No description available.

The two questions that motivate the present inquiry are: is it possible that human beings will freely, and what does free will make possible? John Duns Scotus and William James are two defenders of the possibility of free will, although each has a very different notion of the will. First, I present the accounts of the will articulated by Duns Scotus and James, with attention to the context in which the accounts were developed and the reasons each philosopher gives for the possibility of free will. Next, I briefly consider the picture of human action each account of the will makes possible. Then, I discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each account. Finally, in response to a weakness of both accounts, I argue that in order to widen the possibilities of human moral agency, it is necessary to reflect not only on our strengths but also on our physical and moral frailty.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2374.pdf: 1948759 bytes, checksum: d042068510b4cc93c8066495ead75b48 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-03-06 / Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais / One of the objectives of this essay is to argue that determinism and indeterminism remain central themes of the science of psychology especially the Analysis of Behavior and its philosophy, Radical Behaviorism. At first blush, our attention seems to be misplaced, for Skinner declares himself to be a determinist. However, closer examination suggests that Skinner's writings warrant an indeterminist reading of his philosophical and scientific commitments. Accordingly, a "tension" between the determinist and indeterminist theses, underlying Skinner's writings, calls for analysis. One way of shedding light on this "tension" is to turn to philosophy. However, philosophy offers numerous definitions, as well as different levels of analysis of determinism and indeterminism. Because of this, another objective emerged: the development of an analytic tool for examining determinism and indeterminism, not only in Skinner's behaviorism, but also in philosophy. A heuristic tool was devised, based on considerations suggested by philosophy of science, which consists in three levels of analysis of determinism and indeterminism to wit, conceptual, ontological and epistemological. By means of this, some confusions and logical difficulties, often present in discussions about determinism and indeterminism, were elucidated. Some questions which arise from the examination of Skinner's work can also be addressed: Is determinism a necessary condition of science, or can there be indeterminist sciences? Are determinism and causality synonyms? Or can there be non-deterministic causation or non-causal determinism? Is determinism a condition of prediction and control? Does indeterminism imply caprice or chaos? Is probability and index of ignorance of some of the causes of behavior, or is it a constitutive element of behavior per se? Based on philosophical analyses of determinism and indeterminism, texts which broach related concepts and theses, from every decade of Skinner's intellectual production, are considered. This historical approach enables us to identify possible tendencies, regarding determinism and indeterminism, in Skinner's work. Moreover, it allows us to offer a brief history of Radical Behaviorism, interpreting its past, reconstructing its present, and indicating its future possibilities. / Um dos principais objetivos deste trabalho é argumentar que o tema do determinismo e indeterminismo é ainda central para a ciência psicológica, em especial, para a Análise do Comportamento, e sua filosofia, o Behaviorismo Radical. À primeira vista, o problema parece não se justificar, já que Skinner declara-se determinista. Todavia, um exame mais atento sugere que o texto skinneriano também abre o flanco para uma interpretação indeterminista de seus compromissos científico-filosóficos. Com isso, instala-se uma tensão entre teses deterministas e indeterministas, que reclama esclarecimento. Uma maneira de compreender essa tensão é recorrer ao texto filosófico. No entanto, há também nesse domínio uma pluralidade de definições e diferentes níveis de análise de determinismo e indeterminismo. Diante dessa situação, outro objetivo emerge: construir uma ferramenta analítica para examinar o determinismo e o indeterminismo, não só no behaviorismo skinneriano, mas também na filosofia. A partir das reflexões fomentadas pela filosofia da ciência extrai-se uma ferramenta heurística que consiste no exame do determinismo e indeterminismo privilegiando três níveis de análise: conceitual, ontológico e epistemológico. Com essa ferramenta são explicitadas eventuais confusões e embaraços lógicos que, não raro, estão presentes nas discussões do determinismo e indeterminismo. É possível também responder algumas questões que surgem no exame do texto skinneriano: determinismo é uma condição necessária para a ciência, ou haveria uma ciência indeterminista? Determinismo e causalidade são sinônimos? Ou será possível um indeterminismo causal, ou ainda, um determinismo não-causal? Controle e previsão só são possíveis no determinismo? Indeterminismo implica capricho ou caos? A probabilidade é apenas um atestado de ignorância das causas do comportamento, ou é um elemento constitutivo do próprio comportamento? A partir da matriz filosófica do determinismo e indeterminismo são examinados textos referentes a cada década da produção intelectual de Skinner, que apresentam conceitos, noções e teses diretamente relacionados ao tema principal. Essa abordagem histórica permite identificar possíveis tendências no texto skinneriano com respeito ao determinismo e indeterminismo. Não apenas isso, possibilita também construir uma breve história do Behaviorismo Radical, interpretando seu passado, reconstruindo seu presente e abrindo possibilidades para um futuro.

