The increasing complexity and high stakes of foreign policy decisions, especially of major powers such as the United States, have generated specialized studies of decision making. One approach, called "multiple advocacy," maps a strategy of role tasks and process norms to guide the decision-makers towards an optimal decision-making process. This process allows the President to make an informed policy choice as a result of having heard a variety of options debated freely and openly among his advisors in his presence. A crucial actor in this process is the National Security Advisor. As process manager or "custodian," he must ensure that the key provisions of the strategy are met while abstaining from personal involvement in the substance of policy advice and execution. This thesis examines the internal coherence and usefulness of the strategy. The first two years of the Carter administration provide a close approximation of the strategy. Four important policy issues during this period form the empirical basis of this test: the "Deep Cuts" proposals in SALT II, the war in the Horn of Africa, Sino-American Normalization, and the fall of the Shah of Iran. While the basic principles of the strategy are found useful and sound, several of its provisions are challenged. First, in spite of its claim, the strategy does not produce multiple options when the advisors have no wide divergence of opinion. Second, contrary to the strategy's prescriptions, the custodian can improve the process in such situations by joining the policy debate. Third, custodial engagement in activities such as diplomacy and public speaking need not be prohibited too strictly. Last, the demise of the strategy can be more narrowly defined as the result of custodial disregard for a free flow of information and open participation among the advisors. Though further studies are needed to widen the empirical base, several tentative suggestions are offered to improve the strategy. The president must insist on a reasonable range of opinions when appointing advisors. While the National Security Advisor may join the policy debate to widen the range of options, his policy advice should not become the rule. At all times the President must insist that all policy debates among his advisors be brought to his attention, and that all policy options receive a fair hearing. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis is a study of national security decision making in the Ford Administration. The subject for study is the Kissinger- Schlesinger controversy in the Ford Administration. The thesis will attempt to prove that the differences that emerged over issues of national policy were due to deep theoretical disagreements as to the nature of the international system, the utility of power in the nuclear age and the means by which to preserve detente. An examination of the substantive policy differences will be preceded by an examination of the conceptual disagreements between the Secretaries on topics that are fundamental to any study of international politics. Studies on decision making in intemational politics will be used to show that each man had a different perception of the role that the United States should have in the international system and the usefulness of America's strategic arsenal for the preservation of peace. After having defined the theoretical differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger on issues in international politics, an analysis of the substantive policy disagreements between the two Secretaries will show that they can be directly related to each man's conception of the international system. Policy differences between the two will be shown to have evolved out of disagreements over policy goals, and not policy implementation. Any study of individual decision making in defense and foreign affairs stresses the importance of individual policy makers and of issues. Foreign nations perceive changes in foreign and defense policy goals when new leadership emerges with which they are uncomfortable. It will be shown, through an analysis of the foreign reaction to the Kissinger-Schlesinger controversy, that foreign nations expressed concern for the outcome of this policy split. In particular, it will be shown that the matter was of great interest to the Soviet Union. In conclusion the thesis will reiterate the point that national security decision making in the Ford Administration was unab1e to reach a compromise on issues of policy because of funamental differences between the Secretaries of State and Defense on detente, the definition of the national security in the nuclear age and the negotiating strategy that America should follow with the Soviets on arms limitations. These differences on policy were made inevitable due to differing models that each Secretary had on the nature of the international system. The study of their individual perceptions will help to give one an understanding as to why the policy disagreements made compromise impossible.

No description available.

One of the key features of the 2002 United States National Security Strategy was an abrupt shift from the traditional U.S. approach to proliferation threats that prioritized deterrence and promotion of nondiscriminatory nonproliferation norms, to an approach called counterproliferation that emphasized military preemption and direct challenges to adversarial state identity. This thesis asks the question, what caused counterproliferation to largely replace deterrence and nonproliferation as the central national security policies of the U.S. concerning unconventional weapons? The thesis argues that to understand this policy change requires not merely an appreciation of changes in the post-Cold War international security environment, but also an examination of how culturally shaped threat conceptions among American policymakers interacted with capabilities development and policy institutionalization within the U.S. military. As no current theory adequately addresses those dynamics, complimentary strategic culture and organizational theory models are presented as the framework for analysis. This thesis will contend that policy shift from NP to CP resulted from the merging of strategic cultural efforts aimed at legitimizing conceptions of proliferation threats as originating from state identity, with a military organizational drive to avoid uncertainty through the development of counterproliferation capabilities. Together these strategic cultural and organizational responses to shifting proliferation threats altered the menu of choice for policymakers by institutionalizing and legitimizing a policy response that directly challenged existing nonproliferation norms and practices. This thesis relies on a detailed case study of the evolution of counterproliferation policy from 1993 to 2002, with particular focus on the analysis of public discourse, declassified policy planning and Department of Defense documents, and participant interviews.

