The philosophical enterprise is a critical inquiry into the fundamental assumptions of what is real, what can be known, what is right and just, and how we can formulate precise patterns of sound reasoning about these fields of inquiry. It is the premise of this dissertation that the work of Karl Marx makes claims in all these fields, but in fact is not as sound a pattern of reasoning as has been claimed by his many and diverse followers. / Because Marx himself pointed out that all the categories of political economy could be evolved from the concepts of private property and alienated labor, that the division of labor and private property are identical expressions, and that alienated labor is synonymous with the labor in the division of labor, it seems reasonable to criticize his claims on the basis of his use of the concept 'division of labor'. / Since Marx limits the development of communism to a period in which man's technological ability will provide all his necessities, and man will only have to be concerned with those products which have been added to his subsistence, it would seem unlikely that it would be possible to do away with the division of labor and maintain the level of development at the same time. In addition, since humans are biologically dependent for both subsistence and the knowledge of survival techniques, it would seem to be impossible to do away with either the individual or the cultural level of the division of labor, since it is the means of preserving such a large quantity of information for the next generation, and it cannot be preserved or taught by any one person. / If the economic 'infrastructure' is the source of man's social relations, his perceptions of reality, and his political ideology, then workers cannot gain self-control by doing away with the division of labor which is the form of all three. A free, creative individual with no cultural history and no norms for sharing the tasks and the products of society (the division of labor) will not have any social relations or any society, and only insofar as one has social relations can an individual survive qua human, or can humans survive as a society. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 42-06, Section: A, page: 2711. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1981.

The purpose of this dissertation is to attempt to show that C. L. Stevenson has been largely successful in accomplishing what he set out to accomplish with his metaethical noncognitivism: mainly, (a) to clarify the meanings of some key ethical terms, and (b) to characterize the methods by which moral judgments are and can be supported. In particular, I wish to argue that the two fundamental (and definitive) doctrines of Stevenson's noncognitivism are correct. These two doctrines are that moral judgments generally do not function as descriptions of objects or states of affairs, and that moral judgments function to express, evoke, and/or alter attitudes toward the objects of our moral sentiments--and do so without necessarily altering beliefs about those objects. This is to say that moral judgments do not generally function as constatives, but rather have functions which are primarily illocutionary and perlocutionary. / In Chapter I, I discuss the nature of metaethical inquiry, and I argue that metaethics is substantially neutral with respect to normative ethics. This is important because in order to properly evaluate Stevenson's theory, we must understand that indeed his is a metaethical theory, and as such does not have "dire consequences" for morality--a criticism often directed toward Stevenson's theory. / Stevenson's theory is largely a theory about ethical language. It is natural to ask why philosophers are concerned with language about duty, goodness, right and wrong, etc., rather than right and wrong themselves. Chapter II deals with this question by way of outlining a general theory of semiotics. Insofar as metaethics is largely concerned with the meanings of moral judgments, it is important that the moral philosopher recognize that meaning is a function of all three dimensions of language: the pragmatical as well as the semantical and syntactical dimensions. Furthermore, if we are apprized of the conventional nature of language we can perhaps more fully appreciate Stevenson's theory of meaning than do some of his critics. / Chapter III is a reductio of sorts. Here I offer brief sketches of some traditional metaethical theories and indications of what I think are some major shortcomings of these theories. What these traditional theories all have in common is that they are "descriptivistic," i.e., they regard moral judgments as descriptions of either very special "moral facts" (intuitionism), empirical facts (naturalism), or transcendent facts (supernaturalism). The success of these theories depends upon their establishing the existence of a semantical basis for moral judgments--this, I believe, they have failed to do. / Chapters IV-VI are concerned with the particulars of Stevenson's theory and criticisms thereof. In Chapter IV, I am concerned with explicating Stevenson's conception of the nature of ethical disagreement. His theory that ethical disagreement is essentially a matter of divergent attitudes (as opposed to divergent beliefs), and his doctrine of intrinsic/extrinsic approval, well account for a large part of ethical argumentation, and do so with very modest ontological and epistemological assumptions. In Chapters V and VI the doctrine of emotive meaning is explicated and defended; I offer a criticism of Stevenson's application of truth-values to moral judgments; and the function of reason in ethics is examined. I try to show here that Stevenson's theory--contrary to widely held opinion--recognizes a greater role for reason to play in ethics than do most, if not all, competing theories. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 41-07, Section: A, page: 3144. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1980.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 31-11, Section: A, page: 6116. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1970.