This dissertation is about some of the most important philosophical aspects of chaos research, a famous recent mathematical area of research about deterministic yet unpredictable and irregular, or even random behaviour. It consists of three parts. First, as a basis for the dissertation, I examine notions of unpredictability in ergodic theory, and I ask what they tell us about the justification and formulation of mathematical definitions. The main account of the actual practice of justifying mathematical definitions is Lakatos's account on proof-generated definitions. By investigating notions of unpredictability in ergodic theory, I present two previously unidentified but common ways of justifying definitions. Furthermore, I criticise Lakatos's account as being limited: it does not acknowledge the interrelationships between the different kinds of justification, and it ignores the fact that various kinds of justification - not only proof-generation - are important. Second, unpredictability is a central theme in chaos research, and it is widely claimed that chaotic systems exhibit a kind of unpredictability which is specific to chaos. However, I argue that the existing answers to the question "What is the unpredictability specific to chaos?" are wrong. I then go on to propose a novel answer, viz. the unpredictability specific to chaos is that for predicting any event all sufficiently past events are approximately probabilistically irrelevant. Third, given that chaotic systems are strongly unpredictable, one is led to ask: are deterministic and indeterministic descriptions observationally equivalent, i.e., do they give the same predictions? I treat this question for measure-theoretic deterministic systems and stochastic processes, both of which are ubiquitous in science. I discuss and formalise the notion of observational equivalence. By proving results in ergodic theory, I first show that for many measure-preserving deterministic descriptions there is an observationally equivalent indeterministic description, and that for all indeterministic descriptions there is an observationally equivalent deterministic description. I go on to show that strongly chaotic systems are even observationally equivalent to some of the most random stochastic processes encountered in science. For instance, strongly chaotic systems give the same predictions at every observation level as Markov processes or semi-Markov processes. All this illustrates that even kinds of deterministic and indeterministic descriptions which, intuitively, seem to give very different predictions are observationally equivalent. Finally, I criticise the claims in the previous philosophical literature on observational equivalence.

Several philosophical problems are based on an analogy between a real situation and a probabilistic model. Such problems are based on urn analogies. The present dissertation aims to describe and implement a methodology oriented towards the resolution of philosophical problems based on an urn analogy. This methodology is based on the use of the n-universes. To this end, I describe first the n-universes in a detailed way. I also discuss the difficulties of the theory of n-universes related to the demultiplication of the criteria and to the relation one/many between the objects and a given criterion.On the one hand, I present an application of the framework of n-universes to the Doomsday argument and to the problems recently appeared in the literature in keeping with the Doomsday argument. My concern is also with showing how the application of the framework of n-universes to several problems and thought experiments related to the Doomsday argument helps clarifying the problem data and making disappear the associated ambiguity. I present then an analysis of the following problems related to the Doomsday argument: the two urn case, God's Coin Toss, the Sleeping Beauty Problem, the Presumptuous Philosopher, Lazy Adam, and the Shooting-Room Paradox. I present lastly a solution to the Doomsday argument, based on a third route, by contrast to two types of solutions classically described.On the other hand, I present an application of the framework of n-universes to Goodman's paradox. I replace first Goodman's statement in the framework of n-universes. I propose then a solution to the paradox, based on a distinction between two different modelizations of Goodman's statement in two structurally different n-universes.