This thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically distinct from other freedom-concepts although it presupposes free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a 'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or not removing a real obstacle to choice/action that impedes (to a greater or a lesser extent) B's doing x. This responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appropriate, in the given context, to ask A for a justification of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational concept. Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars, for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom; nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of autonomy. Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-, not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct, values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions of method. It is argued that the widely held essential contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical, and that it is methodologically possible to construct an authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and critical but non-relative.

This thesis is a study of some recent issues and arguments in the debate over freedom and determinism. Most of the philosophers whose work I examine are sympathetic to the doctrine known as compatibilism, according to which determinism poses no threat to the freedom of action. / In chapter I, the introduction, I discuss some basic notions and offer a brief survey of the discussion of freedom and determinism between 1930 and 1970. In chapter II, I examine an influential recent attack on the principle that an agent is responsible for his actions only if he could have done otherwise. In chapters III and IV, I discuss the emergence of explanation as a major issue in the free-will debate. In III, I criticize the claim that mechanistic explanations are compatible with intentional ones. I conclude by identifying some major outstanding problems.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2006. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 287-307).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Adelaide, 1985. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 180-181).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Capital Bible Seminary, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 67-70).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Calvin Theological Seminary, 2004. / This is an electronic reproduction of TREN, #007-0184. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-124).

Thesis (M. Div.)--Trinity International University, 2008. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 74-79).

Thesis--University of Paris.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1997. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-85).