This study addresses the effects of altruism and intention for succession on family firm's risk-taking behaviors. Results show that higher levels of familial altruism in family firms with succession plans lead to lower levels of R&D investment, but have no significant impacts on their earnings management. Also, altruism in these family firms decreases their cost of debt. / May 2016

Global warming imposes significant physical, regulatory and reputational risks to listed corporations. Consequently, climate-related issues have recently received increased attention from investors, creditors and stock market regulators. In February 2010, The United States (US) Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an interpretative guidance requiring publicly listed firms to disclose material climate change risks (CCR) in their annual securities filings (10Ks). However, considering the level of enforcement and managerial discretion in the definition of materiality, market participants raised concerns about the lack and quality of CCR disclosure. This research explores the effects of family control as an important determinant of CCR disclosure strategies. Family firms are the world’s most common form of economic organizations, dominating the global economy. The socioemotional wealth (SEW) theoretical perspective argues that family firms behave differently from their nonfamily counterparts and exhibit significant heterogeneity depending on the level of family control and involvement. Using a sample of S&P 500 companies, I examine whether family firms differ from their non-family peers in their climate change disclosure strategies. Additionally, I further explore the effects of two dimensions (i.e. family control and influence, family identity) of socioemotional wealth on CCR disclosures. Overall, I find that family ownership has no impact on CCR disclosure decisions, but is negatively related to CCR disclosure quality. Moreover, I find a positive relationship between family firms prioritizing family identity and CCR disclosure quality. The findings of this research have implications for regulators, investors, and academic researchers.

In East Asian economies, about 2/3 listed firms are controlled by family shareholders. In the US and West European, the proportions of family firms are about 33% and 44%, respectively. Thus, family-controlled listed firms are common in almost every nation. In Taiwan, nearly 70% of listed firms are family-controlled. Many previous studies have pointed out that family firms are playing an important role in global economic activities. The equity structures and management ideas of family firms are different from those of common firms. For instance, family members possess decisive equities and will usually take positions of directors or top managers. They may usually view their firms as an asset inherited from forefathers, and they should pass it on to their next generations. The impact of these differences on firm¡¦s financial decisions has become a main research focus in recent years. Previous studies of family firms mainly placed the focus on the impact of family factors on corporate performance, but this study would attempt to investigate the impact of family factors on debt decisions from the perspectives of debt-financing decision and cost of debt-financing. First of all, this study probed into whether family and non-family firms have differences debt-financing decisions. Empirical findings indicated that family firms have a lower debt ratio and a 0.2813% lower cost of debt than non-family firms. A further comparison on the factors of debt decisions showed that the difference in the impact of family and non-family firms on debt levels lies in mainly three aspects, including depreciation tax shield, operational risk, and firm size. In the aspect of cost of debt-financing, family firms are relatively more sensitive to firm size, debt ratio, and credit risk. Previous studies that applied the agent theory to investigate debt decisions focused more on the problems of debt agency problem and seldom used the inter-relationship between equity agency problem and debt agency problem to discuss the impact of equity agency problem on debt decisions. The problems of equity agency of family firms encompass the traditional equity agency between the manager and shareholders and core equity agency between controlling shareholders and external shareholders. Besides, family ownership and management can reduce the problems of traditional equity agency, and controlling shareholders using the pyramid structure of equities and cross-holding to enhance control right will increase the problems of core equity agency. Thus, based on the problems of equity agency problem, the family factors can be divided into family ownership, enhancement of control, and family management to investigate the respective impact on debt-financing decisions. In the aspect of debt-financing, it was empirically discovered that higher family ownership would lead to a closer relationship between firm value and the wealth of family shareholders. Debt financing would be avoided to reduce financial risks and maintain the wealth of family shareholders. A positive correlation existed between debt ratio and the difference between family control and family ownership, implying when the difference between family control and family ownership is higher, the problems of core equity agency between controlling shareholders and small shareholders will be more serious, and the company will be inclined to adopt debt-financing to acquire long-term capitals. The estimate coefficient of the effect of family management on debt ratio is not significance. Thus, whether the CEO is taken by a family member will not affect debt-financing decisions. In the analysis of control level, when the control level is low, firms are inclined to adopt debt-financing decisions to reduce the effect of equity dilution. On the contrary, when the control level is high, in order to avoid the loss of control benefit caused by debt monitoring, firms will be inclined to avoid debts. As a result, control and debt ratio are in an inverted U-shaped relationship. In addition, for family firms, the maintenance of control and risk control are important factors affecting their debt-financing decision. In the aspect of cost of debt, family ownership can reduce the cost of debt-financing. If the non-linear relationship of family ownership is considered, the impact of family ownership on the cost of debt-financing is non-linear and in an inverted U shape. The maximum value is 8.64%. When the family ownership exceeds 17.9%, the effect of family ownership on the cost of debt financing is negative. As the minimum family ownership was defined as 10% in this study, and the average family ownership among the samples was 21%, it could be inferred that higher family ownership would lead to a lower cost of debt-financing. In a comparison with Anderson et al. (2003), it was discovered that the average family ownership has negative influence on the cost of debt, but for the family firms in the US, higher family ownership would reduce its negative influence on cost of debt, and for domestic family firms, higher family ownership would increase its negative influence on the cost of debt. The Control-enhancing mechanisms will increase core equity problem and cost of debt, and the relationship between control enhancement and cost of debt are not in a non-linear relationship. Creditors conceive that their mortgage will be more secured if family members take the position of CEO. Thus, family CEO can reduce the cost of debt-financing.