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Christian Emmanuel de Menezes Montenegro.pdf: 1632030 bytes, checksum: 5a16ca4636299f21667da413dcc8fd26 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-30 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This paper aims to achieve a study of the conceptions of causality in David Hume, a Scottish empiricist philosopher of the 18th century and in Charles Sanders Peirce, an American pragmatist philosopher of the 19th century. In order to discuss these conceptions, a historical-critical approach was chosen. We believe this approach should enable the reader a clearer perception of what is at stake, namely, the passage of a deterministic vision for an indeterministic worldview. Hence we will take a route we intend to present the modern scientific thinking from its genesis to mid 20th century. As Michel Paty tells us in his article entitled The genesis of physical causality2, (published in the journal Studia Scientiae): the notions or categories of causality and determinism have accompanied the formation of modern sciences, foremost, the Physical Science one . At the time of Galileo, Descartes and Newton, physics was called Natural Philosophy and comprised a search laws of Nature expressed through regularities and causal relations. Although the notion or idea of causality were always present in Western Thought since Greek times it could be mainly found merged with metaphysical conceptions. Aristotle, for example, in his work entitled Metaphysics, lists four causes, namely, material cause, formal cause, efficient cause and final or teleological cause. According to Paty, it was due to d Alembert s Traité de dynamique more than Newton s Principia the idea of a physical causality subsumed to a mathematical functional relation (differential temporal causality), in the sense of efficient cause, that took shape. It was this conception, excluding other causes, says Paty, that prevailed in Modern Science, from the 18th century, Hume s time. The success achieved by Newtonian synthesis, expressed in its analytical form by d Alembert, led to the belief in determinism, expressed in Laplace s saying. With the advent of the theory of evolution by natural selection in the biological sciences of the 19th century, many thinkers considered that living being built up as something irreducible, which could not be explained solely in terms of efficient cause, therefore it would be necessary to resort to some kind of life force or vital breath inflated by an intelligent intention and only by him. Hence the need to resort to the final or teleological causes. Peirce was one of these thinkers, as we will have the opportunity to see along the exposition of his philosophy. We take as theoretical basis of our research the following works: 2 PATY, Michel. The genesis of physical causality . In Scientiae Studia, São Paulo, vol. 2, n. 1, 2004, p. 9. Available in www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1678-31662004000100002&script. X A Treatise of Human Nature, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and the Principles of Moral and An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, besides the works of two commentators, namely, The Hume s Skepticism by Plínio Junqueira Smith and Hume and the Epistemology by João Paulo Monteiro. In the same way, Regarding Peirce s works, we have taken the following works: The Essential Peirce, vol. 1; The Essential Peirce, vol. 2; Illustrations of the Logic of Science; Semiotics; Semiotics and Philosophy and the works by three commentators, namely, Kósmos Noetós by Ivo Assad Ibri; The Induction from Aristotle to Peirce, by Maria de Lourdes Bacha; Charles S. Peirce s Evolutionary Philosophy by Carl Hausman / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo realizar um estudo das concepções de causalidade em David Hume, filósofo empirista escocês do século XVIII, e em Charles Sanders Peirce, filósofo pragmatista americano do século XIX. Abordaremos estas concepções através de um enfoque de caráter histórico-crítico. Acreditamos que esta abordagem deva possibilitar ao leitor uma percepção mais clara do que está em jogo, a saber, a passagem de uma visão determinista para uma visão indeterminista do mundo. Para tanto, faremos um percurso no qual pretendemos apresentar o pensamento científico moderno, desde sua gênese até meados do século vinte. Como nos diz Michel Paty em um artigo publicado na Revista Scientiae Studia intitulado A gênese da causalidade física1, as noções ou categorias de causalidade e determinismo acompanharam a formação das ciências modernas e, em primeiro lugar, da física . Na época de Galileu, Descartes e Newton a física era denominada filosofia natural e compreendia uma busca de leis da Natureza expressa através de regularidades e relações