Published Article / Modern philosophy left us with an unbridgeable divide between factual reality and the domain of values (normativity). This article first of all analyze modal norms, such as the principle of avoiding what is legally excessive. There are distinct but mutually cohering kinds of laws. The distinction between modal laws / norms and type laws / norms required an example from the domain of human society - John Locke and Adam Smith, whose ideas in practice gave birth to trade unionism and labour parties. The idea of an "invisible hand" (manifest in the "free market") operates with exact (natural) laws, such as supply and demand. When modal norms are distinguished from type norms it becomes clear that states and a business enterprises can act uneconomically by wasting their money although they ought to function in a way that is guided by economic considerations of frugality. As an example the well-known natural law of energy-conservation is explained as the embodiment of an analogical link between the physical aspect and the kinematic aspect which should rather be designated as the law of energy-constancy. Finally the problem of normativity is related to the coherence between the logical-analytical aspect and its coherence with the aspects of number and space - focused on the principle of the excluded middle and its implications for diverging schools of thought within twentieth century mathematics. The last subsection concludes with reference to the norms guiding technological developments and with an assessment of the meaning of technology.

The dispute between nomological realists and anti-realists has been reflected in the formulation of various arguments and counterarguments that reach topics as diverse as modality, induction and the very scientific practice. In this context it is common to take the main realist argument –the nomological argument– for an instance of Inference to the Best Explanation, while Nomological Anti-realism is considered a skeptical alternative concerning natural laws, sustained by independent reasons. This paper aims to review that image of the Nomological Realism vs. Anti-realism debate in light of what we believe is an appropriate distinction between abduction and Inference to the Best Explanation. / La disputa entre realistas y antirrealistas nomológicos se ha plasmado en la formulación de diversos argumentos y contraargumentos que alcanzan tópicostan heterogéneos como la modalidad, la inducción y la misma práctica científica.En ese marco es frecuente tomar al principal argumento realista, el llamadoargumento nomológico, por una instancia de la inferencia a la mejor explicación,mientras que el antirrealismo nomológico se considera una alternativa escépticarespecto de las leyes naturales fundamentada por razones independientes. Elpresente trabajo propone revisar esa imagen del debate realismo vs. antirrealismonomológicos a la luz de lo que, consideramos, es una adecuada distinción entreabducción e inferencia a la mejor explicación.

Why is there a phenomenon of chance in the created world? There are many different probability distributions and does that point at different ideas of chance? Given that God has created the whole universe, why is chance an element of that universe of ours? Does He use chance as a mechanism for His providence? There is a common apprehension of the laws of nature, that they are statistically attained in an asymptotic behaviour over a long period of time. The laws of probability are likewise evolved in the same fashion, as shown in the paper. The universe seems to be lawfully constructed according to both natural laws and probability laws. It is a clear conclusion to regard chance as an intrinsic concept of the world. But, why are there so many ideas of chance despite this common feature of the world? Next section in the paper addresses the many conceptions of chance and works out an idea of how to look at these conditions. The paper results in a presentation of a hierarchy, where different events with their probability distributions might be gathered to some more common properties of chance. The question rises if God is working on that higher level of hierarchy.  This paper has come to a conclusion that, because there are that many ideas of chance and that many probability distributions, we might lack the idea of chance.

J. S. Mill a été l’une des cibles privilégiées de toute une littérature critique dénonçant la prétention de l’économie à l’universalité, c’est-à-dire à établir des lois naturelles. Parmi ces critiques, on peut déceler deux angles d’attaque différents : celui d’auteurs qui, comme Durkheim, Veblen ou Schmoller, fustigent la prétention de l’économie à réduire l’homme à un homo œconomicus, et par suite à faire l’apologie du « laissez-faire » ; celui de Marx qui dénonce le caractère naturalisant de la propriété privée capitaliste dans le discours économique. Pourtant, en examinant de près les textes épistémologiques de Mill, nous montrons que ce dernier se trouve justement être l’avocat – et par anticipation – de ses critiques. Toutefois, rien ne garantit que Mill dise tout le vrai sur sa propre pratique d’économiste. Or, nous dévoilons que certains de ses écrits économiques présentent bien une forme d’universalité, n’étant pas uniquement valables dans les économies de marchés capitalistes. / J. S. Mill was one of the main targets of a whole critical literature denouncing the pretention of economics to universality, that is to say, to establish natural laws. Among the criticisms one can detect two different angles of attack: that of authors such as Durkheim, Veblen or Schmoller who criticize the claim of political economy to reduce man to a mere homo œconomicus, and consequently to glorify “laissez-faire”; that of Marx who castigates the naturalizing character of capitalist private property in the economic discourse. However, by closely examining Mill’s epistemological texts, we show that this author just happens to be the advocate of his own critics. However, there is no guarantee that Mill says all the truth about his own practice as an economist. Now, we demonstrate that some of his economic writings present indeed a form of universality, in as much as they are not only valid in capitalist market economies.