I argue that, because fundamental scientific theories are attempts to tell us something about reality, we are required to take into account the metaphysical features of those theories. I claim that a guarded realism is the proper stance to take toward fundamental scientific theories: philosophically, one must guard against accepting every posit at face value. Laws of nature are one of the posits of fundamental scientific theories and, since they are part of the nomic, I argue that they cannot be eliminated from the ontology of the world. I consider whether the nomic can be reduced to the Humean base and argue that doing so leaves us with no metaphysical explanation for the regularities we observe. I agree with Galen Strawson that the world requires a metaphysically real glue to hold it together and argue that this glue is accounted for by reifying the nomic and not reducing any of the nomic concepts to the Humean base. I argue, against Helen Beebee, that a regularity theorist about laws of nature and causation makes the world out to be a world without reasons for the regularities, which is not acceptable. I consider the Best System Analysis of laws of nature in conjunction with Humean Supervenience and show that it is not able to account for objective chance in a metaphysically acceptable way. I then turn to Armstrong’s contingent relation among universals account of laws of nature and consider Bird’s ultimate argument against it. I argue that one way to overcome the argument is to allow that some universals have nontrivial modal character, which is an acceptable solution for the nomic realist.

While remaining rooted in a comparison of some of the primary texts of the thinkers under scrutiny, my thesis also discusses several issues which arise in the mutual consideration of Heidegger and Strauss, specifically the questions of the ontological and political status of nature, the problem of ‘first philosophy,’ and the method by which to interpret philosophical texts, as well as a continuous analysis of Strauss’s appellation of ‘modern,’ as opposed to ‘ancient,’ and ‘religious,’ as opposed to ‘philosophical,’ to Heidegger’s thought. I first consider every moment in Strauss’s corpus where he discusses Heidegger’s thought. From this discussion, I identify four main lines of critique which may be extracted from Strauss’s writings on Heidegger. Then, I turn to Heidegger’s texts themselves in order to determine if Strauss’s critique indeed finds purchase there, addressing each of the lines of critique in turn. Finally, I consider Strauss and Heidegger in tandem, in light of the three questions identified above. I show that many of what Strauss determines to be Heidegger’s errors arose as a result of the way that Heidegger read ancient philosophical texts, and I suggest that Strauss’s approach, i.e., to consider the possible esoteric meaning of a text, in fact permits the reader to access an interpretation that is truer to the textual phenomena. This claim, however, is not intended to obscure the remarkable similarities between each thinker’s respective interpretive methods. I conclude that Strauss’s critique of Heidegger, vehement as it is, also indicates Strauss’s dependence on Heidegger’s thought for the inspiration of Strauss’s own philosophical project. The relation between Strauss and Heidegger, then, remains profoundly ambiguous.

Nature is often considered a site of pristine perfection existing outside of human interaction. It is this notion that has led humanity to draw away from the environment and has encouraged the continual degradation of the Earth today. This exploratory research investigates the world as a series of permeable and impermeable boundaries – a shifting interwoven-web of matter, where all things are drawn together. Nature is to be understood as the continual arena of interchange between all the things of the world. Humanity and all of its constructs are merely a subset embedded within the greater reality of the physical world. This practicum examines the phenomenological ways in which humanity is entwined within the natural world, with implications for how this concept may be applied to the field of landscape architecture. The result is an open-ended design for a park and interpretive center for Gillis Quarries, in Garson, Manitoba.

No description available.

I argue that, because fundamental scientific theories are attempts to tell us something about reality, we are required to take into account the metaphysical features of those theories. I claim that a guarded realism is the proper stance to take toward fundamental scientific theories: philosophically, one must guard against accepting every posit at face value. Laws of nature are one of the posits of fundamental scientific theories and, since they are part of the nomic, I argue that they cannot be eliminated from the ontology of the world. I consider whether the nomic can be reduced to the Humean base and argue that doing so leaves us with no metaphysical explanation for the regularities we observe. I agree with Galen Strawson that the world requires a metaphysically real glue to hold it together and argue that this glue is accounted for by reifying the nomic and not reducing any of the nomic concepts to the Humean base. I argue, against Helen Beebee, that a regularity theorist about laws of nature and causation makes the world out to be a world without reasons for the regularities, which is not acceptable. I consider the Best System Analysis of laws of nature in conjunction with Humean Supervenience and show that it is not able to account for objective chance in a metaphysically acceptable way. I then turn to Armstrong’s contingent relation among universals account of laws of nature and consider Bird’s ultimate argument against it. I argue that one way to overcome the argument is to allow that some universals have nontrivial modal character, which is an acceptable solution for the nomic realist.

Thesis (M.S. - Watershed Management)--University of Arizona. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on November 9, 2007) Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 276-292). Also available via World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.S.)--Montana State University--Bozeman, 2005. / Typescript. Chairperson, Graduate Committee: Kathy Hansen. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 57-61).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Tulsa, 1972. / Bibliography: leaves 174-190.