This thesis is a comparative analysis of nationalism in Quebec, Scotland, and Catalunya and the perspectives of nationalist parties towards questions of constitutional change within the broader Canadian, United Kingdom, and Spanish states. It is the goal of this thesis to analyse how minority national groups view themselves within the constitutional framework of multinational states and what arguments they make for greater recognition for their national communities. All of the nationalist parties under discussion argue that the distinct position of the minority national group is not sufficiently recognised within the state. How this recognition can be achieved is of primary concern to nationalists and shapes their approach towards constitutional dialogue. Nationalist parties adopt various approaches towards constitutional reform in an effort to achieve either a reform of the existing state or the secession of the minority national group's territory from the state. This thesis analyses these approaches as advocated by the parties themselves and by other political and academic participant-observers. In examining the Catalan, Quebecois, and Scottish cases this thesis compares the unique asymmetrical arrangements that each state has adopted as a means to accommodate the minority national groups. Many nationalists argue that this evolving asymmetry is insufficient to meet the goal of greater recognition, leading to their advocating various federal, con federal, and secessionist options. After considering the various constitutional options that are presented this thesis argues that promoting a higher degree of constitutional and administrative asymmetry is an effective means of bringing greater recognition to Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya within the state. The qualitative analysis in this thesis is based upon original research and a review of available secondary source material. The original research consists largely of data obtained from personal interviews and from an analysis of party documents. The personal interviews were conducted in Scotland, Quebec, and Catalunya with political participant-observers, including members of nationalist parties and individuals involved in developing constitutional policy and with academic participant-observers who specialise in constitutional politics. The thesis is divided into four sections. The first section includes the introduction that outlines the research method and Chapter 1 that examines various theoretical approaches to nationalism. The second section lays the groundwork for the following two sections. It consists of chapters two to four, which examine the historical evolution of nationalism in Quebec, Catalunya, and Scotland from its antecedents to the late twentieth century, paying particular attention to the evolution of nationalist political thought. The third section consisting of chapters five to seven is the main analytical section. In each of these chapters the constitutional framework of each state and the nationalist response are analysed through an examination of constitutional documents and party manifestos, leaders' speeches, and other policy material. Data obtained from interviews is analysed here. The fourth and final section is made up of the conclusion and a comparative analytical chapter that draws the three cases together through an analysis of various constitutional options in the three multinational states.

The Uyghurs are a Muslim population in the Xinjiang province in Northwest China. They have been agitating for independence almost since the formation of the PRC. Like many minorities in Central Asia, the Uyghurs have a long history that includes much violence. Significantly, the Uyghur have not embraced Islamic fundamentalism in any meaningful way. Though there are limited examples of fundamentalism in Xinjiang, the population as a whole does not support it, even though their goals of independence are the same. The reason the Uyghurs have not embraced fundamentalism is because their sense of nationalism is stronger, relatively speaking, than their Islamic identity. The Uyghurs' nationalism, as well as their unique Islamic identity, was forged by a millennium of struggle, self-determination, oppressive rule, and external influence -- among many other factors. These forces have culminated in a modern Uyghur identity, one that values self-determination above all else. / US Navy (USN) author.

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The disestablishment and disendowment of the Church in Wales was a direct result of a renascent Welsh nationalism asserting itself in the daily life of Wales and in the English parliament. This thesis examines the historical, political, and social aspects of the disestablishment and disendowment of the Church.

In this thesis, we aim to find the relationship between the economic crisis and the rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia. In addition, we focus on the political framework, as defined by the 1974 Constitution, which significantly changed the course of Yugoslav institutions after the death of Tito. We find that the rising levels of debt and economic misbalance across republics were key contributors to increasing tensions between republics. We conclude that the combination of these factors with the lack of political will, stemming from decentralization and increased power to republics, as the main culprits behind the rise of nationalism. We build on the existing literature, contributing to the further cross-examination of reasons behind the dissolution of Yugoslavia. The importance of this thesis is related to the political elite, who can apply key takeaways from the case of Yugoslavia to the modern geopolitical context dealing with economic and political crises.