causais. Embora a concepção ou ideia de causalidade sempre estivesse presente no pensamento ocidental desde a Antiguidade grega, ela encontrava-se mesclada com concepções metafísicas. Aristóteles, por exemplo, em sua Metafísica, relaciona quatro causas, a saber, causa material, causa formal, causa eficiente e causa final ou teleológica. Segundo Paty, foi com d Alembert, no seu Traité de dynamique, mais do que com os Principia de Newton, que a ideia de uma causalidade física subsumida a uma relação matemática funcional (causalidade temporal diferencial), no sentido de causa eficiente, ganhou forma. Foi esta concepção, excluindo outras causas, diz-nos Paty, que prevaleceu na Ciência Moderna, a partir do século XVIII, época de Hume. O sucesso alcançado pela síntese newtoniana, expressa em sua forma analítica por d Alembert, levou à crença no determinismo expresso no célebre dito de Laplace. Com o advento da teoria da evolução por seleção natural, nas ciências biológicas do século XIX, muitos pensadores consideraram que o ser vivo constituía-se como algo irredutível, que não poderia ser explicado somente em termos de causas eficientes e, portanto, seria necessário recorrer-se a uma espécie de força vital ou sopro vital insuflado por um propósito inteligente, e apenas por ele. Donde a necessidade de recorrer-se à causa final ou teleológica. Peirce foi um desses pensadores, como teremos a oportunidade de ver na 1 PATY, Michel. A gênese da causalidade física . In Scientiae Studia, São Paulo, vol. 2, n. 1, 2004, pp. 9-32, p. 9. Disponível em www.scielo.br/scielo.php?pid=S1678-31662004000100002&script. VIII exposição de sua filosofia. Tomamos como fontes básicas de nossa pesquisa as obras: Tratado da Natureza Humana, Investigações sobre o entendimento humano e os princípios da moral e Sumário do Tratado da Natureza Humana de David Hume, além das obras de dois comentadores de Hume, a saber, O ceticismo de Hume, de Plínio Junqueira Smith e Hume e a Epistemologia de João Paulo Monteiro. Com relação a Peirce tomamos as seguintes obras: The Essential Peirce, vol. 1; The Essential Peirce, vol. 2; Ilustrações da Lógica da Ciência; Semiótica; Semiótica e Filosofia e as obras de três comentadores, a saber, Kósmos Noetós de Ivo Assad Ibri, A Indução de Aristóteles a Peirce de Maria de Lourdes Bacha e Charles S. Peirce s Evolutionary Philosophy de Carl Hausman

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Renato Salatiel.pdf: 884932 bytes, checksum: 8fdd5731b5f2d391dd75a1ae2f191b96 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-11-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The theme of this thesis is the concept of Chance in the philosophy of the American thinker Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), a concept associated with the doctrine that he called Tychism. In this work, I propose to interpret different senses of the concept of chance that can be found in the work of the author, seeking to read them again in light of his philosophical system. I advocate, too, the hypothesis that Chance, one of the main concepts of peircean philosophy, must be interpreted from the systemic perspective of his work and in light of modern theories of complexity. I proposed, as a justification for this research, to make a contribution that will support an understanding of various aspects of peircean metaphysics, given the consideration that the concept of Chance, so present in contemporary scientific literature, is worked in an innovative and, we can say, pioneering way by the author. In the development of this work, I adopted, always, the criterion of reference to Peirce s original work, also referring to the scholarly literature concerning the theme in question / O tema desta tese é o conceito de Acaso na filosofia do pensador norte-americano Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), associado à doutrina que ele denomina Tiquismo. Propomo-nos, neste trabalho, interpretar sentidos diferentes da noção de acaso encontráveis na obra do autor, buscando relê-los à luz de seu sistema filosófico. Defendemos, também, a hipótese de que o Acaso, um dos principais conceitos da filosofia peirciana, deve ser interpretado sob uma perspectiva sistêmica de sua obra e à luz das modernas teorias da complexidade. Supomos, como justificativa da presente pesquisa, trazer uma contribuição que venha subsidiar o entendimento de aspectos da metafísica peirciana, a par da consideração de que o conceito de Acaso, tão presente na literatura cientifica contemporânea, ser trabalhado de forma inovadora e, pode-se dizer, pioneira, pelo autor. No desenvolvimento do trabalho, adotamos, sempre, o critério de remissão à obra original de Peirce, recorrendo também à literatura de comentários afeita ao tema em pauta

