional co-operative maritime arrangements which rely more on mutual understanding and less on a naval arms build-up.
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Japanese Defense policy legacies of the past, challenges for the futureJipping, Ken 09 1900 (has links)
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Japan faces new security challenges due to the rise of China, the potential nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the distraction of the United States forces caused by the "War on Terror". This will mean that, increasingly, Japan must take care of its own defense requirements. Unfortunately, this will not be an easy transition for a country with a past of militarism and colonial expansion, an aversion to nuclear weapons, and a political structure that has purposely limited the role and resources of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). This thesis examines the legacies of the past - militarism, colonialism, the aversion to nuclear weapons, and the political structure that emerged after 1945, and assesses how those legacies impact the adaptation of the JSDF to the new security requirements of the 21st Century. The basic conclusion is that Japan needs to emerge from under the security umbrella of the a military power commensurate with its economic power. / Lieutenant, United States Navy
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United States strategy toward China after a peaceful Taiwan Strait resolutionHickey, Stephen J. 12 1900 (has links)
Although the United States has maintained a one-China policy since 1972, U.S. actions have upheld de facto Taiwan sovereignty in the face of Chinese threats of forceful reunification. This seemingly contradictory American stance has focused Chinese attention on the Taiwan issue and the U.S. role in perpetuating it. The growing economic interdependence between Taiwan and the mainland make peaceful reunification a plausible exigency. If China no longer needs to worry about this historical thorn in its paw, it is logical it would divert its attention and energies elsewhere. This thesis examines the current state of economic, socio-political, and military considerations between the United States and the People's Republic of China to infer the likelihood of either cooperation or contention between the two nations in a post-reunification era. The thesis argues that endemic suspicion and competition between China and the United States make moot the possible amelioration in relations a PRC-ROC reunification might present. The thesis concludes that American policy should be tailored to address the Chinese challenge in a post-unification world.
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Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia causes and recommended measuresSiddiq, Irfan. 12 1900 (has links)
This research examines ethnic conflicts in Indonesia from 1998 to 2004 in an attempt to identify their underlying causes by using two case studies of ethnic conflict, one on Maluku Island and one in Poso, Central Sulawesi. The lessons learned that I drew from those two case studies address the questions, of why have ethnic conflicts in Indonesia taken place more frequently since 1998 and what the best strategies for the Indonesian government to use to prevent the eruption of ethnic conflicts in Indonesia in the future? With regard to the lessons learned from Maluku and Poso, this research generally concludes that underlying factors such as political disputes, economic and social disparities, religious and cultural differences, and tribal disputes have contributed to the current ethnic conflicts in Indonesia. Among the underlying factors, political disputes and economic and social disparities outweighed the other factors and played a more significant role in triggering the initial conflicts. This research contributes valuable information to the Indonesian government and nongovernmental organizations in dealing with future ethnic conflicts in Indonesia.
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The Great Orange Hope Ukraine, NATO, and the dilemma of European integration after the Orange RevolutionCramer, Clarke S. 12 1900 (has links)
This thesis examines the dilemma of Ukrainian integration into Europe and analyzes the significance and prospect of Ukrainian membership in NATO following the 2004 â Orange Revolution.â The extraordinary election of Victor Yushchenko became a powerful catalyst for Ukrainian integration efforts into Europe and amplified Ukraineâ s geopolitical plight between Europe and Eurasia. Although Russia remains Ukraineâ s â eternal strategic partner,â President Yushchenko affirmed his intention to integrate Ukraine into the EU and the NATO. However, EU accession remains improbable due to years of empty Ukrainian reform efforts coupled with recent setbacks within the EU. Consequently, the Ukrainian path into Europe starts with NATO integration. Despite periods of political discord, Ukraine and NATO share a history of military cooperation, and Ukraine would be an asset within the transformed Alliance. After the Orange Revolution, NATO quickly moved to consolidate democracy, promote reforms, and facilitate future Ukrainian integration into Europe. With support, Ukraine may fulfill the necessary conditions for NATO accession in the coming years. However, the notion of NATO membership is still unpopular among Ukrainians, and anti-NATO influence in Ukraine remains significant. The onus remains on Ukraine to take the actions needed to join the Euro-Atlantic and European communities, and long-term success remains uncertain.
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Pakistan's Afghanistan policyHussain, Khawar 06 1900 (has links)
Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have remained estranged mainly due to Afghanistan's revanchist claim made about Pakistan's western province and its non-recognition of the Durand Line as the international border. With a hostile India to the East, Pakistan can ill-afford another irredentist neighbor. Since 1947 both countries have interfered in each other's domestic affairs. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan forced Pakistan to wage a proxy war in Afghanistan, garnering the support of Western and Arab allies. Since the end of Cold war, Pakistan continued its forward policy in Afghanistan through support of Taliban. Its prime security interest in Afghanistan remains having a friendly government in Kabul. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, Pakistan abandoned support of Taliban and joined the U.S.-led coalition to destroy the Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Once again, Pakistan encountered a deep-seated hostility, this time from the Northern Alliance, which dominates the new power structure in Kabul. Skepticism and fear remain as both countries move cautiously to revitalize bilateral ties. This thesis analyzes Pakistan's Afghanistan policy from 1947 to 2001. It recommends Pakistan's effective engagement with Afghanistan. While Pakistan protects its legitimate security interests, it must refrain from actively interfering in Afghanistan's political future. The thesis will also recommends that the United States should substantively remain engaged in Afghanistan to stabilize the region, assist with the reconstruction of Afghanistan, ensure non interference of regional actors, and finally and most importantly help settle the Durand Line issue once and for all.
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Joint strike fighter across the Atlantic to unify or divide?Reinhard, Scott W. 12 1900 (has links)
This thesis examines the procurement of fighter aircraft as an indication of transatlantic relations. Specifically it asks if European rationale toward purchasing the Joint Strike Fighter indicates its position toward increasing military capabilities and the importance placed on defense cooperation with the United States. Certain observers have suggested that the relentless U.S. pursuit of technology in the â Revolution in Military Affairsâ has exacerbated the capabilities gap and encouraged the U.S. to act unilaterally. This thesis argues the JSF offers allies a means to circumvent recent damage done in the Atlantic Alliance. Through a case study of four countries â expectedâ to purchase the JSF to replace U.S.-made F-16 aircraft, this thesis concludes that rationale for some who have heretofore abstained from the program is worrisome, but the fact that some are electing to pursue other choices indicates further divergences in the transatlantic realm. Through the views of these countries and looking at the larger picture, the JSF will further divide Europe and the U.S. in defense relations, as the pursuit of military technology threatens to drive the U.S. away from multilateralism and toward a â buy our equipment or be left outâ stance on the so-called network centric battlefield.
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