This thesis explores two different approaches to the study of simple general equilibrium models in situations where "full" or "long-run" equilibrium does not prevail. The first part of the thesis examines the consequences of dynamizing the two-sector model of competitive equilibrium, in the sense of making explicit the process whereby momentary equilibrium (i.e., full equilibrium with a given factor endowment) is attained. A number of plausible adjustment mechanisms are proposed, of which the "short-run capital specificity" hypothesis is an interesting special case. The implications of these adjustment mechanisms for international trade theory, for the theory of proportional factor market distortions in both open and closed economies, for the behaviour of the Harris-Todaro model when capital is intersectorally mobile, and for the dynamic response of the trade balance to a devaluation in a small open economy are then examined. The second part of the thesis studies the properties of a neo-Keynesian temporary equilibrium, by which is meant a shortperiod equilibrium where agents base their behaviour on their expectations about the future and where prices and wages do not move to clear markets in the short run. It is shown that the closed economy model of Malinvaud and the open economy model of Dixit are both special cases of a more general model which incorporates a non-traded good whose price is sticky in the short run, and a traded good, whose price is determined on world markets. While the long-run properties of this model are shown to be fully consistent with the monetary approach to the balance of payments (so, for example, a devaluation has no real long-run effects), its short-run comparative statics properties are shown to provide, in some circumstances, considerable support for discretionary policy.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Engineering, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburq, in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Engineering. Johannesburg, 1996. / An apparatus to measure residue curves and the associated VLE data was designed. The apparatus was required to measure this data quickly, easily, cheaply and reasonably accurately. The Acetone, Benzene and Chloroform and the Acetone, Methanol and Benzene ternary liquid systems were measured to test the accuracy of the apparatus. In both cases, the results obtained correlated reasonably well with those predicted by theory using published data. [Abbreviated Abstract. Open document to view full version] / AC2017

Uncoordinated frequency hopping (UFH) has recently emerged as an effective mechanism to defend against jamming attacks. Existing research focuses on the optimal design of the hopping pattern, which implicitly assumes that the strategy of the attacker is fixed. In practice, the attacker might adjust its strategy to maximize its damage on the communication system. In this thesis, we study the design of optimal hopping pattern (the defense strategy) as long as the optimal jamming pattern (the attack strategy). In particular, we model the dynamic between the legitimate users and the attacker as a zero sum game, and study the property of this game. We show that when the legitimate users and the jammer can access only one channel at any time, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium. In the Nash equilibrium, the legitimate users and Eve will access or jam only a subset of channels that have good channel quality. Furthermore, the better the channel, the larger the probability that Eve will jam the channel and the smaller the probability the legitimate users will access this channel. We further extend the study to multiple access multiple jamming case and characterize the Nash equilibrium. We also give numerical results to illustrate the analytical results derived in this thesis.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 1982. / MICROFICHE COPY AVAILABLE IN ARCHIVES AND DEWEY / Bibliography: leaves 100-104. / by Sanjay Srivastava. / Ph.D.

The role of dynamical systems in general equilibrium analysis is chronicled. Starting with the introduction of a suitable phase space and evolution model, fundamental existence and stability results are proved. From here, many negative statements regarding the convergence of the price mechanism and attempts to rectify these conclusions are examined. The conclusion is that either the traditional economic hypotheses behind the model need to be reexamined or the economist’s dream of a universal pricing mechanism must be abandoned.

1v. (various pagings) : / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (D.Sc.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Physical and Inorganic Chemistry, 1974

Questa tesi si compone di tre capitoli. Nel primo capitolo, si presenta una rassegna della letteratura sui principali contributi teorici di modellazione per la progettazione della sicurezza sociale, assumendo gli individui come non-standard preferences. Ci concentriamo su tre approcci particolari: time inconsistent preferences, temptation preferences e myopia. Il secondo capitolo studia gli incentivi politici per la progettazione della politica di sicurezza sociale nelle democrazie competitive con le famiglie lungimiranti e miopi in un ambiente di probabilistic voting. In particolare, l'analisi si concentra sul trade-off tra le dimensioni e il grado di redistribuzione del sistema pensionistico. Il terzo capitolo introduce il comportamento miope di risparmio in un modello pensionistico a due paesi, in cui vengono confrontate le politiche pensionistiche non-cooperative e cooperative. Inoltre, questo capitolo analizza gli effetti di cooperazione per l'accumulo di capitale mondiale con la presenza di agenti miopi. / This dissertation consists of three chapters. In Chapter 1, I present a literature review on the main theoretical contributions modeling social security design assuming non-standard household preferences. We focus on three particular approaches: time inconsistent preferences, temptation preferences and myopia. Chapter 2 investigates the political incentives for the design of social security policy in competitive democracies with both far-sighted and myopic households in a probabilistic voting setting. In particular, the analysis focuses on the trade-off between the size and the redistribution degree of the equilibrium social security policy. Chapter 3 introduces myopic saving behavior in a two-country normative model of social security, in which non-cooperative and cooperative pension policies are compared. Moreover, this chapter analyzes the effects of cooperation to world capital accumulation with the presence of myopic agents.