Les résultats de mesures quantiques sont généralement considérés comme aléatoires, mais leur nature aléatoire, malgré son importance dans la théorie de l’information quantique, est mal comprise. Dans cette thèse, nous étudions plusieurs problèmes liés à l’origine et la certification de l’aléatoire et l’imprévisibilité quantique. L’un des résultats clés dans la formation de notre compréhension de la mécanique quantique comme théorie intrinsèquement indéterministe est le théorème de Kochen et Specker, qui démontre l’impossibilité d’attribuer simultanément, de façon cohérente, des valeurs définies et non-contextuelles à chaque observable avant la mesure. Cependant, si nous présumons qu’une observable à valeur définie doit être non-contextuelle, alors lethéorème ne montre que le fait qu’il existe au moins une observable à valeur indéfinie. Nous renforçons ce résultat en démontrant une variante du théorème de Kochen et Specker qui montre que si un système est préparé dans un état quelconque j i, alors chaque observable A est à valeur indéfinie sauf si j i est un état propre de A. La nature indéterministe de la mesure quantique n’explique pas bien la différence de qualité entre l’aléatoire quantique et classique. Soumise à certaines hypothèses physiques, nous montrons qu’une suite de bits produite par la mesure des observables à valeurs indéfinies est garantie, dans la limite infinie, d’être fortement incalculable. De plus, nous discutons comment utiliser ces résultats afin de construire un générateur quantique de nombres aléatoires qui est certifié par des observables à valeurs indéfinies. Dans la dernière partie de cette thèse, nous étudions la notion d’imprévisibilité, qui est au coeur du concept d’aléatoire (quantique). Ce faisant, nous proposons un modèle formel de (im)prévisibilité qui peut servir à évaluer la prévisibilité d’expériences physiques arbitraires. Ce modèle est appliqué aux mesures quantiques afin de comprendre comment la valeur indéfinie et la complémentarité quantique peuvent être utilisées pour certifier différents degrés d’imprévisibilité, et nous démontrons ainsi que le résultat d’une seule mesure d’une observable à valeur indéfinie est formellement imprévisible. Enfin, nous étudions la relation entre cette notion d’imprévisibilité et la certification de l’incalculabilité des suites aléatoires quantiques. / The outcomes of quantum measurements are generally considered to be random, but despite the fact that this randomness is an important element in quantum information theory, its nature is not well understood. In this thesis, we study several issues relating to the origin and certification of quantum randomness and unpredictability. One of the key results in forming our understanding of quantum mechanics as an intrinsically indeterministic theory is the Kochen-Specker theorem, which shows the impossibility to consistently assign simultaneous noncontextual definite values to all quantum mechanical observables prior to measurement. However, the theorem, under the assumption that any definite values must be noncontextual, only strictly shows that some observables must be value indefinite. We strengthen this result, proving a stronger variant of the Kochen-Specker theorem showing that, under the same assumption, if a system is prepared in an arbitrary state j i, then every observable A is value indefinite unless j i is an eigenstate of A. The indeterministic nature of quantum measurements does little to explain how the quality of quantum randomness differs from classical randomness. We show that, subject to certain physical assumptions, a sequence of bits generated by the measurement of value indefinite observables is guaranteed, in the infinite limit, to be strongly incomputable. We further discuss how this can be used to build a quantum random number generator certified by value indefiniteness. Next, we study the notion of unpredictability, which is central to the concept of (quantum) randomness. In doing so, we propose a formal model of prediction that can be used to asses the predictability of arbitrary physical experiments. We investigate how the quantum features of value indefiniteness and complementarity can be used to certify different levels of unpredictability, and show that the outcome of a single measurement of a value indefinite quantum observable is formally unpredictable. Finally, we study the relation between this notion of unpredictability and the computability-theoretic certification of quantum randomness.

