Abstract According to the Company Act, to convene a regular shareholder¡¦s meeting, a majority of the shareholders who represent more than 50% of the total number of the company¡¦s outstanding shares shall be present. It is also regulated that a shareholder may stipulate the scope of authority in the proxy issued by the company and appoint a proxy to attend the shareholder¡¦s meeting on his behalf. Due to the dispersion trend of ownership structure of domestic listed companies, where some mid/large-size companies with long histories have, in average, less than 20% of shareholding of board of directors, it seems reasonable for companies to rely on proxy solicitation in order to convene a shareholder¡¦s meeting, have all proposals resolved, and elect board members. The operation of a business entity and its corporate governance are closely tied to the effectiveness of its top management. However, domestic listed companies in general are unable to separate the ownership and management, and therefore those who obtain the management become the management team of a company. As a result of relatively low shareholding held by major shareholders of domestic listed companies, lower cost of proxy solicitation than buying shares from the market, and less care about proxy rights from individual investors, major shareholders in listed companies intend to win more seats in the board via proxy solicitation in order to obtain management. For the above reasons, proxy solicitation becomes an important tool in determing management of listed companies, their operation and corporate governance. Proxy makes it possible to obtain the management of a corporate with relatively low shareholdings, resulting in asymmetry in cost and management obtained, and this might pose risks on company¡¦s corporate governance. However, on the other hand, proxy assists convening a shareholder¡¦s meeting, and therefore become an indispensable tool in defending the management of a corporate with honesty and integrity. With all the advantages and disadvantages, proxy is of great importance for individual corporate and overall operation of economy. The research conducts a case study on C Company with references on other listed companies to explore the impacts of proxy on management and operation of a company and its corporate governance. Pros and cons for proxy solicitation are summarized while solutions are proposed. The result of the research shows that listed companies demonstrate deep reliance on proxy. Whether or not a listed company conducts business with honesty and good faith, its major shareholder is likely to exploit the advantages to obtain unsymmetrical positions in the board in contrasts with its low shareholding. However, the performance of corporate governance afterward depends on the integrity and conscience of the management team, and actually has no direct link to proxy solicitation. Also, with the ¡§winning betting¡¨ nature to achieve management leverage, proxy solicitation could be a possible factor for corporate mis-governance. To avoid the unfairness caused by proxy solicitation and enhance corporate governance, competent authorities must consider revising the Company Act and related laws instead of revising regulations governing proxy solicitation alone. Suggestions in this research include the following: (1) To abrogate rules in the Company Act providing that ¡§to convene a regular shareholder¡¦s meeting, a majority of the shareholders who represent more than 50% of the total number of the company¡¦s outstanding shares shall be present¡¨. (2) The number of shares present via proxy solicitation, voting right and election right shall be discounted. (3) To promote electronic voting, split of voting rights of institutional shareholders, and adoption of nomination system for the director election. (4) To change the election method of independent directors, where the new method elects the independent director based on the number of voting individual shareholders, rather than the cumulative voting shares. The suggestions are proposed to provide a reference for competent authorities. Key words: proxy, corporate governance, board election, management, electronic voting, board election nomination system

中文摘要 公司治理的強化已成為世界各國所共同重視的議題，我國亦不落其後自1997年起逐步推動各項公司治理政策，若仔細觀察其發展過程，主管機關應是甚為期盼公司治理能正本清源的從董事、監察人獨立性的強化這個源頭紮實做起。 惟自民國94年起引進了董監候選人提名制度，特別是上市櫃公司的獨立董事，更強制採候選人提名制度，然近幾年我國上市櫃公司掏空、內線交易、不正當利益輸送、背信、董事自肥、財報不實等案件仍時有所聞，究竟我國引進董監候選人提名制度是改進公司治理的有效解決方案嗎?即是本文探討的主題。 首先，本文先研究公司治理與董監選任制度的關聯程度，分析公司治理的意義、目標、監督機制、架構以及董監選任於公司治理的重要性。隨後簡介美國及日本的董監選任制度，希望能對我國的現行董監選任制度有所借鏡。 接著，分析我國現行董監選任制度的主要問題，包括第192-1條第1項限制股東應就董事候選人名單中選任之，係對股東權的限制而非強化；允許股東選任自己認定的理想人選與董監候選人提名制度並不衝突，在現行制度下，所當選之董監較公司法第192條之選任方式更不具獨立性，對公司治理的提升並無助益，故實無限制之必要。第192-1條第3項對於無表決權之股份，為避免計算基礎過度膨脹，保障真正少數股東之權利，應限縮解釋。第216-1條監察人選舉準用第192-1條之規定，監察人之候選人可由董事會提名，將違反公司治理精神，恐造成監察人成為董事會之附屬而無法執行監督義務。而上市櫃公司依公開發行公司獨立董事設置及應遵循事項辦法第5條強制採候選人提名制度選任獨立董事，依新近大法官釋字第733號精神涵攝，關於選舉方式之強制，恐有限制團體內部組織與事務之自主決定已逾必要程度，而有違反憲法第二十三條所定比例原則及侵害基於結社自由所含的自治精神之嫌。另現行主管機關發佈董事、監察人提名委員會組織章程參考範例，也可能因獨立性不足、權限劃分不明等原因而形同聊備一格。同時，本文亦將現行公開發行公司出席股東會使用委託書規則(以下簡稱委託書規則)其與董監候選人提名制度法律條文進行比較，發現主要差別除持股比例之要求外，委託書規則對董監資格限制可謂更為嚴謹。此外，委託書規則遇有股東會董監選舉徵求時，被選舉人資格審查無須經董事會或提名委員會審議，亦無強制公司股東僅能就委託書徵求人本人或所擬支持之候選人名單選任，但反而強制將候選人經營理念予以公開，故本文以為委託書規則不僅有董監候選人提名制度之實，又不失為一種更直接訴諸「股東民主」的制度，同時也是對股東行動主義正面回應的一種機制。 最後，本文認為，董監選任應回歸公司法第192條規定，使董監選任更具獨立性， 也無違反大法官第733號解釋之虞。若希望對散戶股東進行董監選舉時能有參考依據而堅持採董監候選人提名制度之精神，亦無需疊床架屋，另立新法條，只需放寬或廢除徵求門檻及上限，回歸現行委託書規則即可。否則，至少現行制度應針對董事會等審查機關若違法濫權等，授權審理法院得在股東會召開前或召開後，視情況採取緊急保全處分，以保障股東提名權。同時對獨立董事形式或實質獨立要件亦宜擴大認定，並可考慮拉長獨立董事的冷卻期間，來淡化利害關係並強化獨立董事之獨立性。