Kurdish ulema, a religious class with a strong influence on Kurdish social life, have developed various forms of religious nationalism. This study offers a possible reading of the accounts of Kurdish ulema during the Turkish Republican period, as a neglected form of Kurdish nationalism. I illustrate how they defined the Kurdish nation in the name of religion, supplied religious metaphors and symbols central to the representation of the Kurdish nation, and even produced an alternative to secular nationalism by sharing the underlying grammar of modern nationalism. This calls into question the concept of Kurdish nationalism as something uniform and secular. Such accounts of religious nationalism were largely suppressed in modern Kurdish history writing under Marxist influences. Since the 1940s, this historiography often marginalized the narratives of Kurdish ulema by setting them apart from Kurdish national struggle. This project provides the first in-depth analysis of the role of Kurdish ulema in the story of the development of Kurdish nationalism during the Turkish Republican period (1920s-1990s). My analysis challenges the dichotomy in the Kurdish nationalist historiography that Islamic and Kurdish identities are exclusive of one another. Kurdish ulema combined their Islamic identity with a strong sense of Kurdish national consciousness. Some envisioned the Kurdish nation’s liberation in education, some in joining secular national movements, some in conformity with Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood and some in political Islamic resistance. I emphasize that Kurds, whether secular or religious, formed a united front against Kurdish regional underdevelopment, exclusivist state policies, and exploitative sheikhs as late as the late 1960s. There has been an overlap between opposing Kurdish groups and the division between them was not primordial. These initially similar concerns, however, were gradually shaped by different popular ideologies of their day: nationalism, Marxism, and Islamism, in Turkey and around the world.