In Plato's middle period, the Old Academic Dichotomy (absolute/relative, or $\kappa\alpha\theta$' $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute o/\pi\rho\grave o\varsigma\ \acute\alpha\lambda\lambda o)$ performed the function of distinguishing the Forms from the perceptibles, whereas in his late period it assisted in an extensive plan of "relativization" of the Forms themselves (as in the Sophist and Statesman). At the same time, it enabled him to address some troublesome paradoxes that concern existence/non-existence, predication itself, indeed the very problems Aristotle resolved with the aid of the categories. / For Aristotle, I claim, the OAD not only provided the inspiration for the essence/accident distinction, but that the "deep structure", as it were, of the categories can best be understood as predications which involve (and are sometimes explicitly given as such) the OAD. For example, an accidental predication presupposes a reference to another: "Socrates is white" presupposes the predication "Something in Socrates (a surface) is white $\kappa\alpha\theta$' $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute o$." / Thus, when the scope of the OAD is confined to predicates, the result is the Aristotelian categories. / When the scope is confined to being, and in particular the "is" of predication, the OAD renders us the existential "is" ("is" by itself) and the copulative "is" ("is F"). The view I take here is contrary to the view of G. E. L. Owen, who tries to reduce the existential "is" to the predicative "is". / Finally, when the scope is confined to the $\varepsilon\iota\delta o\varsigma$, or form, the OAD (via the distinction made by Thomas Aquinas) renders first the ontological form, the part that is in the subjects, e.g. the soul, and, second, the universal, the indeterminate whole, that is said of the subject but not in the subject, e.g. man. The equivocal use of $\varepsilon\iota\delta o\varsigma$ in Met. ZH$\Theta$ may not be pernicious, an indication that Aristotle was confused. / By paying attention to the scope (predicates, "is", $\varepsilon\iota\delta o\varsigma)$ one can see how the OAD elucidates some inveterate problems in Aristotle. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 49-12, Section: A, page: 3755. / Major Professor: Russell M. Dancy. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1988.

In this work formal systems suitable for the development of a model of inquiry are investigated. We append to a sequent-version of a tableau deductive system new rules for adding formulas to a tableau construction which represent the acquisition of information concerning a given model of the initial premises. These rules may be thought of as enabling an inquirer to ask questions of a source of information about the model. / We begin by showing how the derivability relation for various of the resulting systems is related to derivability in standard deductive systems. We next look at the way these so-called interrogative systems differ from deductive systems with respect to the basic metatheoretical properties: soundness, completeness, transitivity, etc. We finally begin the development of a theory of interrogative definability, or identifiability. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 51-09, Section: A, page: 3103. / Major Professor: Jaakko Hintikka. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1990.

What does it mean for something to be rational? In deciding whether a belief, action, or desire can be considered rational, philosophers have always ran into the ambiguity between the normative and descriptive uses of the term. For instance, to claim that a belief in God is rational could mean that the belief came through some process of argumentation, or it could mean that this is a good belief for someone to have. Similarly, to say that a desire for wealth and fame is irrational might mean that no process of argument brought it about; or it might simply mean that it is not a good desire to have. This kind of ambiguity is related not only to the fact-value problem, but to the classical distinction between theory and practice. / Upon careful scrutiny, however, of all the processes involved in making judgments or holding beliefs, that is, inference and the experience upon which it is based, reasoning and the various shapes in which it is found, and reflective as well as nonreflective use of rules serve to establish a continuity between facts and values. At the same time, such a critical scrutiny indicates the real distinction between 'is,' as signifying what is the case, and 'ought,' as signifying what should be the case. / In performing such a scrutiny, I was forced to perform a double task: first, to develop a set of categorical terms for normative and descriptive rationality; and second (more importantly), to show the relation between ordinary and technical reasoning, thereby inviting philosophy, and theory in general, to assume its established role in the world of practical affairs. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 51-01, Section: A, page: 0185. / Major Professor: Eugene F. Kaelin. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1989.