Family firms are ubiquitous around the world. Family involvement in family businesses gives rise to unique features that not only make family firms behave distinctively from their nonamily counterparts but also lead to great variations among such firms. From an innovation perspective, while family firms are regarded as conservative businesses that lack an innovation spirit in some studies, others recognize family firms as key economic drivers demonstrate entrepreneurial spirit. This dissertation is an attempt to advance the understanding of family firm innovation heterogeneity by focusing on the role of family CEOs. In particular, this research explores what idiosyncratic resources and capabilities are generated from family management, specifically when a family member holds the CEO position. Employing a capability-based perspective of firm innovation, this research posits that the impact of a family CEO on firm innovation is twoold. Family CEOs have a direct impact on firm innovation due to the distinctive resources possessed and the unique goals pursued. Family CEOs also have an indirect impact on firm innovation via the configuration and orchestration of other top management team (TMT) members’ competencies, which manifests as high-order, idiosyncratic managerial capabilities. Therefore, superior or inferior family firm innovation is the result of both TMT members’ unique competencies acquired and developed by family firms as well as family CEOs’ idiosyncratic managerial capabilities. A randomly selected sample of 250 high-technology firms was used for the empirical tests. Findings suggest that family CEOs have a direct impact on firm innovation input and output and that family CEOs configure and orchestrate TMT resources distinctively compared to their professional counterparts. The results reveal theoretical implications for both family business and firm innovation and offer practical implications for leaders of family firms.

The governance field is well studied. However, small family firms do not receive their fair amount of coverage, despite their importance. In this work the field of governance in small family firms is qualitatively explored, using a sample of eight Swedish firms with a total of ten interview partners. Using a Constructivist Grounded Theory, informed by previous literature, we find nine key themes characterizing governance in small family firms: (1) Ownership & Board, (2) Holding Company, (3) Advisor & External Help, (4) Responsibility, (5) Formality, (6) Informality, (7) Conflict, (8) Succession and (9) Discussion & Conversation. Our findings suggest that all small family businesses employ some form of governance, however, this is not always recognized as such in previous literature, showing that corporate governance is too narrowly defined. We also investigate why governance structures are (not) implemented and how this is done. In connection to this, we visualize the factors influencing whether or not a small family firm implements formal governance structures. Additionally, we discuss what actually makes a family firm small. We contribute by investigating governance concepts in another context, namely the one of small family businesses, and seeing to what extent they hold up. The work allows us to conclude that some findings confirm existing theory, while others question it or cannot be found therein at all.