Machinery investments represent a substantial portion of agribusiness firms’ costs. Because of high machinery costs, variable profit margins, and increasing competition, agribusiness managers continually seek methods to maintain profitability and manage risk. One relatively new method is jointly owning and sharing machinery. Contract design issues to enhance horizontal linkages between firms through machinery sharing are addressed. Specifically, costs and depreciation sharing between two firms entering into a joint machinery ownership contract are examined. Two, two-player models, a Nash equilibrium game theoretical model and an applied two-farm simulation model are used to determine impacts of machinery sharing on firms engaged in machinery sharing. The Nash equilibrium model determines theoretical optimal sharing rules for two generic firms. Using the Nash equilibrium model as the basis, the two-farm simulation model provides more specific insights into joint harvest machinery sharing. Both models include contractual components that are uniquely associated with machinery sharing. Contractual components include penalty payment structure for untimely machinery delivery and the percentages of shared costs paid and depreciation claimed paid by each firm. Harvesting windows for each farm and yield reductions associated with untimely machinery delivery are accounted for within the models. Machinery sharing can increase the NPV of after tax cash flows and potentially reduce risk. Sharing will, however, not occur if own marginal transaction costs and/or marginal penalty costs associated with untimely machinery delivery are too large. Further, if the marginal costs of sharing are small relative to own marginal net benefits, sharing will not occur. There are potential tradeoffs between the percentage of shared costs paid and the percentage of shared depreciation claimed depending on each farms’ specific tax deductions. Harvesting window overlaps help determine the viability of machinery sharing. Farms may be better off sharing larger, more efficient machinery than using smaller machinery even when harvest must be delayed. Percentages of shared costs, depreciation, and tax deductions have important tax implications that impact the after tax cash flows and should be considered when negotiating machinery sharing contracts.

This dissertation is a compilation of essays highlighting the usefulness of game theory in understanding socio-economic phenomena. The second chapter tries to provide a reason for the strict codes of conduct that have been imposed on unmarried girls in almost every society at some point of time in its history using tools from classical game theory. If men prefer to marry submissive women, then parents of girls will have an incentive to signal the submissiveness of their daughters in various ways in order to attract better matches. At the same time, parents will find it costlier to signal the submissiveness of girls who are not really submissive. This line of reasoning thus helps us interpret phenomena such as veiling, footbinding, and sequestration of women in general as signals of submissiveness. The third chapter attempts to rationalize some of the ad hoc rules proposed for dividing a bankrupt estate using tools from evolutionary game theory. The ad hoc rules differ from each other because of the axioms that are imposed in addition to efficiency and claims boundedness. Efficiency requires that the estate be completely divided between the claimants, and claims boundedness requires that no claimant be awarded more than her initial contribution. This dissertation tries to show that an ad hoc rule can be rationalized as the unique self-enforcing long run outcome of Young's [46] evolutionary bargaining model by using certain intuitive rules for the Nash demand game. In the fourth chapter I present a simple model of conflict over inputs in an economy with ill-defined property rights. Agents produce output from the land they hold, which in turn can be allocated to consumption or the production of guns. There is no agency to enforce rights over the initial land holdings, and the future holdings of land are determined using a contest success function that depends on the guns produced by both agents. I characterize the equilibria in which only one, both, and none of the agents produce guns, as a function of the total land and the inequality of initial land holdings for general forms of utility, production, cost, and contest success functions.

Project (M.A.) - Simon Fraser University, 2005. / Project (Dept. of Economics) / Simon Fraser University. Also issued in digital format and available on the World Wide Web.