The history of philosophy is replete with attempts at invoking rationality as a means of directing and even subduing human desire and emotion. Understood as that which moves human beings to action, desire and emotion come to be associated with human freedom and rationality as a means of curbing that freedom. Plato, for instance, takes for granted a separation between thought and action that drives a wedge between our rational ability to exercise self-discipline and the free expression of desire and emotion. Hobbes, on the other hand, replaces our internal ability for rational self-control with the external authority of the political State. So long as freedom and control are pitted against one another, human beings are incapable of attaining a symbiosis of these two elements of human action so essential to realizing true democracy. Unlike Plato, John Dewey sees in democracy the greatest potential for individual and social life. The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate how the educational philosophy of Dewey, which culminates in an educational aesthetic, appeals to and makes the most of the symbiosis of freedom and self-control, emotion and reason. Dewey's educational aesthetic not only offers an alternative to traditional methods of education, but also demonstrates how the goal of a democratic way of life is made feasible by means of intelligently guided self-discipline—a form of self-control guided by intelligence that is not a constraint upon freedom, but instead embodies greater opportunity for freedom. I trace the basis for this synthesis, in the social-political and pedagogical principles of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Both Locke and Rousseau offer educational theories that begin turning our attention toward the essential partnership required of rationality and emotion. Dewey's educational aesthetic is then considered as a response to alienating forms of education that continue to pit control and freedom against one another, and which thwart the intellectual and emotional development necessary for autonomy and democratic forms of social organization. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2005. / Date of Defense: August 16, 2005. / Self-directed learning, student as artist, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rosseau, John Dewey, Reason and emotion, Democracy and education, freedom and self-control, student alienation / Includes bibliographical references. / C. David Gruender, Professor Directing Dissertation; Emanuel I. Shargel, Outside Committee Member; Eugene F. Kaelin, Committee Member.

This dissertation attempts to re-evaluate the Darwinian concept of adaptation in light of recent evidence from the fields of Evolutionary Developmental Biology and Self-Organization. Recent findings seem to suggest that certain features of organisms, genomes, etc., might be explicable as the product of fixed principles of self-organization, rather than as product(s) of natural selection. This and similar findings potentially alter the landscape for the Darwinian idea of adaptation driven by natural selection. It is my position that the reception of these new ideas and findings has been much too enthusiastic and uncritical. Philosophers of biology in particular have gotten carried away with the incorporation of development into the evolutionary fold, and while I think that development certainly deserves inclusion (and has for a long time), we must be more mindful of the changes we make to the prevailing theory. What I seek to provide with this dissertation, is a more conservative take on the inclusion of development into the MS version of evolutionary theory. This conservative position seeks to preserve some of the more traditional opinions of the Synthesis Architects, while attending to recent findings from molecular biology, self-organization, complexity theory, physics, and the like. Most importantly, I hope to provide a more refined account of natural selection, and prove to the reader that natural selection is still a potent causal force in explaining adaptive complexity. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2010. / Date of Defense: July 1, 2010. / Natural selection, Kauffman, Self-organization, Evo-Devo, Adaptation, Constraint, Darwin / Includes bibliographical references. / Michael Ruse, Ph.D, Professor Directing Dissertation; Matthew Day, Ph.D, Outside Committee Member; Russ M. Dancy, Ph.D, Committee Member.

Many claim that Hannah Arendt's political thought was developed through various stages, and that this development took place through various confrontations with topics such as ideology, totalitarianism and her concerns with the so-called "Jewish question". Arendt's political thought is usually characterized by an early emphasis on the priority of the political over that of the mind. In other words, her work is usually read as emphasizing the priority of the mode of living-with-others; action, over the solitary activity of thinking. This 'early' emphasis on the priority of politics goes hand in hand with her rejection of all transcendent standards or truths in the sphere of politics. Arendt's later writings, which were devoted mainly to the life of the mind, are usually read as a reversal of thought: a priority of thinking over action. Arendt's alleged reversal of thought took place through her witnessing the trial of the war criminal Adolph Eichmann whose crime, Arendt suggested, sprang from the fact of thoughtlessness. Arendt's new emphasis on the priority of thinking is supposedly something for which her early works made no provision. Almost contradicting everything she believed in before, Arendt's new 'political thinking' allows the introduction of truth and transcendental standards into the political realm. I believe that the above interpretation does not do justice to Arendt's political thought. To introduce the distinction between 'early' and 'late' into her works obscures above all the continuity of her thought. I believe that there is a unifying thread that runs through Arendt's main works whether 'early' or 'late.' I call this unifying thread 'political thinking.' Careful analysis of Arendt's 'early' thoughts on politics shows a considerable emphasis on the importance of thinking in relation to politics or action. It is this specific kind of thinking, political thinking, that does justice to both, the demands of the mind on one hand, and the demands of experience on the other. I explore the development of 'political thinking' in Arendt's major writings beginning from her doctoral dissertation on Rahel Varnhagen to her final thoughts on The Life of the Mind. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Degree Awarded: Fall Semester, 2006. / Date of Defense: August 4, 2006. / Theory and practice, Ideology, Zionism, Thinking, Action / Includes bibliographical references. / Peter Dalton, Professor Directing Dissertation; John Kelsay, Outside Committee Member; Russell Dancy, Committee Member.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 32-11, Section: A, page: 6493. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Florida State University, 1971.