This study is primarily concerned with answering several important questions surrounding the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1950-1951 which have remained unanswered. What were the detailed origins of the disputes between the Iranian Government and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company? Why was such a favourable oil concession granted to a British citizen? What was the impact of the occupation of Iran on the Iranian people's way of political thinking and how did oil become an issue for public debate? Why was there an oil crisis in 1951 ? What were the motivations of the parties to the oil dispute? Was the crisis mainly over economic grievances ? What was the role of nationalism ? These are answered within a framework that highlights the salient variables such as politics, economy, international relations and diplomacy. The methodology adopted is a descriptive analysis of archival material and literature on the related subjects. The emphasis is on the Iranian view of the crisis for the reason that, although it received international attention and was in many ways an international crisis, it originated in Iran. There were features unique to it which were Iranian. Given the nature of Iranian society with its strong oral traditions, the past is important to an explanation of the crisis. It is alive in Iranian mind in a way not apparent to western society. Conceptions of the past and an awareness of the weakness of Iranian autonomy are important in the context of the 1950 crisis.Consequently, it is necessary to examine the concept of history prevalent in Iran. This takes the staring point of the thesis to the D'Arcy oil concession. In 1900, Iran was bankrupt in Western terms, the Shah needed immediate cash payment,I authorities were financially corrupt and politics was riddled with foreign intrigue. Oil had been sought in Iran since 1878 without much success. By 1900, the demand for Iranian oil was supported by the British Legation. D'Arcy, an English financier, managed to obtain, through connections with a string of individuals, an oil concession for 60 years. The Iranian authorities had every reason to believe that this oil concession, like all other oil concessions would eventually lapse. However, D' Arcy worked the concession to the point of bankruptcy and his engineer, to the point of exhaustion. As a result an oil industry was established which "was to see the Royal Navy through two world wars, and to cause Persia more trouble than all the political manoeuvrings of the great powers put together". 2The world oil rivalry, compounded with the British government's desire for oil independence, turned the Iranian oil industry into the largest oil industry of the time and an important source of income for the British Treasury. The exploitation of the oil reserves of Iran by an industrial power soon became a matter of great controversy as disputes developed between two parties which extended over several decades. Iran received some funds in revenues. However, the revenues did not improve the Iranian standard of life considerably although they affected the balance of payments, currency reserves and purchase of arms. Iranian society was in the process of transition from a traditional society to a modern one. The Constitutional Movement of 1906 had an impact on the public's political way of thinking. Reza Shah suppressed the society but the desire for a democratic system continued to exist. During the reign of Reza Shah (1925-1941), a large portion of the rural population moved to urban areas. The industrialisation of Iran helped in developing a new class of urban middle class and artisans. It was obvious that the relationship between Iran and the oil company needed readjusting. However, the oil company officiIs did not show much interest in this until it was too late. The occupation of Iran in 1941 helped several political forces appear on the political scene. The released communist prisoners quickly formed the Tudeh Party. The communists were assisted by the Soviet forces in the North to the extent that the Tudeh, a communist party, became one of the main political parties of this period in an Islamic society. However, several factors helped monarchists overcome the communists. One such factor was an increasing American involvement in Iran after Pearl Harbour which functioned as a third power to reduce the dominance of the others. The Tripartite Treaty of 1942 regularised the presence of American troops. The Tehran Declaration of 1943 provided for economic aid at the end of the war. In 1947, the ideological basis for American involvement in Iran was provided by Truman Doctrine. The final blow to the Tudeh Party was delivered in 1949. The attempt on the Shah's life gave the monarchists an excuse to outlaw the Tudeh. Contrary to their ideology, Moscow provoked discontented Iranian minorities rather than encouraging class struggle ! Moscow menaced Iran several times. At least at two occasions Moscow demanded an oil concession. They also threatened Iranian integrity and caused a great deal of public anxiety which directed public attention to Iranain problems. The Azarbaijan crisis of 1945-1946 turned Iranian problem into an international one. Moscow's pressure on Greece and Turkey threatened Western interests in the Near and Middle East and caused inter-Allied friction. In 1941, Iran appeared to have become a model for Allied cooperation. By 1944, however, the first post-war oil crisis seemed to haye turned Iran into a battleground between foreign powers ; the early stages of the cold war. On the Iranian side, at least since 1944 there was a demand for oil nationalisation. The idea developed first into a law forbidding negotiating or granting new oil concessions to foreign powers until Iran was occupied. Mosaddegh was mainly responsible for this. Then in 1947, an overwhelming majority of Majles deputies rejected a Soviet proposal for an oil concession in the North. The Majles instructed the government to negotiate with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for better terms. This set in motion a chain of events which resulted in a proposal to supplement the 1933 oil concession which had replaced the D' Arcy concession. In 1949, a small group of nationalists fiercely fought the proposals. The press criticisms, the Majles debates and public gatherings helped ordinary people understand the oil issue. However, despite strong opposition, the monarchists were III favour of the Supplementary Agreement and attempted to resolve the issue by appointing a strong military man, General Razmara, as prime minister in June 1950. The idea, however, backfired as public desire for the removal of foreign influence was now strong. The Majles opposition, the press and the public appeared to be united. Nationalist feelings were fuelled by long-term resentment over the oil company's handling of the oil issue. By early 1951 nationalist sentiment was too strong to be curtailed. By this time Razmara had become a threat both to the Shah and to the nationalists and acted like an obstacle on the way to the oil nationalisation. His assassination, in March 1951, removed this obstacle. By this time the support for the movement, the demand for oil nationalisation and respect for Mosaddegh covered far-right to the far-left as both clergy and communists supported the nationalists. The communists were represented by the banned Tudeh Party. The political activities of the clergy was mainly associated with Kashani. His role in the movement and relationship with Mosaddegh were vital to the existence of the movement. However, Mosaddegh and Kashani were on a collision course. The Western-educated Mosaddegh was secular. Kashani, on the other hand, was in favour of an Islamic state. The same definition applied to their supporters. However, although they differed in their outlook, the unifying figure of Mosaddegh brought them together over the oil issue; a process which was reversed after 1951. Kashani and some nationalists weakened Mosaddegh and assisted in his downfall. Mosaddegh initiated the first petrodiplomacy in Iranian history. He dedicated his life to fight foreign domination and the nation trusted him. Without him it would be impossible for the nationalists to acquire a political standing strong enough to nationalise the oil. Regrettably, his downfall in 1953 brought an end to his efforts to remove foreign influence from Iran. Iran has been a centre of major political events for over 2000 years. In recent history, the development of two superpowers, Russian and British empires, on either side of Iran changed Iran's geopolitical situation to the extent that they fought within Iran for the dominance of Asia. As a result Iran's independence was weakened, its integrity was threatened, domestic feud was encouraged, corruption and intrigue were promoted, and self-interest and low morality became a feature of life.Whether a victim of international power politics, or a victim of internal strife. low political culture, and short-sightedness of Iranian politicians, the super powers could not tolerate the upset of the oil control in the Middle East. The country-by-country flare-up effect of such an achievement would be disastrous for the Western economy. In their view, the nationalist movement of Iran had to be defeated. Indeed, no other oil-producing country considered oil nationalisation for many years to come.