Financial risk as a result of trade in foreign currencies is inevitable for firms that are engaged in international trade. However the decision how to manage this risk differs from one firm to another. This difference can be a result of the type of ownership in the individual firm.One of the classifications of the type of firms that have different can be categorized as family firms and non-family firms. Studies have showen that family firms differ in their use of control systems and financial management techniques. The difference is explained by the type of ownership. As a consequence of the differences, family and non-family firms may differe in their decision making with respect to foreign risk management. This thesis compaires the practice of foreign exchange risk management in family and non-family firms.the objective is to asses if family firms and non-family firms differe in their decision making to currency exposure management. The effect of the involvement of family members in the management of currency risk will also be addressed. Finaly, the paper will provide some recommandetions to firms exposed to foreign exchange risk.

<p>Financial risk as a result of trade in foreign currencies is inevitable for firms that are engaged in international trade. However the decision how to manage this risk differs from one firm to another. This difference can be a result of the type of ownership in the individual firm.One of the classifications of the type of firms that have different can be categorized as family firms and non-family firms.</p><p>Studies have showen that family firms differ in their use of control systems and financial management techniques. The difference is explained by the type of ownership. As a consequence of the differences, family and non-family firms may differe in their decision making with respect to foreign risk management.</p><p>This thesis compaires the practice of foreign exchange risk management in family and non-family firms.the objective is to asses if family firms and non-family firms differe in their decision making to currency exposure management. The effect of the involvement of family members in the management of currency risk will also be addressed.</p><p>Finaly, the paper will provide some recommandetions to firms exposed to foreign exchange risk.</p>

Intra-family succession is the transfer of management, leadership and/or control of the business from one family member to another, and has been a core topic in family business research (Debicki, Matherne, Kellermanns, and Chrisman, 2009). Family firm researchers have suggested that family firms have a strong desire toward economic and non-economic goals (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013). However, how these goals fit into the strategic management decision of intra-family succession has not been explored by researchers (Chrisman, Kellermanns, Chan, and Liano, 2010). The purpose of this study is to identify and explain the importance of the goals that small private family firms expect to achieve through intra-family succession that cannot be achieved through non-family succession as “success in strategic management, including the management of intra-family succession, must be measured in terms of goal achievement” (De Massis, Sharma, Chua, and Chrisman, 2012, p. 30). To examine why intra-family succession goals (IFSGs) are important, this study relies on the psychological personality constructs of generativity (concern for guiding and establishing the next generation) and narcissism (an individual’s self-assurance, self-esteem and satisfaction with oneself). The respondents of this study are those family members who make up the dominant coalition (founders, incumbents, and potential successors) of the family firm. Only those firms where the family has the ability to influence firm behavior, and the intention (willingness) for intra-family succession, are included in this study. Qualitative data was collected to identify IFSGs, and these IFSGs are used in the development of the structured questionnaire. Fourteen IFSGs were identified from the qualitative phase of the study. The data collected from the structured questionnaire was subject to various statistical methods. The results suggest that the dominant coalition of small private family firms considered each IFSG as important, and that generativity and narcissism partially explain why these goals are important. The findings suggest that gender and the individual’s role within the dominant coalition influence the hypothesized relationship between IFSGs and generativity, and the IFSG of legacy and narcissism. This research provides several analytical, methodological and theoretical contributions and paves the way for further theoretical and empirical enquiry into intra-family succession of small private family firms.

The aim of this dissertation is analysing the factors which have the direct influence on family business. There are some particular suggestions how to increase the firm's prosperity.

Abstract Background &amp; Problem: Many family firms face a change in ownership in the near future. Acquisitions of family firms can therefore be a solution for the change in ownership. Due to special family firm characteristics, acquisitions of such companies can be complicated. Previous research shows that accountants and CFOs have a positive effect on the firm’s survival and growth. However, the CFOs’ roles in family business acquisitions have not been studied before.    Purpose: The purpose of this research is to explore what roles accountants and CFOs have in acquisitions of family firms.   Method: The base of this study is an abductive research approach with a qualitative research strategy. The main method was semi-structured interviews that was complemented with a document study of official documents from websites.    Conclusion: The empirical findings and analysis revealed that the CFOs in family firm acquisitions are important, but the CFOs’ roles in acquirer and acquiree differ. The CFOs in the selling family business is more of a bean counter in the process and provide material. The CFOs in the acquiring group is more of a business partner, conducting analyses and are involved in strategic decisions. The process of acquiring family firms is a special situation for the CFOs in the acquiring group since they need to adapt to the family firms’ informal culture.