An independent judiciary, independent courts and individual judges form the ba- sis for most aspects that are valued within what is today referred to as the rule of law. Thanks to the independence, courts are able settle disputes in an efficient, legally secure, and trustworthy manner. Furthermore, independence is crucial to be able to achieve a balance between enacting legislative acts and upholding hu- man rights of various kinds.  The thesis examined the relationship between the judicial activities of inde- pendent courts and the principle of non-intervention under international law. The research question for this thesis was whether a judgment from a national court may constitute a violation of this principle. In accordance with the practice of the ICJ, two criteria need to be met for it to constitute a breach of the principle of non-intervention: the action must be directed against the internal affairs of a State and the act had to have been coercive. The thesis concluded that a judgment of a national court may constitute a violation of the principle provided that the court belongs to an internationally strong party and applies legislation that en- croaches on the internal affairs of other states.  The thesis was able to state that those who can commit violations of the prin- ciple are states. As the court is a state organ, the state is responsible for all actions taken within the official capacity of the court and the judge. Since the resolution of disputes by notification of a judgment constitutes one of the court's main tasks, the assessment can hardly come to a different conclusion than that the state can be attributed responsibility for the judgment, even if the judge has made a mistake in deciding the dispute. In relation to the consequences that arise in the event of violations of the principle, the far-reaching state responsibility over in- dependent courts raised several questions, which in part remain unanswered.  The conclusion that judgements can constitute a breach was based on the application of a lower level of coercion advocated by some authors of the doc- trine, which raised questions about what level of coercion is in force at the time of writing and whether a lowering of the threshold for coercion may be beneficial in any respect.  Finally, the question was also raised as to whether courts can exercise their right of review of standards to dismiss an action where such legislation needs to be applied and thereby avoid incurring liability on the part of the state.

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