Thesis advisor: Ali Banuazizi / This thesis explores the centrality of myth in the master narrative of Serbian ethno-nationalism that erupted in the late 1980s through the 1990s. By looking at Serbian folk epics depicting the battle of Kosovo, this thesis examines the role of myth as a part of Serbian identity and culture. The way the myth of the battle of Kosovo is remembered is a way of reconstructing the past through using themes in the myth to manipulate public memory and political consciousness. This thesis shows that while myth represents a key construction of a master national narrative, the narrative does not represent the stories of all members of the nation. The theoretical and official “history” of a nation is separate from the lived history of individuals. The last chapter uses gender as a lens to examine the master national stemming from the Kosovo myth, showing how the national master narrative connects to the “myth of the all pervasive patriarchy” in how history is understood. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: History.

While nationalism remains a vital element in the production of the political and economic landscape, it is often treated as a static container for other processes or neglected altogether. Rather, it must itself be treated as a process--a nationalizing project--emerging from a constellation of often contradictory social forces. One such process of nationalization is the development of large-scale transportation infrastructure, such as railroads. These projects produce both new spheres of circulation and new understandings critical to navigating these novel environments, which together radically transform the relation between people, government, and territory. In early twentieth century China, the complicated contest over railroad rights produced and was produced by a fractured political economic geography. Understandings of both identity and space remained fragmented, cohering only partially into a singular entity, thus demonstrating the intimate interrelation between state power, political identity, and territories both real and imagined.

The dissertation begins with a seeming paradox in twentieth-century Guinean history: how did ethnic Fulbe, constituting some 40% of Guinea’s population, come to be labeled “neo-colonial traitors” in a country that was supposedly founded upon a broad-based, multi-ethnic nationalism? Less than two decades after Guineans’ 1958 rejection of membership in a reformed French community, Guinea’s first president, Sékou Touré, argued that there existed a “particular situation” in the Futa Jallon, the historic homeland of the Fulbe, that had caused the Fulbe to diverge from the rest of the country. Using Touré’s speech announcing the “particular situation” as a point of entry, the dissertation argues that the legacy of hierarchies rooted in the pre-colonial Islamic Futa Jallon state, contestation between African political parties during decolonization, and the partial failure of the post-colonial state’s attempt to create a “modern” Guinean society combined to produce a Fulbe fragment of the Guinean nation. The dissertation’s first two chapters examine how the presentation and practice of chiefly authority in the Futa Jallon following the imposition of French rule resulted from the entanglement of local and colonial discourses, and how the opening of colonial spaces – markets, cities, and cash crop fields, for example – allowed room for marginalized groups such as former slaves and women to renegotiate Fulbe social hierarchies. The dissertation then examines how the practical work of building political coalitions as well as ideological debates about the meaning of modernity during decolonization led to the marginalization of Fulbe elites and the conceptual “othering” of the Fulbe. The dissertation then shifts to Fulbe (self-)positioning within an emerging post-colonial order. One chapter argues that political, economic, and social reforms enacted by the Touré-led government marked the Fulbe as resistant to attempts at modernization, leading to the elimination of Fulbe elites and the designation of the Fulbe as “anti-citizens.” Another follows the pathways of Fulbe exiles, migrants, and merchants took after independence, arguing that the Fulbe diaspora created by repression shaped ideas about citizenship, political community, and belonging in post-colonial Guinea. The histories examined by the dissertation demonstrate that the current welding of political community and ethnicity is the result of Guinea’s status as a post-slavery, post-colonial, and post-socialist society, rather than the deterministic result of “natural” regional differences or the structure of the colonial state. The dissertation is based upon two years of research in Guinea, Senegal, and France. Using previously neglected oral and archival sources in French and Pular, it makes several significant interventions in Africanist historiography. Countering temporal and conceptual frameworks based solely upon colonial intervention, I argue that ideas about ethnicity were formed and reformed throughout the twentieth century and that ethnic identities were shaped as much by local ideas as they were by the colonial state. I also argue that, contradicting portrayals of post-colonial balkanization, debates about the nation and citizenship after independence took place in both local and trans-national contexts. Lastly, while previous studies have often cast ethnicity and nationalism in Africa as inherently different forms of political thought, I argue that both arise from similar processes. The failure of the post-colonial African nation-state is often attributed to the supposed immutability of ethnic identity. The political history of Guinea, on the other hand, demonstrates that African politicians and parties used ethnicities as an “other” in opposition to which they articulated their own visions of the nation. Thus, Fulbe identification and Guinean nationalism were in fact mutually formed and their histories closely intertwined over the course of the twentieth century.