Thesis (M. Ec.) -- University of Adelaide, Department of Economics,1979. / Typescript (photocopy).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Murdoch University, 2006. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Arts. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 284-327)

Thesis (Ed.D.)--Murdoch University, 2002. / Thesis submitted to the Division of Social Sciences, Humanities and Education. Bibliography: leaves i-xiv.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1990. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 214-220). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (D. Comm.(Financial management sciences))-University of Pretoria, 2005. / Summary in English. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-130). Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

The first essay of this dissertation analyzes the claim that a Marshallian total surplus optimum characterizes a second-best Pareto optimum in a general equilibrium model with price makers. The main result of this essay is that a Marshallian total surplus optimum corresponds to a second-best Pareto optimum when (i) the consumer's preferences are quasi-linear with respect to a numeraire, and (ii) for all other markets except the one under consideration, first-best (or Paretian) optimality conditions are satisfied. The second essay characterizes the optimal regulatory policy for point-source pollution emissions when firms are competing in Cournot fashion in the product market and have private information about their own cost. It is shown that the optimal regulatory policy benefits from the strategic interaction between the firms in the output market even though the firms' private information is uncorrelated. The firms strategic interaction in the output market acts as an information correlation externality that mitigates the wellknown "rent-extraction efficiency" trade-off. Each firms' opportunity to over-report their costs is reduced because the output market's strategic interaction reduces the profitability of infra-marginal units if they do. The main result shows that optimal environmental regulations discriminate between firms of given industry. Moreover, it is shown that if the regulator believes that firm A is always more likely to be efficient than firm B (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) and that both firms are equally efficient ex post, then firm A faces a higher marginal tax than its competitor. In light of this result, it is argued that the model provides theoretical foundations for grandfather clauses in environmental regulations.

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The first essay of this dissertation analyzes the claim that a Marshallian total surplus optimum characterizes a second-best Pareto optimum in a general equilibrium model with price makers. The main result of this essay is that a Marshallian total surplus optimum corresponds to a second-best Pareto optimum when (i) the consumer's preferences are quasi-linear with respect to a numeraire, and (ii) for all other markets except the one under consideration, first-best (or Paretian) optimality conditions are satisfied. The second essay characterizes the optimal regulatory policy for point-source pollution emissions when firms are competing in Cournot fashion in the product market and have private information about their own cost. It is shown that the optimal regulatory policy benefits from the strategic interaction between the firms in the output market even though the firms' private information is uncorrelated. The firms strategic interaction in the output market acts as an information correlation externality that mitigates the wellknown "rent-extraction efficiency" trade-off. Each firms' opportunity to over-report their costs is reduced because the output market's strategic interaction reduces the profitability of infra-marginal units if they do. The main result shows that optimal environmental regulations discriminate between firms of given industry. Moreover, it is shown that if the regulator believes that firm A is always more likely to be efficient than firm B (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) and that both firms are equally efficient ex post, then firm A faces a higher marginal tax than its competitor. In light of this result, it is argued that the model provides theoretical foundations for grandfather clauses in environmental regulations. / Arts, Faculty of / Vancouver School of Economics / Graduate

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by Man Ka Kit. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-76). / ABSTRACT --- p.3 / INTRODUCTION --- p.4 / Chapter PART I --- WHAT IS PREDICTION? --- p.7 / Chapter 1.1 --- Structure of Scientific Explanation： Covering-Law Model --- p.8 / Chapter 1.2 --- Prediction and Theory choice --- p.10 / Chapter 1.3 --- Prediction and Economic Methodology --- p.11 / Chapter 1.4 --- Conventional Wisdom --- p.12 / Chapter 1.41 --- Friedman's Methodology --- p.12 / Chapter 1.42 --- The Impact of Popper --- p.14 / Chapter 1.5 --- Unconventional Wisdom --- p.16 / Chapter 1.51 --- KUHN AND LAKATOS --- p.16 / Chapter 1.52 --- FEYERABEND THE ANARCHIST --- p.17 / Chapter 1.6 --- Conclusion for Part I --- p.18 / Chapter PART II --- MACROECONOMIC CONTROVERSY --- p.20 / Chapter 2.1 --- "lucas' Critique, the New Classical and the New Keynesian" --- p.20 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Role of Stabilization Policy --- p.22 / Chapter 2.3 --- Effectiveness of Monetary Policy --- p.24 / Chapter 2.4 --- effectiveness of fiscal policy --- p.25 / Chapter 2.5 --- Conclusion for Part II --- p.26 / Chapter PART III --- TESTING RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE --- p.28 / Chapter 3.1 --- ricardian equivalence versus keynesian theory --- p.29 / Chapter 3:2 --- (unrealistic) assumptions behind ricardian proposition --- p.31 / Chapter 3.21 --- "INEFINTIE horizon, altruism, and intergeneration transfer" --- p.31 / Chapter 3.22 --- IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKET --- p.34 / Chapter 3 23 --- DISTORTIONARY TAX --- p.35 / Chapter 3.24 --- "BOUNDED rationality, PERFECT FORESIGHT, AND RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS" --- p.36 / Chapter 3.3 --- Empirical Evidence --- p.37 / Chapter 3.31 --- CONSUMPTION FUNCTION STUDIES --- p.38 / Chapter 3 32 --- INTEREST RATE STUDIES --- p.43 / Chapter 3.4 --- technical problems： (unrealistic) assumptions behind the econometric models --- p.45 / Chapter 3.41 --- Specification and Data Generation Process --- p.45 / Chapter 3 42 --- IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM --- p.48 / Chapter 3 43 --- staggerjng of (NOT-well-established) hypotheses --- p.49 / Chapter 3.44 --- PROXIES FOR unobservables --- p.50 / Chapter 3.5 --- Conclusion for Part III --- p.51 / Chapter PART IV --- CONCLUSION --- p.53 / Chapter 4.1 --- Duhem-Quine Thesis --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Austrians and Subjectivism --- p.55 / Chapter 4.3 --- hausman --- p.57 / Chapter 4.4 --- Friedman and Popper Revisited --- p.58 / Chapter 4.5 --- The Role of Prediction --- p.61 / EPILOGUE --- p.62 / Ricardian Equivalence Vs Approximate Equivalence： Some Reflections --- p.62 / Truth and Invariance --- p.63 / "Certitude, Simplicity, and Irrationality" --- p.65 / REFERENCES --- p.67