Split Soundscape est un projet artistique d’installation sonore inspiré par les notions de paysage sonore et de schizophonie introduites par le compositeur R. Murray Schafer. Ce projet artistique propose la reconstitution de l’espace sonore en temps réel par un double dispositif : des microphones disposés dans un territoire captent et transmettent leur environnement sonore par internet en temps réel (technique du streaming). Dans un espace d’exposition dédié à l’écoute, des haut-parleurs diffusent les sons transmis et construisent un espace nouveau.La recherche interroge la notion d’espace dans sa définition géographique, sociale et philosophique. La notion de paysage sonore est définie, remise en question, et mise en perspective par l’archéologie sonore et l’espace sonore dans sa dimension sociale, deux notions qui nous amènent à considérer l’écoute comme centrale dans la réception et la construction du paysage sonore. La notion de schizophonie (la séparation d’un son originel de sa reproduction), est définie et mise en perspective avec celle d’objet sonore et comme avatar de la reproductibilité technique.Le travail artistique est situé dans le champ de la création sonore et contemporaine, et particulièrement dans son rapport aux notions de flux, d’indéterminisme et de composition. Dans le contexte du doctorat « pratique et théorie », l’aspect pratique de la recherche est évoqué, et l’évolution du projet plastique est présentée à travers des expérimentations inspirées de la recherche théorique. / Split Soundscape is a practice based research project that revisits the concepts of Soundscape and Schizophonia originally introduced by the composer R. Murray Schafer. The artistic practice consists of a series of sound installations that focus on the reconstitution of sound space in real time. A number of “Open” microphones located in given territories are employed to transmit the local sonic environment via the internet in real time (using audio streaming technologies). A new soundscape is composed from these transmitted soundscapes and played through loudspeakers in a dedicated (exhibition) listening space. The theoretical research investigates geographical, sociological and philosophical definitions of space. The concept of soundscape as defined by Schafer is called into question and reconsidered from the perspective of sound archeology and as a social construct. This in turn, leads to the positioning of listening as being central in the construction of soundscape. The notion of Schizophonia (the separation of an original sound from his technical reproduction) is examined in detail and compared with Pierre Schaeffer’s definition of the sound object or objet sonore as an alternative consequence of mechanical reproduction. The artistic practice is contextualized in relation to the field of contemporary sound art and more specifically the concepts of flux, indeterminism in composition. The tools developed to facilitate the practice are described, and the evolution of the art project is presented as a succession of experiments informed by the academic research.

Hur tillskriver vi moraliskt ansvar, och varför? Inom filosofin debatteras häftigt huruvida vi har fri vilja eller ej, och således ifrågasätts om vi kan tillskrivas moraliskt ansvar över huvud taget. Ett av argumenten som sägs hota den fria viljan är den omfattande situationistiska litteraturen, som verkar visa på att människors beteende påverkas mer av situationella faktorer än av personlighetsdrag. EH (Explanation Hypothesis) är en psykologisk hypotes som, förutom att redogöra för vardagliga moraliska bedömningar, kan reda ut filosofiska frågor såsom varför våra intuitioner kring moraliskt ansvar ter sig inkonsekventa. Denna studie testade EH experimentellt med en enkätstudie som dessutom undersökte folks intuitioner i moraliskt signifikanta situationer med kopplingar till den situationistiska litteraturen. Resultaten stärkte EH i enlighet med tidigare resultat, samt visade på att folks moraliska bedömningar inte påverkades av vetskapen om starka psykosociala fenomen som kan ha haft inverkan på agenternas beteenden. Implikationerna för den filosofiska debatten kring fri vilja och moraliskt ansvar, liksom begreppet determinism, diskuteras och förslag på fortsatt forskning läggs fram. / How do we attribute moral responsibility, and why? The notion of free will is heavily debated within philosophy, thus questioning whether we can truly be morally responsible for our actions. One of the arguments said to threaten the notion of free will is the vast collection of situationist literature that seem to show that human behavior is often more influenced by situational factors rather than personality traits. The Explanation Hypothesis (EH) is a psychological hypothesis that make general claims about everyday moral judgements, as well as accounting for philosophical issues such as the inconsistency of folk-intuitions on these issues. This study used surveys to test EH experimentally, also investigating folk-intuitions on moral responsibility in scenarios related to the situationist literature. The results support the hypothesis according to an earlier, similar study, as well as showing that the participants moral judgements were not influenced by being made aware of strong, psychosocial phenomena that seem to have had an impact on agents behaviors. The implications for the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility as well as the notion of determinism is discussed and further research is proposed.