This thesis responds to the longstanding call from constructivist and poststructuralist scholars for a turn to discourse. It focuses on the paradox of the ability of language to act as a constituting and constraining device within an agent-structure discussion. The Copenhagen School (CS), its attention to language and its concept of securitization is examined in terms of its strengths and weaknesses, including bringing discourse onto the security agenda to an unprecedented extent. This thesis seeks to speak security at a deeper level and move securitization beyond the moment of utterance and the notion of agents breaking free of rules that would otherwise bind, as well as beyond a singular definition of security. It is proposed that the CS framework can be theoretically complemented by Wittgenstein’s notion of language games on board. The analytical shift made by juxtaposing a speech act and a language game also foregrounds the link between language and rules. Wittgenstein’s idea of ‘acts of interpretation’ is also considered, and substantive questions are raised about what the language of security legitimates in principle and in practice. The Bush administration’s justifications for the 2003 Iraq war are taken as a point of departure, and covers how the Bush administration deployed the language of security to justify highly controversial moves. Their narrative about the use of the pre-emptive use of force without an imminent threat existing and ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ such as those seen in the Abu Ghraib photographs in the name of security exemplify that words matter. The arguments conclude that adjustments are needed in the way security is currently spoken in IR theory.

Electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes was largely unregulated prior to 1978. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (hereinafter "FISA") was enacted to implement a judicial authorization process for foreign intelligence electronic surveillance that would effectively balance competing needs for national security and civil liberty under the Fourth Amendment. This study examines the evolution of FISA and its effectiveness under the Fourth Amendment, as assessed by federal reviewing courts and scholars since the statute's enactment. The study concludes that the FISA electronic surveillance authorization process has been effective in providing a constitutional mechanism to obtain foreign intelligence information.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / Many authors, critics, and policy makers question the presence of a unified grand strategy with which the United States has striven toward in recent years. This is a topic worthy of pursuit since such a strategy is responsible for identifying how this nation intends to accomplish its goals. This thesis defines what, if any, grand strategy the United States is currently pursuing. It observes several prominent theories of grand strategy, from both the realist and liberal perspectives. This analysis is set in context of historical grand strategy decisions since World War II and uses the framework of Taiwan as the case study. The thesis then compares the three theories, Selective Engagement, Offshore Balancing, and the Liberal Milieu and their recommendations to real-world activities of the United States with a focus primarily on military deployments and national objectives. The study reveals that of the three in question, the Liberal Milieu grand strategy is the only one that is supported by ongoing deployments in the East Asia region as well as by the national rhetoric which define our policy objectives.

My research provides a historical and archaeological context for this thesis, in which I argue the JB-2 missile is historically significant as a unique example of the rapid duplication of enemy technology for both physical and psychological retaliation, as a crucial link in the chain of development for America’s cruise missile program, and for its role in early Cold War deterrence. Jet Bomb model number 2 (JB-2), America’s first operationally successful, mass produced cruise missile, developed as a direct copy of the German V-1, with slight variation in manufacture due to differences between German and American components, machinery and tooling. Continuing modifications of the JB-2 during its service life led to improvements in performance, control, and accuracy. From 1944 to 1953, the JB-2 transitioned from a weapon quickly prepared for wartime deployment to an essential test vehicle for the United States Army, Air Force and Navy while supporting the U.S. policy of containment during the early Cold War.

Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) / In the early 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower encouraged citizens to “Wake Up! Sign Up! Look Up!” to the Soviet atomic threat by joining the Ground Observer Corps (GOC). Established by the United States Air Force (USAF), the GOC involved civilian volunteers surveying the skies for Soviet aircraft via watchtowers, alerting the Air Force if they suspected threatening aircraft. This thesis examines the 1950s response to the longstanding problem posed by the invention of any new weapon: how to adapt defensive technology to meet the potential threat. In the case of the early Cold War period, the GOC was the USAF’s best, albeit faulty, defense option against a weapon that did not discriminate between soldiers and citizens and rendered traditional ground troops useless. After the Korean War, Air Force officials promoted the GOC for its espousal of volunteerism and individualism. Encouraged to take ownership of the program, observers appropriated the GOC for their personal and community needs, comprised of social gatherings and policing activities, thus greatly expanding the USAF’s original objectives.